K.A. v S.Z.

Supreme Court, Westchester County

Decided on June 18, 2026

Index No. XXXXX

James L. Hyer, J.

The following documents were considered in connection with the motion of the Plaintiff, dated March 20, 2026, (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 1"), seeking the entry of an Order granting the following relief:

1. Granting Plaintiff interim counsel fees pursuant to DRL § 237 in the sum of $200,000; and

2. Granting such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

PAPERS DOC. NO.

Order to Show Cause/Attorney Affirmation/Plaintiff's Affirmation/Exhibits 1-18/ 1-21

Attorney Affirmation/Defendant's Affirmation/Exhibits A-BB/Part 130 Certification 22-52

Relevant Factual and Procedural Background

On July 14, 2025, this matrimonial action by Plaintiff with the filing of a summons with notice seeking the entry of a judgment of divorce dissolving the parties' marriage pursuant to the alleged irretrievable breakdown of the parties' marriage pursuant to New York State Domestic Relations Law (hereinafter "DRL") § 170(7) and seeking other ancillary relief,^FN1 represented by [*2]Mantel McDonough Riso, LLP (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Prior Counsel").

On July 21, 2025, a notice of appearance and demand or complaint^FN2 were filed by Defendant's counsel being Miller Zeiderman, LLP (hereinafter "Defendant's Counsel").

On August 26, 2025, a complaint^FN3 was filed now seeking dissolution of the parties' marriage pursuant to both the alleged irretrievable breakdown of the parties' marriage pursuant to DRL § 170(7) and the alleged adultery of Defendant pursuant to DRL § 170(4); asserting that there are two children of the parties' marriage being: (1) A.Z. (D.O.B.: XX/XX/XXX); and (2) B.Z. (D.O.B.: XX/XX/XXXX) (hereinafter collectively "Children"); seeking legal and physical custody of the Children; and awarding other ancillary relief.

On September 15, 2025, an answer with counterclaim^FN4 was filed wherein Defendant seeks the dissolution of the parties' marriage pursuant to DRL § 170(7); seeking legal and physical custody of the Children; and awarding other ancillary relief.

On September 19, 2025, a request for judicial intervention^FN5 was filed, after which the undersigned was assigned to preside over this action.

On September 22, 2025, a court notice^FN6 was issued scheduling this matter for a preliminary conference.

On October 6, 2025, Defendant's Counsel filed Defendant's statement of net worth;^FN7 and on November 4, 2025, filed Defendant's second statement of net worth (hereinafter "Defendant's SNW").^FN8 Defendant's SNW indicates that both parties are self-employed consultants who each have juris doctor degrees and includes the following financial representations of Defendant as of August 21, 2025: (A) monthly expenses of $55,946.00 (annual $671,352.00) noting, "[d]oes not include expenses for which Husband does not have information and does not include repairs/maintenance for marital residence (Irvington, NY)"; (B) annual income of $501,353.00 asserting the following note "[t]he Husband's current annual income of $425,000 comprised of the following: (1) $300,000/year from a consulting contract with V.S.M., Inc; (2) $75,000/year from a consulting contract with W.G., Inc. (3) $25,000/year from a board seat with I.F. (paid by I.F.; and (4) $25,000/year based on same board seat (paid by C.C.)"; (C) Assets including: (1) cash accounts with a cumulative balance of $13,692.00; (2) two parcels of real property with an undisclosed value; (3) a retirement account valued at $45,232.00; (4) tangible personal property of an undisclosed value including furniture with an original price of $200,000.00, art with an original price of $10,000.00, Rolex watch, and 28 ounces of gold coins; (5) interests in [*3]businesses with an undisclosed value including 25% of C.S.M. LLC, 40-45% of S.L. LLC, 33% of S.S.G. L. LLC, 99% of A.G. 2 LLC, less than 7% of M.U. LLC, and 50% of Z.B. LLC; (6) investment accounts with a cumulative balance of $754,908.00 excluding two which had an undisclosed value; and, (D) liabilities with a cumulative balance of $1,642,591.

While the legal and expert fees portion of the form of Defendant's SNW calls for the inclusion of "the amount you have paid to all lawyers and experts retained in connection with your marital dissolution, including names of professional, amounts and dates paid, and source of funds," none of this information was provided. Instead, and despite being signed by Defendant and certified by her counsel, "Rights Reserved" was inserted. A retainer agreement was annexed to Defendant's SNW (hereinafter "Defendant's Retainer Agreement"), signed by Defendant and Defendant's Counsel, providing the requirement of an initial retainer of $25,000.00 and a trial retainer of no less than $75,000.00, to be billed at attorney rates of $300.00-$795.00 per hour.

On October 6, 2025, Plaintiff's Prior Counsel filed Plaintiff's statement of net worth (hereinafter "Plaintiff's SNW").^FN9 Plaintiff's SNW indicates that Defendant is self-employed while Plaintiff's occupation is listed as "primary caregiver" offering no education information for the parties and includes the following financial representations of Defendant as of August 21, 2025: (A) monthly expenses of $37,499.00 (annual $449,988.00) noting several itemized expenses as "husband has information" and for income tax information noting "see tax returns"; (B) failing to include any stated annual income by including "2023 joint tax return is annexed hereto as Exhibit 1"; (C) Assets including: (1) cash accounts with a cumulative balance of $12,804.74; (2) one parcel of real property with an approximate value of $2,075,000.00; (3) tangible personal property including a vehicle and "various" other items with an undisclosed value; (4) a 5% interests in businesses in A.G. 2 LLC; and, (D) liabilities with a cumulative balance of $1,491,548.23.

While the legal and expert fees portion of the form of Plaintiff's SNW calls for the inclusion of "the amount you have paid to all lawyers and experts retained in connection with your marital dissolution, including names of professional, amounts and dates paid, and source of funds," much of this information was not provided. Instead, and despite being signed by Plaintiff and certified by her counsel, "$25,000 to MMR. Retainer Agreement annexed hereto as Exhibit B" and "$30,000 to Miller Law Group for failed collaborative divorce" was inserted. A retainer agreement was annexed to Plaintiff's SNW (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Retainer Agreement"), signed by Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Prior's Counsel, providing the requirement of an initial retainer of $25,000.00 and a trial retainer of no less than $75,000.00, to be billed at attorney rates of $595.00-$995.00 per hour.

On November 6, 2025, all parties and then counsel appeared for a preliminary conference after which a preliminary conference order^FN10 was entered reflecting that the parties had entered into an interim parenting plan on April 4, 2025; the parties stipulated to proceed with the dissolution of their marriage pursuant to DRL § 170(7); and as custody remained unresolved with certain allegations made that an appointment of an attorney of the children and a forensic evaluator would be made with payment made solely by Defendant subject to reallocation at trial. [*4]A so-ordered transcript from this appearance was filed (hereinafter "11/6/2025 Transcript"),^FN11 which reflects that the parties engaged in oral argument as to the issue of interim legal fees.

Plaintiff's Prior Counsel represented that Plaintiff had no income, with Defendant's Counsel representing that Defendant's annual income to be between $425,000.00 and $500,000.00.^FN12 Plaintiff's Prior Counsel then requested an award of interim legal fees from Defendant in the amount of $150,000.00.^FN13 Defendant's Counsel responded by asserting that her client had provided $21,000.00 towards Plaintiff's legal fees and offering an additional $25,000.00.^FN14 In support of her position, Defendant's counsel confirmed Plaintiff had earned no income as, "she hasn't worked for a long time, but she is fully capable of working at this point," and that, "my client is asking that she actually start to contribute."^FN15 This Court then granted Plaintiff's application to the extent that Defendant was directed to provide to Plaintiff's Prior Counsel $50,000.00 as an for interim legal fees with leave to make additional applications.^FN16

On November 7, 2025, this Court filed the following: (1) so-ordered confidentiality agreement regarding disclosure during the discovery process; (2) so-ordered interim parenting plan; (3) order appointing Joy Joseph, Esq., as the attorney for the parties' youngest child; (3) order appointing Dr. Jonathan Sinowitz, Psy.D., as forensic evaluator.^FN17

On November 21, 2025, a consent to change attorney^FN18 was filed by Dimopoulos Law Firm, P.C. (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Counsel"), advising that they were the incoming counsel for Plaintiff in the place of Plaintiff's Prior Counsel.

On February 6, 2026, a compliance conference was held before the undersigned wherein all parties and counsel appeared, after which an order^FN19 was entered setting forth extended discovery deadlines.

On February 20, 2026, Plaintiff's Counsel filed a letter^FN20 indicating that on consent the parties sought the appointment of a neutral financial expert Sara Nanchantt of SN Forensics, to provide an opinion of value of Defendant's interest in S.L., LLC, C.S.M. LLC, M.U. LLC and A. [*5]G. 2, LLC with analysis of applicable valuation discounts such as lack of marketability/control; and to provide statement and spending analysis for A.G., LLC and its successor, A.G. 2, LLC from January 1, 2022 to the present.

On February 26, 2026, this Court entered an order of appointment^FN21 wherein Sara Nanchantt of SN Forensics was appointed as a neutral financial expert as requested by the parties to be paid a flat fee of $26,000.00 to be paid from marital funds subject to reallocation at trial.

On March 20, 2026, Motion Sequence No. 1 was filed by order to show cause,^FN22 seeking the above-referenced relief, which was conformed, directing: (1) March 23, 2026, be the deadline for service of the motion; (2) April 6, 2026, be the deadline for filing any answering submissions and/or cross motions; (3) April 20, 2026, be the deadline for filing any answering submissions to cross motions filed, being the return date for the motion and any cross motions filed, with no reply submissions accepted or appearances required.^FN23

In support of Plaintiff's application, Plaintiff's Counsel filed an affirmation^FN24 wherein he states that his firm and Plaintiff entered into a retainer agreement (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Current Retainer Agreement"),^FN25 a fully executed copy of which is annexed as exhibit 17 to the application, reflecting an initial retainer of $50,000.00, with attorney billing rates from $700.00 to $850.00 per hour. Plaintiff's Counsel then asserts that:

"Our $50,000 retainer was paid via transfer by prior counsel, Mr. K.M., after having received said sum from S. Z., who was ordered to pay interim counsel fees. Since receiving the initial retainer, this firm has not been paid any further sums because the Plaintiff is without any money, with the exception of the interim maintenance award she receives monthly. The initial retainer was long ago depleted, and my client has incurred legal fees and expenses totaling $100,793.59 (the redacted invoices are attached hereto as Exhibit 18). In addition, my client has work-in-progress totaling $13,490.25 which— together with the charges for drafting this motion— will appear on her April 1, 2026 invoice. At the same time, Defendant has paid his attorneys $143,000, and, upon information and belief, they are not owed any fees."^FN26

On April 9, 2026, answering submissions were filed.^FN27 In opposition to the relief requested Defendant's Counsel initially asserts that the relief should be denied due to the asserted failure of Plaintiff to comply with 22 NYCRR § 202.16(k) due to the submission of a statement of net worth that is inaccurate pointing to the deposition transcript of Plaintiff wherein she [*6]acknowledges that certain information pertaining to expenses are inaccurate after which is has failed to file an updated statement of net worth.^FN28 Defendant's Counsel then claims that the requested attorneys' fees are unreasonable as Defendant has already contributed $104,031.03 to Plaintiff's legal fees, while now seeking $200,000.00, without Plaintiff's Counsel having explained what the fees will be utilized for, that the parties' financial circumstances do not warrant the requested award, and that Plaintiff's behavior has caused the parties to incur significant legal fees.

No additional submissions have been filed pertaining to Motion Sequence No. 1.

Legal Analysis

A. Request for Interim Legal Fee Award.

[1] 22 NYCRR § 202.16(k)(2)

Initially, Defendant's Counsel requests that Plaintiff's application be denied due to Plaintiff's alleged failure to comply with 22 NYCRR § 202.16(k)(2) which requires that "[n]o motion shall be heard unless the moving papers include a statement of net worth in the official form prescribed by subdivision (b) of this section." Defendant's Counsel asserts that while Plaintiff filed a statement of net worth, that the document is outdated and includes inaccurate information pertaining to the expenses listed, directing this Court's attention to Plaintiff's deposition transcript, annexed to Defendant's submission as exhibit B, inclusive of the following inquiry of Plaintiff:

"Q: With regard to your net worth statement, do you believe your net worth statement is currently correct?

A: No, I told you this was —

Q: Have you filled out a new net worth statement?

A: I have not, no.

Q: So, this net worth statement, we agree, is not actually accurate as we sit here today?

. . .

A: I don't think it's one hundred percent accurate. No.

Q: It's not nearly accurate. Some of the expenses have been reduced?

. . .

A: Some of them, yes.

Q: Some of them no longer exist?

A: Yes.

Q: Some of the ones that you've got listed here are expenses that S.Z. has paid for; correct?

A: Some of them, yes."

While it remains required to submit a statement of net worth pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 202.16(k)(2), in concert with DRL § 236(B)(4)(a), when making a motion for interim financial relief, the failure to strictly adhere to this court rule does not automatically result in the denial of the requested relief, but instead requires further examination by the reviewing court. The court must then determine if the movant has engaged in "substantial compliance" with the financial disclosure requirement, which may be effectuated by the filing of a submission other than a [*7]statement of net worth, as noted in one decision by the Appellate Division, First Department wherein it upheld the trial court's decision granting interim legal fees:

"The court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the mother interim counsel fees (see Domestic Relations Law § 237[b]; Matter of Balber v. Zealand, 169 AD3d 500, 500—501, 94 N.Y.S.3d 253 [1st Dept. 2019]). Contrary to the father's contention, the mother's failure to include with her counsel fee application a statement of net worth in the prescribed form (see 22 NYCRR 202.16[k][2]) did not mandate denial of the application as a matter of law. Although 22 NYCRR 202.16(k)(2) provides that a motion for counsel fees shall not be heard "unless the moving papers include a statement of net worth in the official form prescribed by subdivision (b) of this section," subdivision (b) states that statements of net worth need only be in 'substantial compliance' with the prescribed form (22 NYCRR 202.16[b]). The financial disclosure affidavit submitted by the mother substantially complied with the official form. The father's contention that the mother's failure to submit pertinent information precluded the court from accurately assessing the parties' financial disparity in awarding counsel fees is unavailing, especially in view of Family Court's finding that the financial information provided was 'undisputed' and 'sufficient' for the court to render a decision. Further, the father has not pointed to any additional information that would have been necessary for the court to make an informed ruling on the mother's application" (Matter of Antoine L. v. Virginie F., 212 AD3d 502 [1st Dept 2023]).

Just last year, the Appellate Division, First Department, rendered a decision echoing its earlier position set forth in Matter of Antoine L., that a movant may comply with the required financial disclosure in the context of a motion for interim financial relief, by engaging in substantial compliance by filing either the form statement of net worth or a "comparable statement" with the necessary information, going even further to note that the trial court maintains the discretion to dispense with the requirement upon a showing of good cause:

"The motion court appropriately exercised its discretionary denial of the father's applications for attorney's fees. The father failed to include the required statement of net worth, or comparable statement evidencing his income in either of his applications as required pursuant to Domestic Relations Law §§ 237, 238 and 22 NYCRR 202.16(k)(2) (see Lek v. Lek, 232 AD3d 547, 547, 221 N.Y.S.3d 70 [1st Dept. 2024], lv dismissed 43 NY3d 926, 229 N.Y.S.3d 102, 254 N.E.3d 646 [2025]; Trevino v. Pray, 217 AD3d 592, 593, 192 N.Y.S.3d 63 [1st Dept. 2023]). Nor was there good cause shown by the father establishing why the court should dispense with that requirement (see Levy v. Levy, 272 AD2d 207, 208, 708 N.Y.S.2d 292 [1st Dept. 2000]). Furthermore, the record before the motion court was devoid of any *404 evidence which it could have considered to be in 'substantial compliance' with the prescribed statement of net worth form (22 NYCRR 202.16[b]; Antoine L. v. Virginie F., 212 AD3d 502, 183 N.Y.S.3d 71 [1st Dept. 2023])" (Milchin v. Milchin, 244 AD3d 420 [1st Dept 2025]).

It has been determined that the burden for substantial compliance will not be determined to have been met if the movant's submissions do not reflect the party's current financial situation through the filing of a current statement of net worth or most recently filed income tax return:

"The court improperly granted plaintiff husband's application for interim relief by [*8]directing defendant wife to pay a percentage of certain child support add-on expenses, effectively modifying the parties' financial agreement and judgment of divorce before the anticipated financial hearing. The court made this determination notwithstanding the husband's failure to attach a current sworn statement of net worth as required by 22 NYCRR 202.16(k)(2) and his failure to provide his most recently filed tax returns or any financial documentation (see Neufeld v. Neufeld, 135 AD3d 570, 570, 22 N.Y.S.3d 854 [1st Dept. 2016]). The husband's argument that the net worth statements he submitted in 2015 and 2018, neither of which were annexed to this application, satisfied the statutory requirement is unavailing. He filed the instant application six years after he submitted his most recent net worth statement and does not attest that *529 either statement reflects his current financial situation" (Molner v. Molner, 243 AD3d 528 [1st Dept 2025]).

Upon receipt of an application for financial relief, the reviewing court must be presented with financial information sufficient to evaluate movant's finances (see D'Ambra v. D'Ambra, 225 AD3d 662 [2d Dept 2024]).

Turning to the issue of what is required to find substantial compliance as set forth in 22 NYCRR § 202.16(k)(2), attention must be provided to 22 NYCRR § 202.16(b)(2), which sets forth the rule pertaining to the form of statements of net worth providing, "[s]worn statements of net worth, except as provided in subdivision (k) of this section, exchanged and filed with the court pursuant to section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law, shall be in substantial compliance with the Statement of Net Worth form contained in appendix A of this section." Review of the form included in the aforementioned appendix lists eight separate categories of information including: (1) family data (including 9 items of requested information); (2) expenses (including 101 items of requested information); (3) income (including 22 items of requested information); (4) assets (including requested information for 13 categories of assets); (5) liabilities (including requested information for 9 categories of liabilities); (6) assets transferred; (7) legal & expert fees; and, (8) other data. The form notes on the last page that required attachments include, "Retainer Agreement; most recent W-2, 1099s, K1s, Income Tax Returns, and Two Most Recent Paystubs, Any Written Agreements between the Parties (Prenuptial, Postnuptial, Separation, etc.)."

In support of the instant application, Plaintiff's SNW was annexed as exhibit 1 wherein the document indicates that the information is accurate as of July 20, 2025; was signed by Plaintiff and notarized on August 25, 2025; was certified by Plaintiff's Prior Counsel; and includes exhibits inclusive of income tax returns and a retainer agreement from Plaintiff's Prior Counsel. While Defendant's Counsel asserts that the document is inaccurate and outdated, the only inaccuracies set forth in Defendant's answering submissions pertain to certain delineated expenses and make no mention of any other portions of the document or required attachments. This appears to be an acknowledgement by Defendant that seven of the eight areas of requested information were not inaccurate and that the required records to be annexed to Plaintiff's SNW were in fact included. Accordingly, this Court finds that with the filing of Plaintiff's SNW, Plaintiff engaged in substantial compliance as set forth in 22 NYCRR § 202.16(k)(2).

[2] Request for Interim Legal Fees

DRL § 237(a) provides authority of a trial court to enter an award of counsel fees and expenses in the context of a matrimonial action providing:

"In any action or proceeding brought (1) to annul a marriage or to declare the nullity of a [*9]void marriage, or (2) for a separation, or (3) for a divorce, or (4) to declare the validity or nullity of a judgment of divorce rendered against a spouse who was the defendant in any action outside the State of New York and did not appear therein where such spouse asserts the nullity of such foreign judgment, (5) to obtain maintenance or distribution of property following a foreign judgment of divorce, or (6) to enjoin the prosecution in any other jurisdiction of an action for a divorce, the court may direct either spouse or, where an action for annulment is maintained after the death of a spouse, may direct the person or persons maintaining the action, to pay counsel fees and fees and expenses of experts directly to the attorney of the other spouse to enable the other party to carry on or defend the action or proceeding as, in the court's discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse. In exercising the court's discretion, the court shall seek to assure that each party shall be adequately represented and that where fees and expenses are to be awarded, they shall be awarded on a timely basis, pendente lite, so as to enable adequate representation from the commencement of the proceeding. Applications for the award of fees and expenses may be made at any time or times prior to final judgment. Both parties to the action or proceeding and their respective attorneys, shall file an affidavit with the court detailing the financial agreement between the party and the attorney. Such affidavit shall include the amount of any retainer, the amounts paid and still owing thereunder, the hourly amount charged by the attorney, the amounts paid, or to be paid, any experts, and any additional costs, disbursements or expenses. An unrepresented litigant shall not be required to file such an affidavit detailing fee arrangements when making an application for an award of counsel fees and expenses; provided he or she has submitted an affidavit that he or she is unable to afford counsel with supporting proof, including a statement of net worth, and, if available, W-2 statements and income tax returns for himself or herself. Any applications for fees and expenses may be maintained by the attorney for either spouse in his or her own name in the same proceeding. Payment of any retainer fees to the attorney for the petitioning party shall not preclude any awards of fees and expenses to an applicant which would otherwise be allowed under this section."

The Court of Appeals artfully set forth the legislative intent of DRL § 237(a) to ensure that both parties to a matrimonial litigation would have equal access to funds needed to litigate their case:

"This enactment, which has deep statutory roots, is designed to redress the economic disparity between the monied spouse and the non-monied spouse. Recognizing that the financial strength of matrimonial litigants is often unequal—working most typically against the wife— ***10 the Legislature invested Trial Judges with the discretion to make the more affluent spouse pay for legal expenses of the needier one. The courts are to see to it that the matrimonial scales of justice are not unbalanced by the weight of the wealthier litigant's wallet. Domestic Relations Law § 237(a) marks our present place in a long legislative and decisional law journey that carries us to our result.

* * *

When the Legislature lifted the ban against awarding fees for past legal services it acted on the expressed intent that counsel fee allowances be accorded greater flexibility and [*10]judicial discretion (Report of Joint Legis. Comm. on Matrimonial & Family Laws, 1963 N.Y.Legis. Doc. No. 34, at 89).

In transferring the counsel fee provisions from Civil Practice Act § 1169 to Domestic Relations Law § 237(a) the Legislature also deleted the word "necessary" from the statute, removing any requirement or interpretation (see, e.g., Lake v. Lake, 194 NY 179, 87 N.E. 87) that the less affluent spouse be entirely spent down before being entitled to counsel fees. This advanced the objective that marital litigation is best shaped not by the power of the bankroll but by the power of the evidence. The enactment broadened the discretion of the court, enabling Judges to award counsel fees as justice required, according to the respective circumstances of the parties. In applying Domestic Relations Law § 237, courts have also relieved the less affluent spouse of the need to show a likelihood of success as a strict predicate to a counsel fee award. The award is now measured by circumstances and discretion, irrespective of the outcome at trial (see, e.g., Cassese v. Cassese, 197 AD2d 605, 602 N.Y.S.2d 667)" (O'Shea v. O'Shea, 93 NY2d 187 [1999]).

Where a movant seeks to obtain an award for payment of expert witness fees, the reviewing court must be provided with sufficient information in order for a determination to be made granting such relief as noted by the Appellate Division, Second Department upholding a trial court denial of such an award:

"The award of expert witness fees in a matrimonial action is left to the sound **339 discretion of the trial court, but such awards should not be made routinely (see O'Donnell v. O'Donnell, 2 AD3d 604, 769 N.Y.S.2d 282). They should be made upon a detailed showing of the services to be rendered and the estimated time involved (id.; see Ahern v. Ahern, 94 AD2d 53, 58, 463 N.Y.S.2d 238). Absent affidavits from the expert witnesses at issue, the Supreme Court lacks a sufficient basis to grant a motion for the award of such fees (id.; see Corrao v. Corrao, 209 AD2d 573, 574, 619 N.Y.S.2d 647). Here, the wife concedes that she failed to submit such an expert affidavit. Thus, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of her motion which was for an award of an expert's fee" (Avello v. Avello, 72 AD3d 850 [2d Dept 2010]).

With respect to an application for interim counsel fees, such an award may be made without the court conducting a full evidentiary hearing (see Isaacs v. Isaacs, 71 AD3d 951 [2d Dept 2010]; see also Singer v. Singer, 16 AD3d 666 [2d Dept 2005]), while a final determination as to counsel fees must be made following an evidentiary hearing, unless the parties enter into a stipulation waving same (see MacKay v. Bencal, 230 AD3d 691 [2d Dept 2024]; see also Potvin v. Potvin, 193 AD3d 995 [2d Dept 2021]; Ader v. Ader, 205 AD3d 637 [1st Dept 2022]). Following the filing of a DRL § 237(a) application, a determination shall include a finding if the movant is eligible to receive an award of counsel fees and/or expert fees, and if so, the amount of such award and the manner of payment (i.e. lump sum by a date certain or through installments) (see Miklos v. Miklos, 21 AD3d 353 [2d Dept 2005]).

Such a request must be based upon a movant's evidenced inability to pay which may be awarded in the discretion of the trial court, even without such a specific request being made (see Cook v. Cook, 95 AD2d 768 [2d Dept 1983]), and will be determined to be made timely if made prior to the entry of a final judgment (see O'Connor v. O'Connor, 89 AD3d 703 [2d Dept 2011]). [*11]The Appellate Division, Second Department has set forth the manner within which a party may seek an award of counsel fees on both an interim basis, as well as through a final award:

"In a divorce action, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 237(a), counsel who represents a nonmonied spouse may seek interim counsel fees from the monied spouse (see O'Connor v. O'Connor, 89 AD3d 703, 704, 932 N.Y.S.2d 147). The purpose of an award of interim counsel fees is to ensure that the less monied spouse will be able to litigate the action on equal footing with the *743 monied spouse (see Calderon v. Esenova, 132 AD3d 711, 713, 18 N.Y.S.3d 627; Prichep v. Prichep, 52 AD3d 61, 65, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667). In determining whether to award final counsel fees at the end of trial, a more detailed inquiry is warranted and the court must 'review the financial circumstances of both parties together with all the other circumstances of the case, which may include the relative merit of the parties' positions' (DeCabrera v. Cabrera—Rosete, 70 NY2d 879, 881, 524 N.Y.S.2d 176, 518 N.E.2d 1168; see Prichep v. Prichep, 52 AD3d at 64—65, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667; Ciampa v. Ciampa, 47 AD3d 745, 748, 850 N.Y.S.2d 190). The court may also consider whether either party has engaged in conduct or taken positions resulting in a delay of the proceedings or unnecessary litigation (see Prichep v. Prichep, 52 AD3d at 64—65, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667; Timpone v. Timpone, 28 AD3d 646, 646, 813 N.Y.S.2d 752; Morrissey v. Morrissey, 259 AD2d 472, 473, 686 N.Y.S.2d 71). At that point, the court is in the best position to determine whether counsel fees should be charged to the moneyed spouse, or charged to the less moneyed spouse as an offset against the equitable distribution award ultimately received, or divided between the parties (see Prichep v. Prichep, 52 AD3d at 66, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667)" (Duval v. Duval, 144 AD3d 739 [2d Dept 2016]; see also Samini v. Samini, 134 AD3d 1010 [2d Dep 2015]; Patanella v. Keveney, 145 AD3d 2016]; O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 139 AD3d 1027 [2d Dept 2016]).

Following a determination that a party seeking an award pursuant to DRL § 237(a) is eligible for an award the amount of the award must be fixed and as noted in one decision, "[i]n determining reasonable compensation for an attorney, a court will consider the following factors: 'time and labor required, the difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to handle the problems presented; the lawyer's experience, ability and reputation; the amount involved and benefit resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee charged by the Bar for similar services; the contingency or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the responsibility involved' (Matter of Freeman, 34 NY2d 1, 9, 355 N.Y.S.2d 336, 311 N.E.2d 480)" (Steiger v. Dweck, 305 AD2d 475 [2d Dept 2003]). Central to this analysis is examination of "the nature and extent of those services which are required to deal with the marital dispute, and the reasonableness of their performance under the circumstances" (Barnes v. Barnes, 54 AD2d 963 [2d Dept 1976]). It has been recognized that, "[t]he determination of what constitutes reasonable counsel fees is committed, in the first instance, to the sound discretion of the trial court, which is in a far "superior position to **785 judge those factors integral to the fixing of counsel fees, such as the time, effort and skill required" (Feldman v. Feldman, 194 AD2d 207 [2d Dept 1993]).

To the extent that a movant fails to provide the reviewing court with information sufficient to review the nature and extent of services provided by their counsel, it is a reversible error to grant such an award as reflected in one decision by the Appellate Division, Second Department:

"The defendant correctly contends, however, that the Supreme Court erred in awarding the plaintiff counsel fees and expenses in the sum of $12,000. The record is devoid of proof regarding the amount of time the plaintiff's attorney spent on the **685 case, the hourly rate for such time, or the nature and extent of the services rendered to the plaintiff (see, Domestic Relations Law § 237[a] ). In light of this absence, the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff $12,000 in counsel fees and expenses since she failed to establish her entitlement thereto (see, Beece v. Beece, 289 AD2d 352, 734 N.Y.S.2d 606; Chadwick v. Chadwick, 256 AD2d 1211, 684 N.Y.S.2d 119; Matthews v. Matthews, 238 AD2d 926, 661 N.Y.S.2d 115; Moses v. Moses, 231 AD2d 850, 647 N.Y.S.2d 318)" (Mazzone v. Mazzone, 290 AD2d 495 [2d Dept 2002]).

When seeking an award of attorneys' fees, the movant must provide the reviewing court with the information needed to engage in the above-referenced analysis including through the submission of itemized billing statements as proof of the attorneys' fees incurred, both to demonstrate substantial compliance with 22 NYCRR § 1400.2 and § 1400.3, and to establish the "extent and value of [the] services" rendered (see Yakobowitz v. Yakobowicz, 217 AD3d 733 [2d Dept 2023]). As noted in one decision made by the Appellate Division, Second Department:

"Although the amount of the award is a matter within the discretion of the Supreme Court, in seeking an award of attorneys' fees, an attorney must submit documentation showing the legal services performed, such as time records or a breakdown of services, and the time spent on each service (see **172 Marshall v. Marshall, 1 AD3d 323, 324, 767 N.Y.S.2d 54; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 300 AD2d 645, 646, 753 N.Y.S.2d 106)" (A.K. v. T.K., 150 AD3d 1091 [2d Dept 2017]; see also Zelenka v. Hertz, 230 AD3d 539 [2d Dept 2024]; Hughes v. Hughes, 208 AD2d 502 [2d Dept 1994]; Wolf v. Wolf, 146 AD2d 527 [1st Dept 1989]).

As it has been held that attorney retainer agreements are not privileged they may be filed with an application made pursuant to DRL § 237(a), along with billing statements filed as a hard copy submission as they may include privileged information (see 22 NYCRR § 202.5; see also 22 NYCRR § 202.5-bb(c)(3); 202.6-b(D)(1)(iv); 22 NYCR § 202.8-a; 22 NYCRR § 20.16-b). These documents may then be reviewed in camera by the reviewing court to redact any portions found to be privileged prior to the court filing same, after all parties have been afforded the opportunity to be heard and a written finding of good cause of any sealing/redactions is entered (see De La Roche v. De La Roche, 209 AD2d 157 [1st Dept 1994]; see also Cheng v. Chan, 2018 WL 5905271 [Sup. Ct. NY Cnty 2018]; Mancheski v. Gabelli Group Capital Partners, 39 AD3d 499 [2d Dept 2007]; Danco Laboratories, Ltd. v. Chemical Works of Gedeon Richter, Ltd., 27 AD2d 1 [1st Dept 2000]; 22 NYCRR § 20.16-1).

Here, Plaintiff's Counsel filed an affirmation (hereinafter "Affirmation of Plaintiff's Counsel"), wherein he asserts the following with respect to the legal services rendered by his office in this action on behalf of Plaintiff:

"I am Managing Partner of the law firm Dimopoulos Law Firm P.C., attorneys for Plaintiff, K.A. ("Plaintiff"). I make this Affirmation in support of Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause requesting an Order (i) granting Plaintiff interim counsel fees in the sum of $200,000 and (ii) granting such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper. For a comprehensive account of the legal fees and expenses the Plaintiff has been [*12]compelled to incur in this protracted litigation, the Court is respectfully referred to the Plaintiff's Affirmation. This firm was retained by the Plaintiff on November 17, 2025. A copy of our retainer agreement is annexed hereto as Exhibit 17. Our $50,000 retainer was paid via transfer by prior counsel, Mr. K.M., after having received said sum from S.Z., who was ordered to pay interim counsel fees. Since receiving the initial retainer, this firm has not been paid any further sums because the Plaintiff is without any money, with the exception of the interim maintenance award she receives monthly. The initial retainer was long ago depleted, and my client has incurred legal fees and expenses totaling $100,793.59 (the redacted invoices are attached hereto as Exhibit 18). In addition, my client has work-in-progress totaling $13,490.2 which— together with the charges for drafting this motion— will appear on her April 1, 2026 invoice.

* * *

As outlined above, the services rendered and the fees incurred by the Plaintiff have been reasonable, necessary, and fully justified by the experience and expertise required for this litigation."^FN29

A review of the billing statements referenced in the Affirmation of Plaintiff's Counsel as exhibit 18 include two invoices being: (1) invoice #1198; dated February 2, 2026, for services rendered from November 17, 2025 through February 6, 2026 (hereinafter "Invoice #1"); and invoice #1242; dated March 7, 2026, for services rendered from February 3, 3036 through February 26, 2026 (hereinafter Invoice #2) (hereinafter collectively "Plaintiff Invoices"). This Court will review each in turn. With respect to Invoice #1, the document is separated into two sections, the first pertaining to services rendered for which Plaintiff was charged and the second for which no charge was made. As to the first section, 199 billing entries were included of which 89 were redacted in whole or in part, while the section included 121 billing entries all of which were entirely redacted. Similarly, Invoice #2 is separated into two sections, the first pertaining to services rendered for which Plaintiff was charged and the second for which no charge was made. As to the first section, 75 billing entries were included of which 38 were redacted in whole or in part, while the section included 15 billing entries 13 entirely redacted and the remaining 2 were partially redacted. Cumulatively, of the 410 billing entries of both invoices, only 147 were unredacted.

The redaction of the Plaintiff Invoices, without submission of an unredacted hard-copy submission to this Court for in camera review, has prevented this Court from engaging in the analysis of the services rendered for Plaintiff by Plaintiff's Counsel required upon receipt of a request for an award pursuant to DRL § 237(a). Moreover, while Plaintiff's Counsel asserts that separate and apart from the work invoiced totaling $100,793.59, services rendered as "work-in-progress" totals $13,490.25, but this Court was not presented with information pertaining to the nature of such services or the manner in which those alleged services are being charged. Finally, the total legal fees and expenses in the Plaintiff Invoices total $100,793.59 and the amount asserted for work-in-progress services total $13,490.25, which equates to 114,283.84. Therefore, as Plaintiff requests an interim counsel fee award of $200,000, it appears that Plaintiff is seeking an additional $85,716.16 for future anticipated services to be rendered. However, this Court was [*13]not provided with a detailed itemization of such anticipated services, the time projected to be expended for such unknown future services, and the amount to be charged for same.

This Court recognizes that it has discretion to grant, in-part, an interim fee application pursuant to DRL § 237(a) wherein the moving party provides some but not all of the necessary proofs required to substantiate such application (see In re Dean E.H. v. Deborah R., 181 AD3d 536 [1st Dept 2020] [granting $60,000 of the respondent's $85,000 fee application pursuant to DRL § 237, when a portion of the billing statements submitted to the court included a "mistake in the redaction", with the remaining statements being considered for the award] see also A.K. v. T.K. 150 AD3d 1091 [2d Dept 2017] [granting the movant $75,000 of the total $150,000 requested as an interim counsel fee award, based on the fact that certain amounts were not supported within the papers]). However, in the case at bar, this Court declines to exercise such discretion in awarding fragmented interim counsel fees in a piecemeal manner for the time period wherein charges were incurred in Plaintiff's Invoices. Instead, this Court determines that a total review of all relevant billing statements in unredacted form, and any other relevant supports for such interim fee application would provide the most fair and equitable outcome to the parties, with such determination also being made in the interest of judicial economy to the extent such a fragmented decision would likely invite further motion practice and confusion relating to which portions of Plaintiff Invoices were considered in the award and which were not. In fact, it would be wholly inappropriate for this Court to grant relief regarding only the unredacted portions of Plaintiff's Invoices, as this Court would not be able to determine the reasonableness of the value of those services rendered without taking into consideration the full scope of legal services provided as a whole. As a result, a denial of this application without prejudice is the more appropriate outcome so that the Court can make a full and informed decision within one order.

Based upon the foregoing, this Court has not been provided ample information to conduct a review of the necessary documentation in order to make a determination under DRL § 237(a) and must deny Plaintiff's application without prejudice.

B. Other Relief.

To the extent relief is not granted or otherwise addressed herein, it is hereby denied.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Motion Sequence No. 1 is hereby denied without prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that by June 22, 2026, Plaintiff's Counsel shall serve all counsel of record via NYSCEF filing with a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry, and by that date shall file a copy of same with proof of service; and it is further

ORDERED that to the extent any relief requested has not been granted or otherwise addressed herein, it is hereby denied.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: June 18, 2026

White Plains, New York

ENTER:

HON. JAMES L. HYER, J.S.C.