Morato v State of New York

Court of Claims

Decided on July 6, 2026

Claim No. NONE

Linda K. Mejias-Glover, J.

Movant moves by Notice of Motion dated August 6, 2025, and filed with the Clerk of the Court on August 14, 2025, seeking an order granting him permission to file a late claim.

In support of his motion, Movant asserts that his delay in filing is excusable due to his lack of knowledge of the short filing period set forth in the Court of Claims Act, a circumstance compounded by his incarceration, which limited his ability to consult with counsel and deprived him of access to legal references and Westlaw. Movant further contends that the State had notice of the essential facts underlying his claim through reports and memoranda prepared in connection with the incident, including Grievance UST-0373-25. He maintains that the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) staff at Upstate Correctional Facility conducted an investigation at the time of the grievance and generated documentation related to the matter.

Movant also argues that his proposed claim is meritorious, asserting that he spent a total of thirty-eight days in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) without lawful sanction, eleven days attributable to a reversed disciplinary determination and twenty-seven days resulting from an [*2]alleged unlawful work stoppage by officers. He contends that his failure to timely serve a notice of intention did not prejudice the State because its employees investigated the incident contemporaneously and remain available to the Attorney General. Finally, Movant asserts that he has no alternative remedy "[b]y operation of Section 24 of the Correction Law."

In opposition, the State argues that Movant failed to address four of the six statutory factors set forth in Court of Claims Act § 10 (6). Defendant rejects Movant's assertion that his delay is excusable, emphasizing that neither his status as a layperson nor his alleged lack of access to legal resources constitutes a legally sufficient excuse. Defendant further contends that the proposed claim lacks the specificity required by Court of Claims Act § 11 (b), in that it does not identify where or when the alleged wrongful confinement occurred. According to Defendant, Movant appears to assert that he was wrongfully confined after being assaulted by an unidentified incarcerated individual, but he does not specify the location or time of the alleged incident. Defendant also asserts that Movant failed to indicate when he was released from SHU or where the disciplinary determination at issue was made.

In reply, Movant notes that Defendant incorrectly claims he failed to address four of the six statutory factors, and further observes that Defendant did not identify which factors were purportedly omitted. As to Defendant's argument regarding lack of legal resources, Movant maintains that because the State itself caused the deprivation, citing a software glitch that impeded access to materials while he was in SHU, the State now seeks to benefit from its own wrongdoing. Movant clarifies that the initial SHU sanction stemmed from a misbehavior report issued at Auburn Correctional Facility on October 31, 2024. On November 11, 2024, he received a second SHU sanction, to run consecutively. In January 2025, the first sanction was reversed; however, the second sanction was backdated only to November 11, 2024, leaving the period from October 31 to November 11, 2024, eleven days unaccounted for. Movant states that the second sanction expired on March 11, 2025, but due to a Wildcat strike, his movement was unlawfully restricted and he remained in SHU without any corresponding disciplinary determination until his release on April 8, 2025, a period of twenty-seven additional days. Movant also asserts that the initial misbehavior report and resulting sanction were reversed because the hearing officer ignored his request for hearing-impaired accommodations, constituting a violation of due process. He argues that because the second period of confinement was imposed without a disciplinary hearing, the State cannot claim quasi-judicial immunity.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The State's Waiver of Immunity Under Section 8 of The Court of Claims Act

The State's waiver of immunity under Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act is conditioned upon a movant's compliance with specific conditions set forth in Article II, including the time limitations set forth in Section 10 (see Alston v State of New York, 97 NY2d 159, 163 [2001]). These requirements must be "'strictly construed and a failure to comply therewith is a jurisdictional defect compelling the dismissal of the claim'" (Hargrove v State of New York, 138 AD3d 777, 777-778 [2d Dept 2016], quoting Welch v State of New York, 286 AD2d 496, 497-498 [2d Dept 2001]; see Finnerty v New York State Thruway Auth., 75 NY2d 721, 722-723 [1989]).

The Sufficiency of the Proposed Claim Under Court of Claims Act § 11 (b)

"Facts stated in a motion for leave to file a late claim are deemed true for purpose of [the] motion, when not denied or contradicted in opposing affidavits" (Sessa v State of New York, 88 Misc 2d 454, 458 [Ct Cl 1976], affd 63 AD2d 334 [3d Dept 1978], affd 47 NY2d 976 [*3][1979], ; see Schweickert v State of New York, 64 AD2d 1026, 1026 [4th Dept 1978]; Cole v State of New York, 64 AD2d 1023 [4th Dept 1978]). Here, Defendant has denied the allegations in the Proposed Claim.

Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) requires that a notice of intention or a claim "shall state the time when and place where such claim arose [and] the nature of same." Whether a claim is sufficient under Section 11 (b) is subject to strict scrutiny as Sections 10 and 11 of the Court of Claims Act are jurisdictional (see Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 NY3d 201, 207 [2003]; see also Dreger v New York State Thruway Auth., 81 NY2d 721, 724 [1992]) and not waivable.

It is well-established that the failure to satisfy the substantive pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) is a jurisdictional defect that requires dismissal of the claim (see Hargrove v State of New York, 138 AD3d 777, 777 [2d Dept 2016]; Kolnacki v State of New York, 8 NY3d 277, 280-281 [2007]; Lepkowski at 206-207 ; Czynski v State of New York, 53 AD3d 881, 882-883 [3d Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 715 [2009]).

The Court has reviewed the allegations contained within the four corners of the Proposed Claim and finds that the allegations contained therein are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of specificity of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b).

Motion to File a Late Claim

Court of Claims Act Section 10 (6) grants the Court the discretion to allow the filing of a late claim upon consideration of all relevant factors, including whether the movant's delay was excusable, whether defendant had timely notice of and the opportunity to investigate the pertinent allegations, whether defendant would suffer substantial prejudice should the motion be granted, whether the proposed claim has the appearance of merit and whether the movant has an alternate remedy. Additionally, an application pursuant to the statute must be made prior to the expiration of the underlying statute of limitations, and it must be supported by a proposed claim that complies with the pleading requirements of Court of Claims § 11 (b). It is "well settled that in deciding whether to grant an application for leave to file a late claim, the presence or absence of any one of these factors is not controlling" (Weaver v State of New York, 112 AD2d 416, 417 [2d Dept 1985]).

Timeliness of the Motion Under Court of Claims Act §10 (6)

The first issue for determination upon a late claim motion is whether the motion was filed before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations under CPLR Article 2 (Court of Claims Act § 10 [6]). The applicable statute of limitations for a claim for wrongful confinement (an intentional tort) is one year from the date of release from SHU (See CPLR § 215[3]). Here, Movant was released from SHU on April 8, 2025, and the motion was filed on August 14, 2025. Accordingly, the motion is timely.

Consideration of the Six Factors Under Court of Claims Act § 10 (6)

Whether the Delay in Filing was Excusable

While it is true that the appellate courts have held that "barring very unusual circumstances, it has been held that ignorance of the law, lack of access to a law library, and lack of legal assistance are not viable excuses for filing a late claim" (Mario's Pizzeria of Commack, Corp. v State of New York, 87 Misc 3d 1224(A), 2025 NY Slip OP 51676[U],*4 [Ct Cl 2025]; see Matter of Sandlin v State of New York, 294 AD2d 723 [3rd Dept 2002] lv. dismissed, 99 NY2d 589 [2003]; see also Matter of Thomas v State of New York, 272 AD2d 650, 651 [3rd Dept 2000]; see also Matter of P.A. v State of New York, 277 AD2d 671, 672 [3rd Dept 2000]), it would further the interests of fairness and meaningful access to justice to recognize that the [*4]Defendant's failure to provide the legal resources Movant requested forms a reasonable basis for his lack of a timely filing.

While the Court acknowledges that a lack of familiarity with the Court of Claims' requirements does not, on its own, constitute a legally sufficient excuse for a late filing, the Court finds it compelling in this instance that Movant was denied access to essential legal resources, including the law library and Westlaw.

This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of granting the motion.

Whether the Defendant Had Notice and the Opportunity to Investigate, and Whether the Defendant Will Suffer Substantial Prejudice

The next three factors to be addressed—whether the defendant had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim, whether the defendant had an opportunity to investigate the circumstances underlying the claim, and whether the failure to file or serve a timely claim resulted in substantial prejudice to the defendant—are interrelated and will be considered together.

Here, there has been no satisfactory showing that the Defendant lacked the opportunity to investigate or has or will suffer substantial prejudice if the motion is granted. As for whether the Defendant had notice, based upon the allegations and circumstances alleged by Movant, the Court is satisfied that it did have notice, as well as an opportunity to investigate the allegations. Accordingly, these factors weigh in favor of the motion.

Whether Movant has Another Available Remedy

With respect to the fifth factor to be considered—whether the Movant has another remedy available— there is no dispute that there is no alternative remedy for Movant with respect to this claim. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting the motion.

Whether the Claim has the Appearance of Merit

The sixth and most important factor to be considered is whether the proposed claim appears meritorious, since it would be futile to permit a meritless claim to proceed (Matter of Santana v New York State Thruway Auth., 92 Misc 2d 1, *10 [Ct Cl 1977]). In order to establish a meritorious claim, a movant must demonstrate that the proposed claim is not patently groundless, frivolous, or legally defective, and that there is reasonable cause to believe that a valid claim exists (id. at *11). There is a heavier burden on a party moving for permission to file a late claim than on a claimant who has complied with the provisions of the Court of Claims Act (see id. at *11-*12; see also Nyberg v State of New York, 154 Misc 2d 199, 202 [Ct Cl 1992]).

At this stage of the proceedings, however the "[Movant] only has to establish the appearance of merit and need not prove a prima facie case" (see Allen v State of New York, 2002 WL 31940720, 2002 NY Slip Op 50505[U] [Ct Cl 2002], affd Matter of Allen v State of New York, 4 AD3d 835 [4th Dept 2004]).

A cause of action for wrongful confinement, requires claimant to prove that "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged." (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975] cert denied sub nom., Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). The first three factors are usually easily met as was the case here. Whether the disciplinary confinement was privileged is the issue. Disciplinary confinement is privileged if it was done in accordance with DOCCS due process regulations (Lee v State of New York, 124 AD2d 305, 307 [3d Dept 1986]; Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc [*5]2d, 399, 402 [Ct Cl 1986]).

Where DOCCS's employees have conducted the disciplinary process in accordance with the governing statutes and regulations, their actions are considered discretionary conduct that is quasi-judicial in nature and absolutely immune from liability (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]; Bottom,142 AD3d 1314 [4th Dept 2016]). Even if the hearing officer's findings are later reversed after an administrative appeal, disciplinary decisions may be immune from liability (Arteaga, at 215; Loret v State of New York, 106 AD3d 1159 [3d Dept 2013]). Movant must show that there was some violation of a due process regulation and demonstrate that the outcome of the hearing would have been different had the violation not occurred (Bottom v State of New York, 142 AD3d 1314; Moustakos v State of New York, 133 AD3d 1268 [4th Dept 2015]). It is movant's burden to demonstrate that he was denied due process at the hearing, that the disciplinary hearing was conducted in violation of the relevant rules and regulations and that but for such violation, he would not have been confined.

The violation of the due process rules removes the absolute immunity of Arteaga but still requires that a wrongful confinement cause of action be established. Movant has shown the first three elements of a wrongful confinement cause of action and it is the Defendant's burden to establish privilege (Ifill v State of New York, 149 AD3d 1287, 1289 [3d Dept 2017]; Moulton v State of New York, 114 AD3d 115, 120 [3d Dept 2013]).

The release of an incarcerated individual from keeplock or SHU confinement upon the expiration of a disciplinary penalty "is a purely ministerial act invoking no discretionary authority" (Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 406 [Ct Cl 1986]), and when an incarcerated individual is subjected to continued disciplinary confinement that lacks a statutory or regulatory basis, the defendant may be liable for failing to timely release him from the disciplinary confinement (see id.; Minieri v State of New York, 204 AD2d 982 [4th Dept 1994] [state liable for 40 days of SHU confinement after administrative reversal of disciplinary determination]).

Here, Movant has alleged and Defendant has not disputed that he was held in SHU without proper sanction for a total of thirty-eight days. The claim asserts that although the first sanction was reversed, the second sanction was backdated only to November 11, 2024, leaving the period from October 31, 2024 through November 11, 2024, eleven days unaccounted for. Movant further alleges that after the second sanction concluded on March 11, 2025, he remained in SHU due to a Wildcat strike that resulted in an unlawful movement hold at the Upstate Correctional Facility, unaccompanied by any disciplinary determination. He was ultimately released on April 8, 2025. According to Movant, the period from March 11, 2025 through April 8, 2025 constitutes an additional twenty-seven days of unlawful SHU confinement.

The proposed claim further alleges that during this period, from March 12, 2025 to April 8, 2025, Movant was denied programming and other general population activities, and was provided no reasonable accommodations for his hearing impairment.

At this stage, the Court finds that the proposed claim is sufficiently plead to permit Defendant to investigate and assess its potential liability. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting the motion.

DECISION AND ORDER

Weighing all six factors together, the Court will grant Movant leave to file a late claim.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, that Motion No. M-102642, seeking leave to file a late Claim is [*6]GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED, that Movant shall file and serve his claim with the State of New York, within 40 days of the date of the filing of this decision and order, in conformity with the requirements of Court of Claims Act §§ 10, 11, and 11-a.

Dated: July 6, 2026

Hauppauge, New York

HON. LINDA K. MEJIAS-GLOVER,

Judge of the Court of Claims

Papers Read on this Motion:

1. Notice of Motion, Affirmation in Support of Motion to File a Late Claim, Exhibits Annexed

2. Affirmation in Opposition

3. Affirmation in Response to Defendant's Opposition to Claimant's Motion for Permission to File Late Claim, Exhibit Annexed