Supreme Court, Westchester County

Decided on June 24, 2026

Index No. XXXXX

James L. Hyer, J.

[*1]

Relevant Factual and Procedural History

On June 20, 2025, this matrimonial action was commenced with the filing of a summons with notice (hereinafter "Summons"),^FN1 seeking the dissolution of the parties' marriage pursuant to the asserted irretrievable breakdown of their relationship pursuant to New York State Domestic Relations Law (hereinafter "DRL") § 170(7), along with other ancillary relief. Simultaneously with the filing of the Summons, Plaintiff's counsel filed the following documents: (1) notice concerning continuation of health care coverage; (2) notice of automatic orders; and (3) notice of guideline maintenance (hereinafter collectively "DRL Notices").^FN2

On July 9, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel filed proof of service^FN3 of the Summons and DRL Notices on Defendant by personal service on July 9, 2025.

On February 26, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel filed a preliminary conference request with a [*2]request for judicial intervention and proof of service of same upon Defendant.^FN4

On March 2, 2026, a court notice was issued advising that the undersigned was assigned to preside over this action and a preliminary conference was scheduled to be held on March 19, 2026, at 2:00 p.m., wherein all parties and counsel were directed to appear in person,^FN5 for which Plaintiff's counsel filed proof of service on Defendant on March 2, 2026.^FN6

On March 19, 2026, a conference was held before the undersigned wherein appearances were made by Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel with no appearance made by Defendant who did not request an adjournment of the conference, after which an inquest scheduling order (hereinafter "Inquest Scheduling Order")^FN7 was entered providing the following directives:

"ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY:

ORDERED that the Defendant is in default; and it is hereby

ORDERED that an Inquest shall be held on April 24, 2026, at 9:00 a.m., wherein all parties and counsel must appear in-person to address all of the issues pending before this Court pertaining to this action, including but not limited to: (1) grounds for dissolution of the parties' marriage; (2) equitable distribution of marital property; (3) declaration of separate property; (4) claims of dissipation; (5) spousal support and maintenance; (6) child custody, access and support; (7) resumption of pre-marriage surnames; (8) attorneys' fees and litigation expense requests; and (9) any other issues arising out of the requested dissolution of the parties' marriage; and it is further

ORDERED that by April 17, 2026, both parties shall file with the Court and serve upon each other via overnight traceable delivery, with proof of service filed the same date, the following: (1) Witness List for all witnesses to provide testimony at the Inquest with the understanding that if witnesses are not disclosed they will precluded from testifying at the Inquest; (2) an updated Statement of Net Worth with all necessary supporting documentation; and, (3) Exhibit List with copies of all exhibits to be utilized at the Inquest with the understanding that if disclosure is not made pursuant to this directive exhibits will be precluded at Inquest; and it is further

ORDERED that by March 23, 2026, Plaintiff shall serve Defendant with a copy of this Order with Notice of Entry on Defendant via certified mail return receipt requested, and regular mail and file proof of service with the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall order a copy of the Court Transcript, pay the entire cost of [*3]same and submit to the Court to be so ordered by April 20, 2026.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court."

On March 23, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel filed a notice of entry of Inquest Scheduling Order with proof of service of same on Defendant.^FN8

On April 17, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel filed the following pre-inquest disclosure: (1) witness list enumerating Plaintiff as the sole witness to provide testimony at inquest; and, (2) proposed exhibits A-P.^FN9 On that date, Plaintiff also filed a verified complaint asserting that the parties had been married in a civil ceremony on September 28, 2000; and had two children being: (1) B.W. (D.O.B.: XX/XX/XXXX) (hereinafter "B.W."); and (2) S.W. (D.O.B.: XX/XX/XXXX) (hereinafter "S.W.") (hereinafter collectively "Children"); and, that Plaintiff resides at, [Redacted] Ossining, New Yok 10562 (hereinafter "Marital Domicile").^FN10

On April 22, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel filed a note of issue and certificate of readiness for trial.^FN11

On April 23, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel filed a statement of proposed disposition, and filed an amended statement of proposed disposition on April 24, 2026 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Statement of Proposed Disposition").^FN12

Plaintiff filed no further pre-inquest disclosure, and Defendant failed to file any pre-inquest disclosure.

Inquest

On April 24, 2026, an inquest was held before the undersigned wherein appearances were made by Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel, with Defendant failing to appear or request an adjournment. Having been presented with proof of service of the Inquest Scheduling Order on Defendant, this Court proceeded with the inquest in the absence of Defendant, during which Plaintiff was the only witness to present testimony. A court transcript of the inquest was filed (hereinafter "Inquest Transcript"),^FN13 which reflects that Plaintiff's Exhibits A-V were moved into evidence and filed.^FN14

Legal Analysis

A. Witness Credibility.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, has held that the determination of witness credibility is to be determined by the trier of fact:

"The credibility of the witnesses, the reconciliation of conflicting statements, a determination of which should be accepted and which rejected, the truthfulness and accuracy of the testimony, whether contradictory or not, were issues for the trier of the facts. The memory, motive, mental capacity, accuracy of observation and statement, truthfulness and other tests of the reliability of witnesses can be passed upon with greater safety by a trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses than by appellate judges who simply read the printed record" (Barnet v. Cannizzaro, 3 AD2d 745 [2d Dept 1957] [internal citations omitted]).

It has been recognized that in the context of matrimonial proceedings, "[s]ince the court had the opportunity to view the demeanor of the witnesses at the hearing, it was in the best position to gauge their credibility, and its resolution of credibility issues is entitled to great deference on appeal" (Lieberman v. Lieberman, 21 AD3d 1004 [2d Dept 2005] [internal citations omitted]).

Based upon the demeanor and substance of the testimony of Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff is a credible witness. The Court made this determination based upon an assessment of the Plaintiff's character, temperament and sincerity. During the inquest, Plaintiff provided responses to all questions presented to her in a clear and direct manner.

B. Plaintiff's Request that a judgment be entered granting Plaintiff a divorce in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant, dissolving forever the bonds of matrimony existing between Plaintiff and Defendant upon the grounds of the Irretrievable Breakdown of the Relationship pursuant to DRL § 170(7).

Pursuant to DRL § 170(7):

"An action for divorce may be maintained by a husband or wife to procure a judgment divorcing the parties and dissolving the marriage on any of the following grounds:

* * *

(7) The relationship between husband and wife has broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months, provided that one party has so stated under oath. No judgment of divorce shall be granted under this subdivision unless and until the economic issues of equitable distribution of marital property, the payment or waiver of spousal support, the payment of child support, the payment of counsel and experts' fees and expenses as well as the custody and visitation with the infant children of the marriage have been resolved by the parties, or determined by the court and incorporated into the judgment of divorce."

A spouse's statement under oath that the marriage was irretrievably broken for a period of six months is, by itself, sufficient to establish a cause of action for divorce as a matter of law (see Hoffer-Adou v. Adou, 121 AD3d 618 [1st Dept 2014]).

At inquest, Plaintiff testified that the parties had married in the State of Hawaii in a civil ceremony on September 28, 2000; after which there were two issue of the marriage being the Children; and, that the parties had been separated for approximately eight years following [*4]Defendant vacating the Marital Domicile on December 1, 2017.^FN15

Based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the testimony and evidence received at the inquest, this Court determines that Plaintiff credibly testified that the parties' relationship has irretrievably broken down for a period in excess of six months prior to the commencement of this action. Accordingly, Plaintiff's request is granted to the extent that a judgment of divorce shall be entered in her favor and against Defendant, dissolving forever the bonds of matrimony of the parties, due to the irretrievable breakdown of the relationship of the parties for a period in excess of six months pursuant to DRL § 170(7).

C. Plaintiff's Requests Pertaining to Equitable Distribution of Marital Assets, Declaration of Separate Property and Allocation of Debts.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, has noted the manner in which a trial court is to make a determination as to equitable distribution in the context of a matrimonial action:

"The Equitable Distribution Law mandates that, whenever a marriage is terminated, absent an agreement of the parties, the court must determine the rights of the parties in their separate and marital property and provide for the disposition of the property in the final judgment (see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][a]). In determining the equitable distribution of marital property, the court is required to consider 14 specific factors and may take into account any other factor the court finds just and proper (see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][d]). The court is obligated to render a decision in which it sets forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision, a requirement that cannot be waived (see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][g]). In the absence of express findings of fact and of a detailed discussion of the enumerated factors, meaningful appellate review is precluded and a remittal for further fact finding may be required (see Gape v. Gape, 110 AD2d 621, 487 N.Y.S.2d 111; see also Kluge v. Kluge, 159 AD2d 968, 552 N.Y.S.2d 771). Facts must be sufficiently developed at trial to enable a reasoned determination of the issues of equitable distribution and, if not, a new trial may be ordered (see Madu v. Madu, 135 AD3d 836, 837, 24 N.Y.S.3d 678; McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 74 AD3d 911, 915, 903 N.Y.S.2d 467)" (Kaufman v. Kaufman, 189 AD3d 31 [2d Dept. 2020]).

DRL § 236[B][5] notes, in part, that:

"b. Separate property shall remain such.

c. Marital property shall be distributed equitably between the parties, considering the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties.

d. In determining an equitable disposition of property under paragraph c, the court shall consider:

(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the time of the commencement of the action;

(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;

(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects;

(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage as of the date of dissolution;

(5) the loss of health insurance benefits upon dissolution of the marriage;

(6) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;

(7) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other party. The court shall not consider as marital property subject to distribution the value of a spouse's enhanced earning capacity arising from a license, degree, celebrity goodwill, or career enhancement. However, in arriving at an equitable division of marital property, the court shall consider the direct or indirect contributions to the development during the marriage of the enhanced earning capacity of the other spouse;

(8) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;

(9) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;

(10) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party;

(11) the tax consequences to each party;

(12) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse;

(13) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration;

(14) whether either party has committed an act or acts of domestic violence, as described in subdivision one of section four hundred fifty-nine-a of the social services law, against the other party and the nature, extent, duration and impact of such act or acts;

(15) in awarding the possession of a companion animal, the court shall consider the best interest of such animal. "Companion animal", as used in this subparagraph, shall have the same meaning as in subdivision five of section three hundred fifty of the agriculture and markets law; and

(16) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.

e. In any action in which the court shall determine that an equitable distribution is appropriate but would be impractical or burdensome or where the distribution of an interest in a business, corporation or profession would be contrary to law, the court in lieu of such equitable distribution shall make a distributive award in order to achieve equity between the parties. The court in its discretion, also may make a distributive award to supplement, facilitate or effectuate a distribution of marital property.

f. In addition to the disposition of property as set forth above, the court may make such order regarding the use and occupancy of the marital home and its household effects as provided in section two hundred thirty-four of this chapter, without regard to the form of ownership of such property.

g. In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall set forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision and such may not be waived by either party or counsel."

It is further appropriate for the Court to allocate responsibility for the payment of debts between the parties involved in a matrimonial action (see Goddard v. Goddard, 256 AD2d 545 [2d Dept 1998]; see also Dellafiora v. Dellafiora, 54 AD3d 715 [2d Dept 2008]).

The Court is not required to engage in a "point-by-point catechistic discussion" of each factor under DRL § 236(B)(5)(d) (see Sykes v. Sykes, 43 Misc 3d 1220[A] [Sup. Ct. New York Cnty. 2014]). "There is no requirement that the distribution of each item of marital property be made on an equal basis (see DeSouza—Brown v. Brown, 71 AD3d at 946, 897 N.Y.S.2d 228; Peritore v. Peritore, 66 AD3d 750, 752-753, 888 N.Y.S.2d 72; Griggs v. Griggs, 44 AD3d 710, 713, 844 N.Y.S.2d 351)" (Baumgardner v. Baumgardner, 98 AD3d 929, 931 [2d Dept 2012]).

Initially, the court must first determine what the assets are (Fields v. Fields, 15 NY3d 158, 161 [2010] ["[T]he initial determination of whether a particular asset is marital or separate property is a question of law, subject to plenary review on appeal"]). Marital property is defined to include, "all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before...the commencement of the matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held" (DRL § 236[B][1][c]). Alternatively, "property acquired before marriage or property acquired by bequest, devise, or descent, or gift from a party other than the spouse" is defined as separate property (DRL § 236(B)[1](d)[1]). Importantly, relevant case law dictates that the term "marital property" is to be broadly construed, while "separate property" is to be narrowly construed (see Judson v. Judson, 255 AD2d 656 [3d Dept 1988] citing Price v. Price, 69 NY2d 8 [1986]; see also Farag v. Farag, 4 AD3d 502 [2d Dept 2004]).

"Hence, the law favors the inclusion of property within the marital estate . . . and, accordingly, the party seeking to establish that a particular item is indeed separate property bears the burden of proof" (see A.C. v. J.O., 40 Misc 3d 1236(A) [Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty 2013]; compare DRL § 236[B][1][c] and [d]; see Burns v. Burns, 84 NY2d 369 [1994]; Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 NY2d 481 [1984]; LeRoy v. LeRoy, 274 AD2d 362 [1st Dept 2000], citing Seidman v. Seidman, 226 AD2d 1011 [3d Dept 1996]; Heine v. Heine, 176 AD2d 77 [1st Dept 1992]).

"Although in a marriage of long duration where both parties have made significant [*5]contributions to the marriage, a division of marital assets should be made as equal as possible, there is no requirement distribution of each item of marital property be made on an equal basis" (Chalif v. Chalif, 298 AD2d 348, 349 [2d Dept 2002]; Repetti v. Repetti, 147 AD3d 1094, 1098 [2d Dept 2017]). "Courts have discretion to value 'active assets' such as a professional practice on the commencement date [of the action], while 'passive assets' such as securities, which could change in value suddenly based on market fluctuations, may be valued at the date of trial but such formulation should be treated as helpful guideposts and not immutable rules" (Lieberman-Massoni v. Massoni, 215 AD3d 656 [2d Dept 2023]; Daniel v. Friedman, 22 AD3d 707, 708 [2d Dept 2005]; Grunfeld v. Grunfeld, 94 NY2d 696, 707 [2000]).

The Appellate Division, Second Department has noted:

" 'A trial court is vested with broad discretion in making an equitable distribution of marital property, and unless it can be shown that the court improvidently exercised that discretion, its determination should not be disturbed' (Aloi v. Simoni, 82 AD3d 683, 685, 918 N.Y.S.2d 506 [internal quotation marks omitted]). ' 'Equitable distribution is based on the premise that a marriage is, among other things, an economic partnership to which both parties contribute as spouse, parent, wage earner or homemaker' ' (Repetti v. Repetti, 147 AD3d 1094, 1098, 47 N.Y.S.3d 447, quoting K. v. B., 13 AD3d 12, 17, 784 N.Y.S.2d 76 *998 [internal quotation marks omitted]). ' 'The distribution of marital assets depends not only on the financial contribution of the parties but also on a wide range of nonremunerated services to the joint enterprise, such as homemaking, raising children and providing the emotional and moral support necessary to sustain the other spouse in coping with the vicissitudes of life outside the home' ' (Repetti v. Repetti, 147 AD3d at 1098, 47 N.Y.S.3d 447, quoting K. v. B., 13 AD3d at 17, 784 N.Y.S.2d 76 [internal quotation marks omitted])" (Novick v. Novick, 214 AD3d 995 [2d Dept 2023]).

When making a determination as to equitable distribution of marital property, a court must first determine the value of such property (see Niles v. Niles, 126 AD2d 874 [3d Dept 1987]) and a court may exercise discretion in denying equitable distribution of an asset to the extent insufficient evidence is presented at trial regarding valuation of the subject asset (see Horn v. Horn, 145 AD3d 666 [2d Dept 2016]).

For purposes of determining the value of real property it is customary for counsel to introduce into evidence at trial an appraisal report providing the fair market value of the subject property, it is improper for a trial court to reply upon an appraisal report prepared far in advance of trial (see Brevilus v. Brevilus, 41 AD3d 630 [2d Dept 2007]). As noted by one decision entered by the Appellate Division, Second Department, to properly calculate the net equity in a parcel of real property the trial court must receive into evidence an appraisal report prepared within a reasonable date of trial, along with payoff statements for any liens against the subject property:

"A trial court generally has discretion as to the appropriate valuation dates for various assets, upon consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances (see *564 Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][4][b]; McSparron v. McSparron, 87 NY2d 275, 287, 639 N.Y.S.2d 265, 662 N.E.2d 745; D'Angelo v. D'Angelo, 14 AD3d 476, 788 N.Y.S.2d 154). However, because a marital residence is generally considered a passive asset, a valuation date as close to the trial date as practicable should be employed (see Newman v. Newman, 35 AD3d 418, 419, 825 N.Y.S.2d 714; Collins v. Donnelly—Collins, 19 AD3d 356, 357, [*6]796 N.Y.S.2d 159; Moody v. Moody, 172 AD2d 730, 731, 569 N.Y.S.2d 116). This is especially true where the dramatic increase in the value of real property is attributable to market forces rather than the contributions of either party (see Newman v. Newman, 35 AD3d at 419, 825 N.Y.S.2d 714). Here, the trial court erred in employing a May 2002 valuation for the former marital residence since it had before it a valuation made in August 2005, only three months before the trial, and uncontradicted evidence that the residence's **587 increased market value resulted solely from market forces. Further, inasmuch as the amount of the outstanding existing mortgage as of August 2005 is not clearly set forth in the record, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a recalculation of the net equity in the marital home as of August 2005 and the 10% interest therein to which the defendant is entitled" (Donovan v. Szlepcsik, 52 AD3d 563 [2d Dept 2008]).

In another decision entered by the Appellate Division, Second Department, similar to Donovan, the court discussed the ability of the trial court to appoint an appraiser to prepare a valuation in the absence of information presented at trial, for the court to determine the value of real property:

"We remit the matter for a new trial on the issue of equitable distribution of marital property. Although the parties came forward with a paucity of evidence regarding the value of the marital residence, the Supreme Court was nevertheless required to determine the value of the property before awarding sole title to the plaintiff. "A determination must be made as to the net value of each asset before determining the distribution thereof" (D'Amato v. D'Amato, 96 AD2d 849, 850, 466 N.Y.S.2d 23; see Brevilus v. Brevilus, 41 AD3d 630, 631, 839 N.Y.S.2d 157). In circumstances where proof of value is insufficient to make a determination, the court has discretion to, among other things, appoint a neutral appraiser and to direct that such appraiser be paid by one or both parties (see e.g. McDicken v. McDicken, 109 AD2d 734, 735, 486 N.Y.S.2d 52)" (Van Wood v. Van Wood, 142 AD3d 661 [2d Dept 2016]).

Furthermore, when there are inconsistencies or outright misrepresentations among financial records, sworn affidavits, and testimony, and a party is recalcitrant in providing financial document disclosure, the Court may find that the party lacks credibility and draw a negative inference related to the discrepancies in financial representations (Racquel L.J. v. Derwin J.J., 64 Misc 3d 1221, 2019 NY Slip Op 51219 [Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2019]).

[A] Equitable Distribution of Marital Assets and Declaration of Separate Property.

Here, Defendant was provided with several opportunities to appear in this action and meaningfully participate in financial disclosure through the discovery process, and to proceed to trial prior to determinations being made. Nonetheless, Defendant failed to appear or provide any financial disclosure, and therefore has prevented this Court from ascertaining the information needed to determine the entire scope of the parties' finances. This is particularly troubling as Plaintiff has credibly testified that the parties have been separated for approximately eight years, and this Court has been provided no financial information from Defendant pertaining to his income, expenses, assets and liabilities, and therefore makes negative inferences against him in the determinations made herein.

At inquest, Plaintiff admitted into evidence Exhibit A being Plaintiff's statement of net [*7]worth (hereinafter "Plaintiff's SNW"),^FN16 reflecting the following assets:

(1) Chase Bank checking account; date opened listed as approximately 1984; source of funds listed as savings, inheritance, and investments; account number ending 0865; titled in Plaintiff's sole name; with a current balance of $527.28 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Account #1");

(2) Webster Bank checking account; date opened listed as February 2023; source of funds listed as inherited from R.L.; account number ending 7206; titled in Plaintiff's sole name; with a current balance of $11,099.36 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Account #2");

(3) Chase Bank savings account; date opened listed as 1984; source of funds listed as gifted from G.W. (Great Aunt); account number ending 2732; titled in Plaintiff's sole name; with a current balance of $12,843.91 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Account #3");

(4) Webster Bank savings account, date opened listed as December of 2023; source of funds listed as inherited from R.L. (Mother); account number ending 9390; titled in Plaintiff's sole name; with a current balance of $20,214.83 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Account #4");

(5) US Life IRA annuity; date opened listed as April 17, 1995; source of funds listed as pre-marital gifted; titled in Plaintiff's sole name; with a value as of date of commencement of $2,000.00 and current value of $6,094.71 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Account #5");

(6) Invesco Traditional IRA; date opened listed as April 18, 1996; source of funds listed as pre-marital gifted; titled in Plaintiff's sole name; with a value as of the date of commencement of $2,000.00 and current value of $30,421.26 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Account #6");

(7) US Life Annuity; date opened listed as April 17, 1995; no source of funds listed; no account holder information provided; account number ending 9430; with a value of $6,094.71 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Account #7");

(8) Invesco Traditional IRA; date opened listed as April 18, 1996; no source of funds listed; no account holder information provided; account number ending 9716; with a value of $30,421.26 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Account #8");

(9) Morgan Stanley Traditional IRA; date opened listed as April 13, 1998; no source of funds listed; no account holder information provided; account number ending 4696; with a value of $16,923.65 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Account #9");

(10) Alliance Bernstein; date opened listed as April 15, 1999; no source of funds listed; no account holder information provided; account number ending 6884; with a value of $15,608.19 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Account #10");

(11) JP Morgan; dated opened listed as 2000 and 2001; no source of funds listed; no account holder information provided; account number ending 4925; with a value of $17,361.81 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Account #11");

(12) Merril Lynch; dated opened listed as 2023; source of funds listed is through inheritance from mother through various sub accounts some previously listed; with a value listed as $1,37,000,000 ^FN17 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Account #12");

(13) Single family house; title listed as husband and wife; date of acquisition listed as [*8]April 2002; original price listed as $239,000; source of funds listed as separate property of S.W. and gifted $83,307.31; with no liens listed; with estimated current fair market value of $600,000.00 (hereinafter "Marital Domicile");

(14) 2015 Subaru Crosstrek; title owner listed as Plaintiff; date of acquisition listed as March 2015; source of funds listed as trade in and loan; no liens listed; current fair market value listed as $6,000 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Car #1"); and,

(15) 2010 Subaru Forester; title owner listed as Plaintiff; date of acquisition listed as February 2023; source of funds listed as inherited; no liens listed; current fair market value listed as $5,000 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Car #2").

Based upon the evidence and testimony received at inquest, as well as the DRL factors set forth above, the Court makes the following determinations as to equitable distribution of marital assets and declarations of separate property:

(1) Plaintiff's Account #1 — Based upon the submissions made to this Court and Defendant's failure to appear preventing this Court from obtaining information as to Defendant's assets to engage in equitable distribution of same, Plaintiff is awarded sole ownership interest in Plaintiff's Account #1.

(2) Plaintiff's Account #2— Exhibit F was admitted into evidence,^FN18 which Plaintiff identified as an account she inherited from her mother upon her passing in 2023 which currently has a balance of approximately $5,000.00.^FN19 Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's Account #2 is determined to be Plaintiff's separate non-marital property which she shall retain sole ownership interest in.

(3) Plaintiff's Account #3 — Based upon the submissions made to this Court and Defendant's failure to appear preventing this Court from obtaining information as to Defendant's assets to engage in equitable distribution of same, Plaintiff is awarded sole ownership interest in Plaintiff's Account #3.

(4) Plaintiff's Account #4— Based upon the submissions made to this Court and Defendant's failure to appear preventing this Court from obtaining information as to Defendant's assets to engage in equitable distribution of same, Plaintiff is awarded sole ownership interest in Plaintiff's Account #4.

(5) Plaintiff's Account #5— Exhibit J was admitted into evidence,^FN20 which Plaintiff identified as a document pertaining to an individual retirement account that she opened in 1995, which she never deposited other funds into during the parties' marriage.^FN21 Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's Account #5 is determined to be Plaintiff's separate non-marital property which she shall retain sole ownership interest in.

(6) Plaintiff's Account #6 — Based upon the submissions made to this Court and Defendant's failure to appear preventing this Court from obtaining information as to [*9]Defendant's assets to engage in equitable distribution of same, Plaintiff is awarded sole ownership interest in Plaintiff's Account #6.

(7) Plaintiff's Account #7 — Exhibit H was admitted into evidence,^FN22 which Plaintiff identified as a statement for an individual retirement account that she opened in 1996, which she never deposited other funds into during the parties' marriage.^FN23 Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's Account #7 is determined to be Plaintiff's separate non-marital property which she shall retain sole ownership interest in.

(8) Plaintiff's Account #8 — Based upon the submissions made to this Court and Defendant's failure to appear preventing this Court from obtaining information as to Defendant's assets to engage in equitable distribution of same, Plaintiff is awarded sole ownership interest in Plaintiff's Account #8.

(9) Plaintiff's Account #9 — Exhibit K was admitted into evidence,^FN24 which Plaintiff identified as a document pertaining to an individual retirement account that she opened in 1995, which she never deposited other funds into during the parties' marriage.^FN25 Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's Account #9 is determined to be Plaintiff's separate non-marital property which she shall retain sole ownership interest in.

(10) Plaintiff's Account #10— Exhibit L was admitted into evidence,^FN26 which Plaintiff identified as a document pertaining to an individual retirement account that she opened in 1995, which she never deposited other funds into during the parties' marriage.^FN27 Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's Account #10 is determined to be Plaintiff's separate non-marital property which she shall retain sole ownership interest in.

(11) Plaintiff's Account #11 — Based upon the submissions made to this Court and Defendant's failure to appear preventing this Court from obtaining information as to Defendant's assets to engage in equitable distribution of same, Plaintiff is awarded sole ownership interest in Plaintiff's Account #11.

(12) Plaintiff's Account #12 — Exhibit G was admitted into evidence,^FN28 which Plaintiff identified as an account which she opened following the death of her mother after which she deposited funds from several accounts she inherited from her mother which no other individuals have been listed as an owner and into which no other funds have been [*10]transferred having an approximate balance of $1,300,000.00.^FN29 Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's Account #12 is determined to be Plaintiff's separate non-marital property which she shall retain sole ownership interest in.

(13) Marital Domicile

Plaintiff's Statement of Proposed Disposition provided the following request pertaining to the Marital Domicile, "Plaintiff seeking credit of $192,287 ($107,811 down payment and closing costs $84,476 ½ mortgage payments made by Plaintiff."

At inquest, Plaintiff testified that she resides with the Children in the Marital Domicile.^FN30 Exhibit C was admitted into evidence, being the deed by which the parties obtained title to the Marital Domicile (hereinafter "Deed").^FN31 The Deed and annexed Westchester County Clerk Recording Page reflect that the parties took the property as tenants by the entirety with a transfer date of April 10, 2002; noting a purchase price of $239,000.00; and having no mortgage listed. When asked at inquest what disposition she was seeking pertaining to the Marital Residence, Plaintiff was unable to provide a clear answer, seemingly acknowledging her own lack of information to make such a determination as to her own position:

"Q What is it you're looking for the Court to order in regards to the marital residence? Obviously you're looking for those credits. Are you looking for the right to buy out his interest or—

A You know, I'm looking to make a settlement on the house.

Q What settlement are you looking for, buyout his interest or like get an appraisal and buyout his interest or — and you get the first right of refusal to purchase it or just sell the house and you get all those credits you requested and split the proceeds?

A I'm not sure at this time. Depends on what the numbers are.

Q I guess you're looking to have the option of either right?

A. Yes."^FN32

This Court was not provided with any evidence sufficient for a determination to be made regarding the valuation of the Marital Domicile such as an appraisal report. Instead, this Court was offered Plaintiff's speculative approximation of what she believed the fair market value of the property was at the time of inquest being $600,000.00 without any support provided for that [*11]position.^FN33 Indeed, Plaintiff's testimony indicated that the fair market value may be significantly impacted by issues with the property which she asserted included the home needing a boiler and roof, having buckling retaining walls, and a bathroom that did not have a certificate of occupancy.^FN34

Similarly, while Plaintiff testified that the Marital Domicile is encumbered by a mortgage, at inquest this Court was not provided with a note or a mortgage pertaining to the Marital Domicile. Exhibit N was admitted into evidence,^FN35 which Plaintiff identified as her statement for the mortgage encumbering the Marital Domicile from April of 2026.^FN36 When asked what was owed on the mortgage, referring to Exhibit N, Plaintiff responded "approximately $86,500.00" but then acknowledged "I don't think it's on here."^FN37 Upon review of Exhibit N, Plaintiff is correct that the payoff amount for the mortgage is not listed on the document. Instead, it appears to be a Chase statement for a mortgage on the Marital Domicile for a payment due on May 1, 2026, reflecting an "unpaid principal balance" of $82,986.84 with a footnote that reads, "The Unpaid Principal Balance on your statement is not a payoff quote." Accordingly, as this Court was neither provided with an appraisal report to obtain the fair market value of the Marital Domicile or a payoff statement for the mortgage encumbering the property, no mechanism exists for this Court to determine the net equity in the property.

With respect to Plaintiff's request for credits pertaining to the Marital Domicile, Plaintiff testified that she is seeking credits for funds she advanced from her separate property for the purchase of the home and for payments made towards the mortgage paydown. Turning first to Plaintiff's initial request, at inquest despite initially testifying that she had advanced $100,000.00 towards the parties' downpayment on the purchase of the Marital Domicile, she requested a credit of $107,811.11 for such downpayment funds advanced by her.^FN38 To support her position, Exhibit D was admitted into evidence,^FN39 which Plaintiff identified as copies of three separate checks drawn from her separate property accounts utilized for the parties' purchase of the Marital Domicile having a cumulative total of $76,811.67 ($36,246.64; $37,565.03; and, $3,000.00).^FN40 Exhibit E was admitted into evidence,^FN41 which Plaintiff identified as a statement from her pre-[*12]marital banking account from which $24,000.00 was drawn from and utilized for the downpayment for the parties' purchase of the Marital Domicile, which added to the $76,811.67 totaled $100,811.67 (hereinafter "Downpayment Funds"). Based upon the foregoing, this Court determines that the Downpayment Funds originated from Plaintiff's separate non-marital assets for which Plaintiff shall receive a credit as set forth herein in the amount of $100,811.67 (hereinafter "Downpayment Credit").

In support of Plaintiff's request for credits associated with payments made by her towards the mortgage encumbering the Marital Domicile, Exhibit O was admitted into evidence,^FN42 which Plaintiff identified as a list of mortgage payments made by her from October 2018 through April 2026, totaling $168,952.69 (hereinafter "Mortgage Payments"), requesting that she receive a credit for half that amount being $84,176.00.^FN43 Exhibit P was also admitted into evidence with Plaintiff identified as proof of payment of certain mortgage payments including documentation pertaining to banking transactions that correspond to the ledger included in Exhibit O.^FN44 Based upon the foregoing, this Court determines that Plaintiff is entitled to a credit as set forth herein for funds advanced towards the Mortgage Payments in the amount of $84,176.00 (hereinafter "Mortgage Credit").

Based upon the foregoing, without presentation of a recent appraisal report providing the fair market value of the Marital Domicile, this Court determines that the Marital Domicile is a marital asset which must be valued and sold with the net proceeds being distributed pursuant to percentages determined by this Court to be equitable with each party receiving appropriate credits. Turning first to the allocation of the net proceeds between the parties, this Court determines that such net proceeds should be distributed between the parties equally with Plaintiff's receipt from Defendant's fifty percent share of the net proceeds the Downpayment Credit and Mortgage Credit. In making this determination, the Court has considered the default of the Defendant, the allocation of a higher amount of marital assets to Plaintiff having been made herein, the separate non-marital wealth of Plaintiff and the DRL factors set forth above.

To effectuate these determinations, it is hereby determined that the Marital Domicile is a marital asset to be distributed in the following manner:

(a) Valuation — The Marital Domicile fair market value shall be determined by an appraisal report to be prepared by July 31, 2026(hereinafter "Appraisal Report") by a New York State Licensed Real Estate Appraiser from the Part 36 list being: John Saluto, Hudson Property Appraisal Co, LLC, 132 Spy Glass HL, Hopewell Junction, New York 12533, Telephone: 845-592-2427, E-Mail: Carolyn.hpa@gmail.com, the cost of which is to be paid by Plaintiff, half of the cost of which is to be received as a credit from the gross proceeds prior to the parties distribution of net proceeds as set forth herein (hereinafter "Appraisal Credit").

(b) Listing — The Marital Domicile shall be listed for sale by August 31, 2026 at the fair market value set forth in the Appraisal Report (hereinafter "List Price"), by a New York State Licensed Real Estate Broker from the Part 36 list being: Kenneth Richard Dobbins, Coldwell [*13]Banker Realty, 366 Underhill Avenue, Yorktown Heights, New York 10705, Telephone: 914-420-5200, E-Mil: ken.dobbins@cbmoves.com.

(c) Carrying Costs — Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for all carrying costs associated with the Marital Domicile, including, but not limited to, mortgage payments, real estate taxes and property insurance, utilities, snow removal, landscaping, and regular repairs and maintenance. At closing, Plaintiff shall receive as a credit from the percentage of the net proceeds of the sale of the Marital Domicile received at closing payable to Defendant, fifty percent of any payments made by her towards the mortgage principal paydown following the date of this decision (hereinafter "Post Decision Mortgage Credit").

(d) Maintenance — Plaintiff shall ensure that the interior and exterior of the Marital Domicile is kept clean; signage is placed on the property listing the property for sale to the extent same is permitted by any homeowner association and/or local ordinances; and that a lock box be placed on the property.

(e) Transfer — The parties shall cooperate with the marketing and transfer of the Marital Domicile, including, but not limited to: [1] executing any transfer documents; and, [2] appearing at a closing. Any offers for the purchase of the Marital Domicile within 2.5% of the List Price shall be accepted, with the understanding that Plaintiff shall have the right of first refusal to purchase at the same terms as accepted by the parties pursuant to this Decision and Order.

(f) Distribution of Sale Proceeds — The proceeds received from the sale shall be distributed in the following manner and order:

1. Payoff of any mortgages and/or equity lines of credit which encumber the property;

2. Payoff of any other liens which encumber the property;

3. Payment of any usual and ordinary transfer expenses (including, but not limited to: title fees, real estate transfer taxes, real estate broker commissions, and real estate attorneys' fees);

4. Reimbursement of Plaintiff for Appraisal Report Credit;

5. Payment of any remaining net proceeds to the parties in the following manner: Plaintiff fifty percent (50%) and Defendant fifty percent (50%) minus credits due Plaintiff including Downpayment Credit, Mortgage Credit, and Post-Decision Mortgage Credit. To the extent that the application of credits due to Plaintiff from Defendant's share of the net proceeds exceed the amount Defendant is due from his fifty percent (50%) share of the net proceeds of the sale of the Marital Domicile, Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the balance due within thirty (30) days of the closing on the marital domicile and if such payment is not made in full, Plaintiff shall be permitted to file with notice of settlement a proposed money judgement for the amount then due.

(14) Plaintiff's Car #1 — In making a determination as to equitable distribution of a vehicle, the date of commencement value of the vehicle should be utilized (see Hale v. Hale, 16 AD3d 231 [1st Dept 2005]). In the absence of any evidence pertaining to valuation of a vehicle, a trial court may adopt the valuation presented by a party (see Winter v. Winter, 50 AD3d 431 [1st Dept 2008]). Plaintiff's SNW provides $6,000.00 as the current fair market value of Plaintiff's Car #1 with no liens encumbering the vehicle and confirms that the vehicle was acquired during the parties' marriage. While Plaintiff's Statement of Proposed Disposition lists the Marital Domicile as the only marital asset and seven financial accounts as assets claimed to be separate, Plaintiff's Car #1 was not referenced anywhere in the document. At inquest, no testimony was presented pertaining [*14]to Plaintiff's Car #1. Based upon the foregoing, this Court determines Plaintiff's Car #1 to be a marital asset with a value of $6,000.00, which the Plaintiff is awarded sole interest with Defendant to receive a distributive award from Plaintiff in the amount of $3,000.00. To effectuate this award, Defendant shall receive a credit towards the retroactive child support arrears being awarded to Plaintiff as set forth herein.

(15) Plaintiff's Car #2— Plaintiff's SNW provides $5,000.00 as the current fair market value of Plaintiff's Car #2 with no liens encumbering the vehicle, confirms that the vehicle was acquired during the parties' marriage and while asserting that the vehicle was obtained through inheritance no proof confirming same was provided. While Plaintiff's Statement of Proposed Disposition lists the Marital Domicile as the only marital asset and seven financial accounts as assets claimed to be separate, Plaintiff's Car #2 was not referenced anywhere in the document. At inquest, no testimony was presented pertaining to Plaintiff's Car #2. Based upon the foregoing, this Court determines Plaintiff's Car #2 to be a marital asset with a value of $5,000.00, which the Plaintiff is awarded sole interest with Defendant to receive a distributive award from Plaintiff in the amount of $2,500.00. To effectuate this award, Defendant shall receive a credit towards the retroactive child support arrears being awarded to Plaintiff as set forth herein.

[B] Allocation of Debts.

Plaintiff's SNW identified no debts and Plaintiff's Statement of Proposed Disposition asserts that no marital debts exist.

Based upon the submissions made to this Court, evidence and testimony received at inquest, and the foregoing, the parties are hereby each directed to be solely responsible for their own debt and hold the other harmless from the payment of same. Notwithstanding this determination, both parties shall be equally responsible for any liens and/or encumbrances against the Marital Domicile, including, but not limited to, the mortgage on same to be addressed as set forth herein.

D. Plaintiff's Request as to Spousal Support and Maintenance.

The Appellate Division has set forth the manner within which a trial court may award post-judgment spousal maintenance that deviates from the presumptively correct amount calculated utilizing the statutory formula:

" '[I]n any matrimonial action, the court, upon application by a party, shall make its award for post-divorce maintenance pursuant to the provisions' set forth in the statute (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] [a]; see Hughes v. Hughes, 198 AD3d 1170, 1173, 156 N.Y.S.3d 444 [3d Dept. 2021]). In setting the amount of the award, the provisions of Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6) require that the court first determine the presumptive amount of maintenance pursuant to the statutory formulas in paragraph (c) and, second, determine whether other factors under paragraphs (d) and (e) support deviating from the presumptive amount (see Mahoney v. Mahoney, 197 AD3d 638, 639, 152 N.Y.S.3d 727 [2d Dept. 2021]; Iannazzo v. Iannazzo [appeal No. 2], 197 AD3d 959, 961-962, 152 N.Y.S.3d 756 [4th Dept. 2021]). Where there is a deviation from the presumptive amount reached by application of the relevant formula, the court should explain the reasons for that deviation (see generally Severny v. Severny, 210 AD3d 419, 419, 175 N.Y.S.3d 729 [1st Dept. 2022]). '[T]he court need not analyze and apply each and every factor set forth in the statute,' but it 'must provide a reasoned analysis of the factors it ultimately relies upon in awarding maintenance' (Gordon-Medley v. Medley, [*15]160 AD3d 1146, 1147, 74 N.Y.S.3d 412 [3d Dept. 2018]; see Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 AD3d 1363, 1364, 143 N.Y.S.3d 275 [4th Dept. 2021]; Johnston v. Johnston, 156 AD3d 1181, 1184, 68 N.Y.S.3d 178 [3d Dept. 2017], appeal dismissed 31 NY3d 1126, 81 N.Y.S.3d 350, 106 N.E.3d 733 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1053, 88 N.Y.S.3d 408, 113 N.E.3d 464 [2018])" (Renzi v. Renzi, 217 AD3d 1336 [4th Dept 2023]).

Nonetheless, a party in a matrimonial action may waive spousal maintenance and support. (see Messina v. Messina, 143 AD2d 735 [2d Dept 1988]).

At inquest, Plaintiff testified that she is waiving spousal support and during the closing statement of Plaintiff's counsel, it was requested that this Court direct that neither party be required to provide spousal maintenance to the other.^FN45 Based upon the submissions made to this Court, evidence and testimony received at inquest, and the foregoing, neither party shall be responsible for spousal maintenance to the other.

E. Child Custody.

At inquest, Plaintiff credibly testified that the Children are the only issue of the marriage and that both are over eighteen years ^FN46 of age preventing this Court from making any determination regarding child custody. Based upon the submissions made to this Court, evidence and testimony received at inquest, and the foregoing, this Court makes no determinations as to child custody as both Children are over eighteen years of age.

F. Child Support.

The Appellate Division, Second Department has provided instruction as to the manner within which a child support award shall be made by a trial court, by either using the combined parental income up to the then statutory cap, or using discretion in exceeding that amount:

"The Child Support Standards Act (see Domestic Relations Law § 240[1—b] ) sets forth a formula for calculating child support by applying a designated statutory percentage, based upon the number of children to be supported, to combined parental income up to the statutory cap that is in effect at the time of the judgment (see Holterman v. Holterman, 3 NY3d 1, 11, 781 N.Y.S.2d 458, 814 N.E.2d 765; Matter of Cassano v. Cassano, 85 NY2d 649, 653—654, 628 N.Y.S.2d 10, 651 N.E.2d 878), here, $130,000 (see Social Services Law § 111—i[2][b] ). With respect to combined parental income exceeding that amount, the court has the discretion to apply the statutory child support percentage, or to apply the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 240(1—b)(f) (see Matter of Cassano v. Cassano, 85 NY2d at 654, 628 N.Y.S.2d 10, 651 N.E.2d 878; Matter of Byrne v. Byrne, 46 AD3d 812, 814, 848 N.Y.S.2d 319), or to utilize 'some combination of th[ose] two' methods (Poli v. Poli, 286 AD2d 720, 723, 730 N.Y.S.2d 168; see Jordan v. Jordan, 8 AD3d 444, 445, 779 N.Y.S.2d 121).

The hearing court must ' 'articulate its reason or reasons for [that determination], which should reflect a careful consideration of the stated basis for its exercise of discretion, the parties' circumstances, and its reasoning why there [should or] should not be a departure [*16]from the prescribed percentage' ' (Wagner v. Dunetz, 299 AD2d 347, 350—351, 749 N.Y.S.2d 545, quoting Matter of Schmitt v. Berwitz, 228 AD2d 604, 605, 644 N.Y.S.2d 760; see Matter of Cassano v. Cassano, 85 NY2d at 655, 628 N.Y.S.2d 10, 651 N.E.2d 878; Matter of Wienands v. Hedlund, 305 AD2d 692, 693, 762 N.Y.S.2d 90). Inasmuch as the record before us does not reveal the Supreme Court's reasons for its choice not to include income above the statutory cap, it is appropriate to remit the matter to enable the Supreme Court to set forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its determination (see Hohlweck v. Hohlweck, 271 AD2d 571, 707 N.Y.S.2d 461; Zaremba v. Zaremba, 222 AD2d 500, 635 N.Y.S.2d 532; Jones v. Reese, 217 AD2d 783, 629 N.Y.S.2d 311)" (see McCoy v. McCoy, 107 AD3d 857 [2d Dept 2013]).

Plaintiff's Proposed Statement of Disposition requested that Defendant be directed to pay basic child support for B.W., to Plaintiff monthly in the amount of $1,442.97, with an award of retroactive support from the date of commencement totaling $14,442.00 pursuant to the support calculations included in Exhibit R which was admitted into evidence. For purposes of calculation of child support, this Court imputes the annual income of Plaintiff to be $57,566.00 and of Defendant to be $75,000.00 (see Funaro v. Kudrick, 128 AD3d 695 [2d Dept 2015]; see also Liles v. Liles, 56 AD3d 531 [2d Dept 2008]).

Based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the testimony and evidence received at the inquest, Plaintiff is awarded from Defendant monthly child support for B.W. in the amount of $1,442.97, payable on the fifteenth day of each month, commencing on July 15, 2026, and continuing each day thereafter until the date of emancipation of B.W. Further the parties shall be responsible for all statutory child support add-ons in the following manner 56.58% by Defendant and 43.42% by Plaintiff, and in order to effectuate this determination the payor parent shall e-mail or send via certified traceable delivery to the non-payor parent proof of payment of each statutory child support add-on payment within fifteen days of making such payment and the non-payor parent shall reimburse the payor parent within fifteen days of receipt of the proof of payment. Finally, Plaintiff is hereby awarded from Defendant retroactive basic child support from the date of commencement being June 20, 2025, in the amount of $14,442.00. As Defendant shall receive a credit of $2,500.00 for his distributive award for Plaintiff's Car #1 and $3,000.00 for his distributive award for Plaintiff's Car #2, totaling $5,500.00, the remaining retroactive child support due from Defendant to Plaintiff shall be $8,942.00 which shall be paid by certified check from Defendant to Plaintiff by July 15, 2026. To the extent same is not paid in full by that date, Plaintiff shall have leave of this Court to file with notice of settlement a proposed money judgment for the amount then owed. Further, to the extent this amount is not paid in full by the date the Marital Domicile is transferred, Plaintiff shall receive as a credit from Defendant's fifty percent share of the net proceeds or buyout amount, any funds then due Plaintiff from Defendant pursuant to this provision.

In making this determination, the Court utilized the following calculation pursuant to the child support standards act:

	Father	Mother
Gross Income	$75,000.00	$57,566.00
[*17]- (minus)
FICA: Social Security Tax Paid	$4,650.00	$3,569.04
FICA: Medicare Tax Paid	$1,087.50	$834.69
Total Deductions	$5,737.50	$4,403.73
Total Income/Adjusted CSSA Income	$69,262.50	$53,162.27
Combined Parental Income	$122,424.77
Applicable Child Support Percentage	17%
Combined Parental Annual Support	$30,606.19
Non-Custodial Parent Support Obligation	$1,442.97 (monthly)
Parental Share of Combined Income	56.58%	43.42%

H. Exclusive Use and Occupancy.

Pursuant to DRL § 234 pertaining to the title or occupancy of property, the statute provides the following:

"In any action for divorce, for a separation, for an annulment or to declare the nullity of a void marriage, the court may (1) determine any question as to the title to property arising between the parties, and (2) make such direction, between the parties, concerning the possession of property, as in the court's discretion justice requires having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. Such direction may be made in the final judgment, or by one or more orders from time to time before or subsequent to final judgment, or by both such order or orders and final judgment. Where the title to real property is affected, a copy of such judgment, order or decree, duly certified by the clerk of the court wherein said judgement was rendered, shall be recorded in the office of the recording officer of the county in which such property is situated, as provided by section two hundred ninety-seven-b of the real property law."

At inquest, Plaintiff testified that she resides with the Children in the Marital Domicile.^FN47 Plaintiff testified that Defendant left the residence in December 1, 2017,^FN48 establishing a residence elsewhere and thereafter failed to provide financial support for the Marital Domicile. Based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the testimony and evidence received at the inquest, Plaintiff is hereby granted exclusive use and occupancy of the Marital Domicile, notwithstanding the directives included herein-above relating to the sale and/or buyout of the Marital Domicile.

I. Attorneys' Fees & Expenses.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, has noted how a trial court should determine if an award of attorneys' fees is warranted in a matrimonial action:

"In a matrimonial action, an award of attorney's fees is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the issue is controlled by the equities and circumstances of each particular case (see Prochilo v. Prochilo, 165 AD3d 1304, 84 N.Y.S.3d 786; Patete v Rodriguez, 109 AD3d 595, 599, 971 N.Y.S.2d 109). The purpose of Domestic Relations Law § 237(a) is to redress the economic disparity between the monied spouse and the nonmonied spouse by ensuring that the latter will be able to litigate the action on equal footing with the former (see Chesner v. Chesner, 95 AD3d 1252, 1253, 945 N.Y.S.2d 409; Finnan v. Finnan, 95 AD3d 821, 943 N.Y.S.2d 559; Prichep v. Prichep, 52 AD3d 61, 64—65, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667).

In determining whether to award attorney's fees, the court should review the financial circumstances of both parties, together with all of the other circumstances of the case, including, inter alia, the relative merit of the parties' positions, and whether either party has engaged in conduct or taken positions resulting in a delay of the proceedings or unnecessary litigation (see Prochilo v. Prochilo, 165 AD3d 1304, 84 N.Y.S.3d 786; Chesner v. Chesner, 95 AD3d 1252, 945 N.Y.S.2d 409; Prichep v. Prichep, 52 AD3d at 64—65, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667)" (Brockner v Brockner, 174 AD3d 567 [2d Dept 2019]).

"Where a party has asserted unreasonable positions or failed to cooperate in discovery, and thereby increased the cost of the litigation, the court may make a counsel fee award in favor of the offended party or not make, or make a lesser award, in favor of the offending party" (Kaufman v. Kaufman, 189 AD3d 31 [2d Dept 2020] [internal citations omitted]). When seeking an award of attorneys' fees, parties are required to submit itemized billing statements as proof of the attorneys' fees incurred, both to demonstrate substantial compliance with 22 NYCRR § 1400.2 and § 1400.3 and to establish the "extent and value of [the] services" rendered (Yakobowitz v. Yakobowicz, 217 AD3d 733 [2d Dept 2023] [internal citations omitted]).

Based upon the submissions made to this Court, both parties shall be solely responsible for any attorneys' fees, expenses and other litigation costs arising out of this litigation that they have incurred.

J. Prior Pre-Marital Surnames.

At inquest, Plaintiff requested leave to resume the use of her maiden name, being S.L., following the entry of a judgment of divorce.^FN49 Based upon the submissions made to this Court, along with the testimony and evidence received at the inquest, following entry of a judgment of divorce dissolving the parties' marriage both parties shall be permitted to resume the use of any pre-marital surnames including, but not limited to, Plaintiff's resumption of use of her maiden name being S.L.

K. Plaintiff's Request for Other Relief.

Any relief specifically not granted or otherwise addressed herein is denied.

* * *

Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff's request for the entry of a Judgment of Divorce against Defendant, dissolving forever the bonds of matrimony existing between Plaintiff and Defendant upon the grounds of the Irretrievable Breakdown of the Relationship pursuant to DRL § 170(7) is granted, in addition to the ancillary relief as decided herein-above; and it is further,

ORDERED that by June 26, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel shall serve Defendant, via certified traceable delivery, this Decision After Inquest with Notice of Entry, and by that date shall file an Affidavit of Service with copy of the tracking slip; and it is further

ORDERED that by July 15, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel shall file with the Court, with notice of settlement served on Defendant via certified traceable delivery, the following documents:

(1) Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;

(2) Proposed Judgment of Divorce; and,

(3) All other ancillary documents required for this Court to enter a Judgment of Divorce; and, by that date shall file an Affidavit of Service with a copy of the tracking slip; and it is further

ORDERED that to the extent any relief sought has not been granted, it is expressly denied.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: June 24, 2026

White Plains, New York

ENTER:

HON. JAMES L. HYER, J.S.C.