Yoel W. v Sosha W.

Supreme Court, Rockland County

Decided on March 2, 2026

Index No. 031949/2023

Rachel E. Tanguay, J.

The following papers, NYSCEF documents numbered 138-246 were considered in connection with:

• Defendant's Order to Show Cause (Motion #9) for an Order, (i) pursuant to DRL § 234 immediately restoring possession of the marital residence located at [], Airmont, New York 10952 to Defendant and the parties' two unemancipated children; (ii) granting immediate exclusive use, occupancy and possession of the parties marital residence; (iii) awarding Defendant and the parties' two unemancipated children a stay away, non-contact Order of Protection against Plaintiff, or upon such other, and different terms and conditions as this Court deems just and proper; (iv) upon resuming exclusive use, occupancy and possession of the marital residence, authorizing Defendant to immediately list the parties' marital residence for public sale and authorizing the distribution of any net proceeds therefrom to Defendant in accordance with the decision of this Court, dated October 22, 2024, which granted ancillary relief in Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim upon Plaintiff's intentional details; (v) pursuant to CPLR § 5107, issuing an [*2]Order directing the Rockland County Sheriff's Office to execute all paperwork necessary to list the real property for public sale, and further authorizing the execution of all paperwork necessary to convey the property by Sheriff's Deed to a bona fide thirty-party purchaser for value upon its sale; (vi) holding Plaintiff in civil and/or criminal contempt for willfully violating his child support obligations as directed by a Temporary Order of Support of the Rockland County Family Court dated March 27, 2023; (vii) awarding Defendant costs, expenses and reasonable attorney fees; and (viii) granting such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper;

• Defendant's Order to Show Cause (Motion #10) for an Order, (i) holding Plaintiff in civil and/or criminal contempt for willfully violating DRL § 236B(2)(b) and 22 NYCRR § 202.16-a; (ii) pursuant to CPLR § 2701 and DRL § 234, directing Plaintiff disclose and then deposit into Court, or pay into an escrow account as maintained by legal counsel for Defendant, all proceeds from the June 6, 2025 sale of the property, known as [], Airmont, New York 10952; (iii) awarding costs, expenses and reasonable attorneys fees; and (iv) for such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper;

• Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause (Motion #11) for an Order, (i) temporarily staying all proceedings in this action, including but not limited to any scheduled inquest hearing, motions practice, discovery, depositions, trials and any proceeding s whatsoever, pending this court's decision on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Discontinue Action (filed contemporaneously herewith); (ii) vacating any default judgment, default order, or other order entered in Plaintiff's absence during the period when Plaintiff was hospitalized and unable to appear before this court, on the grounds that Plaintiff properly notified the Court of his unavailability due to medical emergency and hospitalization; and (iii) for such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper;

• Plaintiff's Notice of Motion (Motion #12) for an Order, (i) compelling arbitration before Beit Din Kav HaYoshor, pursuant to the binding Arbitration Agreement executed by both parties on July 3, 2024, requiring resolution of all financial and property disputes through arbitration; (ii) discontinuing this action without prejudice, pursuant to CPLR § 3217, on the grounds that the parties contractually agreed to arbitrate all disputes, Defendant executed a stipulation of discontinuance, the parties appeared before the Beit Din on September 18, 2025, additional hearings are scheduled, and Defendant's active participation and execution of the stipulation constitute acceptance of arbitration and a waiver of any defense to arbitrability, or alternatively; (iii) staying all proceedings, pursuant to CPLR § 7503, pending the completion of arbitration currently underway before Beit Din Kav HaYoshor, to prevent inconsistent determinations, conserve judicial resources, and enforce the parties' contractual agreement and Defendant's stipulation of discontinuance; (iv) noting for the record that Plaintiff's due process rights have been systematically violated on two separate occasions; and (v) granting such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper;

• Plaintiff's Notice of Motion (Motion #13) for an Order, pursuant to CPLR §§ 5015(a)(1), (a)(3), 317 and 327(a), (i) vacating the default judgment entered against [*3]Plaintiff on or about July 7, 2025, which so-ordered the transcript of proceedings dated October 22, 2024; (ii) granting Plaintiff leave to appear and defend the action on the merits; (iii) staying all enforcement of the so-ordered transcript pending determination of this motion and any further proceedings; (iv) dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or on the grounds of forum non conveniens; and (v) granting such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Upon the foregoing papers, the Court now rules as follows:

Procedural History

The instant matter has a prolonged history having been commenced on May 2, 2023 with the filing of a Summons with Notice. NYSCEF Doc. 1. A Complaint was filed on June 16, 2023. NYSCEF Doc. 11. An Answer with Counterclaims was filed on July 11, 2023. NYSCEF Doc. 29. On July 17, 2023, Defendant filed a Reply to the Counterclaims. NYSCEF Doc. 30. By Administrative Order, pending custody, family offense and child support dockets/petitions were transferred from the Rockland County Family Court into the matrimonial action. At the time of the transfer, there was a temporary order of support in place that had been entered on March 27, 2023 and had directed Plaintiff to pay to Defendant $1,249 per month in basic child support for their five children. The family offense and custody matters had been pending before the Family Court since 2022, where there were temporary orders of protection in place that directed inter alia that Plaintiff stay away from Defendant and the parties' children (except for contact between Plaintiff and the children as mutually agreed upon by the parties), to stay away from the marital home, the children's schools, to refrain from electronic communication with the Defendant and the children, to refrain from committing family offense against the protected parties, to surrender all firearms, to restore all utility services to the marital home and refrain from taking steps to interrupt such services. The last temporary order of protection out of the Family Court expired June 27, 2023. Justice Sherri Eisenpress, the original Supreme Court Justice on this case, issued a new temporary order of protection out the Integrated Domestic Violence Court on October 13, 2023 which directed Plaintiff (who was listed as the Defendant in the order) to stay away from Defendant and the children, refrain from communication and issuing a protective paragraph. That order expired on January 3, 2024 and no further temporary orders of protection were issued by the prior Jurist. It remains unclear to this Court whether this was intentional or an oversight, although it does not appear that Defendant withdrew her claims at any point. In fact, in 2023, Defendant filed a petition alleging that Plaintiff had violated the temporary order of protection, which was transferred into the matrimonial action as well.

From what this Court can glean from its review of the file, coupled with the parties' submissions, from 2022 through early 2024, Defendant had alleged a series of serious safety concerns in both her family court petitions and her counterclaims for divorce. She claimed that Plaintiff had engaged in a pattern of coercive control, as well as emotional and physical abuse of her and the children, including but not limited to, raping her repeatedly, hitting the children, cutting her off from others and withholding monies. She claims that rabbis intervened and instructed Plaintiff to leave the marital residence in 2022, but that he continually re-entered the home when she was not present to snoop through her WhatsApp messages contained on her personal computer and suspected he planted cameras in the home to monitor hers and the children's movements. She also alleged that Plaintiff engaged in substance use and suffered from mental health concerns. The Court ordered that all contact between the children and [*4]Plaintiff be supervised and directed the parties to submit to a forensic evaluation with Dr. Verno, which was never completed. When the children resisted contact with Plaintiff, the Court ordered a family dynamic assessment with the Derech Shalom Center; however, it does not appear that this was ever completed either.^FN1 The Court also ordered drug testing for both parties and a hair follicle test for Plaintiff. After these orders were issued, Plaintiff left the country and went to Israel, where he remained until 2025.

From commencement of the matrimonial action until on or about January 2, 2025, Judge Sherri L. Eisenpress, J.S.C. (ret.), presided over this matter. In January 2025, Judge Tanguay was informed that she was to assume Judge Eisenpress' former Rockland County inventory in its entirety going forward.^FN2 After multiple adjournments of the proceedings once Plaintiff was in Israel, the Court under the prior Jurist entertained applications in the Plaintiff's absence on October 22, 2024. Defendant appeared pro se on that date, along with the attorney for the child.^FN3 The Court stated the following with respect to Plaintiff's non-appearance:

It's my understanding that Mr. W. is in Israel and that apparently this is a law in Israel that says he cannot leave the country until he gives a Get, which he's refusing to do so he cannot leave Israel; as a result, he has not appeared here on multiple occasions. He did appear once in a virtual conference most recently and I advised him that he's not excused from appearing. He can leave the country as soon as he gives her a Get, which I believe was ordered by the Beth Din.

(NYSCEF Doc. 147 at 3:21-4:4). The Court, based upon the application of the attorney for the child, granted Defendant sole legal and physical custody of the children with no contact between Plaintiff and the children, and granted Defendant's counterclaim for divorce. Defendant asked for the temporary child support order from the Family Court to be made into a permanent order of support and the Court incorrectly stated that the support matter was not pending before the Supreme Court. However, the clerk corrected the record and informed the judge that the support docket had been transferred into the matrimonial action. The Court did not address the child support issue any further, nor did the Court address any of the ancillary financial issues. Defendant requested that in lieu of paying her maintenance, that Plaintiff be ordered to pay the [*5]mortgage payments on the marital home for a ten-year period at which time she would list the property for sale. The Court's succinct conclusion to the proceedings was, "You're asking me, Ms. W., to grant your counterclaims, and I will do that. That application is granted and an order will issue." Id. at 9:20-22. However, no final judgment or documents were ever submitted, nor was the transcript "so-ordered".^FN4 The prior Jurist had marked this action disposed as of October 22, 2024, causing this matter not to appear on the Court's active case inventory when Judge Tanguay inherited Judge Eisenpress' inventory. Defendant's new counsel filed Motion #9 on June 25, 2025, which triggered a review of this closed case to ascertain its procedural history, and where this Court discovered that the matter had been marked as being disposed on October 22, 2024 even though no final order had been issued.^FN5

On May 2, 2025, Defendant filed a family offense petition in the Rockland County Family Court, alleging that the Plaintiff, who she believes continued to reside in Israel, had returned to the United States while she was herself in Israel for several weeks, and that he had re-entered the marital home and changed the locks. The Court did not issue a temporary order of protection, as there were no written orders from the prior Jurist granting a divorce and giving Defendant exclusive possession of the marital home. On the next scheduled court date of May 27, 2025, Plaintiff appeared before the Court, evidencing his return from Israel,^FN6 but Defendant did not and her petition was dismissed.

Factual Allegations in the Five Pending Motions

On June 25, 2025, Defendant filed an Order to Show Cause (Motion #9) for an Order: (i) pursuant to DRL § 234 immediately restoring possession of the marital residence located at [], Airmont, New York 10952 to Defendant and the parties' two unemancipated children; (ii) granting immediate exclusive use, occupancy and possession of the parties marital residence; (iii) awarding Defendant and the parties' two unemancipated children a stay away, non-contact Order of Protection against Plaintiff, or upon such other, and different terms and conditions as this Court deems just and proper; (iv) upon resuming exclusive use, occupancy and possession of the marital residence, authorizing Defendant to immediately list the parties' marital residence for public sale and authorizing the distribution of any net proceeds therefrom to Defendant in accordance with the decision of this Court, dated October 22, 2024, which granted ancillary relief in Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim upon Plaintiff's intentional details; (v) pursuant to CPLR § 5107, issuing an Order directing the Rockland County Sheriff's Office to execute all [*6]paperwork necessary to list the real property for public sale, and further authorizing the execution of all paperwork necessary to convey the property by Sheriff's Deed to a bona fide thirty-party purchaser for value upon its sale; (vi) holding Plaintiff in civil and/or criminal contempt for willfully violating his child support obligations as directed by a Temporary Order of Support of the Rockland County Family Court dated March 27, 2023; (vii) awarding Defendant costs, expenses and reasonable attorney fees; and (viii) granting such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper. NYSCEF Doc. 138. In support of this motion, Defendant submits, inter alia, the Child Support Order, the October 22, 2024 Court transcript, and the home appraisal. NYSCEF Docs. 142-144.

Quite shockingly, Defendant alleges that in or about April of 2025, she went to Israel to visit family, believing that Plaintiff remained in Israel since he had maintained he was unable to travel to the U.S. for court proceedings due to the Israeli travel ban imposed upon him for his failure to give Defendant a Get. However, she learned that while she was there, Plaintiff returned to the United States, re-entered the marital home and changed the locks, rendering her and the children unhoused.

On June 27, 2025, the parties appeared for a conference on the Order to Show Cause during which Plaintiff appeared pro se and requested thirty (30) days to hire an attorney. The Court directed that opposition papers be submitted by August 22, 2025^FN7 and reply papers by September 5, 2025. The Court further noted that the matter should be in IDV as there are family offense and custody/visitation petitions pending in Family Court that had been removed into the matrimonial action.^FN8 Defendant reaffirmed the allegations in the family offense petition and the Court reissued the stay away temporary order of protection (TOP) out of the Supreme Court. The Court noted that the previously issued TOP had lapsed and re-issued a new one which directed, inter alia, Plaintiff to vacate the marital home by 5:00 p.m. on June 27, 2025.^FN9 With both parties present, the Court scheduled the next court conference for September 16, 2025.

On August 8, 2025, Defendant filed another Order to Show Cause (Motion #10) for an Order, (i) holding Plaintiff in civil and/or criminal contempt for willfully violating DRL § 236B(2)(b) and 22 NYCRR § 202.16-a; (ii) pursuant to CPLR § 2701 and DRL § 234, directing Plaintiff disclose and then deposit into Court, or pay into an escrow account as maintained by legal counsel for Defendant, all proceeds from the June 6, 2025 sale of the property, known as [] Airmont, New York 10952; (iii) awarding costs, expenses and reasonable attorneys fees; and (iv) for such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper. NYSCEF Doc. 152. In support of the instant motion, Defendant submits, inter alia, the deed, the RP-5217 and the [*7]Clerk's recording list. NYSCEF Docs. 155-157. After this Court directed Plaintiff to vacate the marital residence and stay away, Defendant learned that he had in fact sold the home without her knowledge or consent, had allegedly pocketed a significant sum of money for the sale and that this violated the Court's automatic orders.

In advance of the September 16, 2025 conference, Plaintiff submitted a document purported to be a fully-executed Stipulation of Discontinuance that appeared to have been signed by both parties and notarized on July 3, 2024. He asked that the Court sign the document, discontinuing the action in favor of arbitration before the Bais Din. Defendant, through counsel, opposed the request and the Court posted a "Court Notice" directing all parties and counsel to appear for the September 16, 2025 conference. This document was first presented to the prior Jurist in 2024 with only the Plaintiff's notarized signature. NYSCEF Doc. 131. Curiously, the document submitted to the Court by Plaintiff on September 12, 2025 purports to have the notarized signatures of both parties. Although upon initial inspection of that document, the Court questions why the purported signature of the Defendant looks very different from her signature on every other document she has signed and filed with the Court. NYSCEF Doc. 172.

On September 16, 2025, the Court held a conference on the two pending Orders to Show Cause (Motions #9 and #10). Plaintiff failed to appear.^FN10 Counsel for Defendant notified the Court that the prior jurist resolved the ancillary issues of the divorce in 2024 without detailing what the issues were or how to distribute the assets. With respect to the instant motion for contempt (Motion #10), counsel for Defendant indicated that a new amended order to show cause would be filed requesting only civil contempt and removing the request for criminal contempt. That amended Order to Show Cause was filed and conformed on September 18, 2025. The Court scheduled an inquest for December 16, 2025 at 2:00 p.m.

On October 28, 2025, Plaintiff, still representing himself, filed two motions (Motions #11 and 12). Motion #11 is an Order to Show Cause (Motion #11) for an Order: (i) temporarily staying all proceedings in this action, including but not limited to any scheduled inquest hearing, motions practice, discovery, depositions, trials and any proceedings whatsoever, pending this Court's decision on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Discontinue Action (filed contemporaneously herewith); (ii) vacating any default judgment, default order, or other order entered in Plaintiff's absence during the period when Plaintiff was hospitalized and unable to appear before this court, on the grounds that Plaintiff properly notified the Court of his unavailability due to medical emergency and hospitalization^FN11; and (iii) for such other and further [*8]relief as this Court deems just and proper. NYSCEF DOC. 201.

Plaintiff contends that he and Defendant voluntarily entered into a binding arbitration agreement on July 3, 2024 that referred all ancillary financial issues to the Bais Din. Defendant, in opposition, claims that in 2024, Plaintiff and his rabbi coerced her into signing an arbitration agreement by threatening her that she would never receive a Get unless she submitted to the Rabbinical Court's involvement. To avoid becoming an agunah, she relented but under duress. She claims to have signed the document in the presence of Rabbi T., who notarized her signature, but that Plaintiff himself did not sign the document at that time. She contends that Plaintiff repudiated the agreement by not signing it at that time and failing to give the Get he would have needed to provide. This failure on his part and his refusal to sign the arbitration agreement, according to Defendant, is why the Israeli tribunal the very next day issued its travel ban. NYSCEF Doc. 216. In reply, Plaintiff claims he did sign the agreement and that they both voluntarily agreed to end the litigation in secular court and refer all matters to the Bais Din in 2024, which effectively ended this Court's jurisdiction over all issues in the divorce action. In support, Plaintiff submits an arbitration agreement with certified English translation that was purportedly signed on the "16th day of the month Sivan year 5,784"^FN12 by both parties.^FN13 NYSCEF Doc. 225. Also attached to the moving papers is a document alleged to be a Stipulation of Discontinuance, but it is only signed by Plaintiff, not Defendant. NYSCEF Doc. 227.

Motion #12 is a motion for an Order: (i) compelling arbitration before Beit Din Kav HaYoshor, pursuant to the binding Arbitration Agreement executed by both parties on July 3, 2024^FN14, requiring resolution of all financial and property disputes through arbitration; (ii) discontinuing this action without prejudice, pursuant to CPLR § 3217, on the grounds that the parties contractually agreed to arbitrate all disputes, Defendant executed a stipulation of discontinuance, the parties appeared before the Beit Din on September 18, 2025, additional hearings are scheduled, and Defendant's active participation and execution of the stipulation constitute acceptance of arbitration and a waiver of any defense to arbitrability, or alternatively; (iii) staying all proceedings, pursuant to CPLR § 7503, pending the completion of arbitration currently underway before Beit Din Kav HaYoshor, to prevent inconsistent determinations, conserve judicial resources, and enforce the parties' contractual agreement and Defendant's stipulation of discontinuance; (iv) noting for the record that Plaintiff's due process rights have been systematically violated on two separate occasions; and (v) granting such other and further [*9]relief as this Court deems just and proper. NYSCEF Doc. 207. Plaintiff contends that under Article 75 of the CPLR, the binding arbitration agreement requires a stay of the action until the arbitration is complete. He also argues that Defendant's alleged participation in arbitration constitutes a waiver to any objections to arbitration. Defendant again reiterates that she has not consented to arbitration. She maintains that she was coerced into signing the June 22, 2024 agreement but that this is unenforceable now anyway since Plaintiff failed to provide her a Get at that time, and that her appearance at a Bais Din in September 2025 was for the limited purpose of receiving a Get and that she refused to participate in what she described as an ambush attempt to bully her into a full arbitration with a rabbi aligned with Plaintiff. Defendant annexes to her opposition papers a certified translation of a document evidencing that Plaintiff provided Defendant a Get on "the 25th day of Elul in the year [5785]"^FN15. NYSCEF Doc. 220 (brackets added).

The Court conformed the Order to Show Cause (Motion #11) and scheduled an appearance on November 13, 2025. Further, the Court crossed out the prong for relief with respect to vacating default orders from the prior appearance since no orders were entered on default at the September 16, 2025 Court appearance. At the November 13, 2025 Court appearance, both parties appeared with counsel. With respect to the arbitration agreement, Defendant argues that the Bais Din involvement on September 18, 2025 was solely with respect to the Get, not the other financial issues and Plaintiff disagrees. The Court noted that the default orders were still in place and that no formal application had been made to vacate same. Plaintiff was directed to file a motion to vacate the default from the October 22, 2024 Court appearance, so-ordered on July 7, 2025, no later than December 5, 2025. The Court also issued another stay away Temporary Order of Protection on behalf of Defendant and the subject children.^FN16 NYSCEF Doc. 209.

On December 8, 2025^FN17, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion (Motion #13) for an Order, pursuant to CPLR §§ 5015(a)(1), (a)(3), 317 and 327(a): (i) vacating the default judgment entered against Plaintiff on or about July 7, 2025, which so-ordered the transcript of proceedings dated October 22, 2024; (ii) granting Plaintiff leave to appear and defend the action on the merits; (iii) staying all enforcement of the so-ordered transcript pending determination of this motion and any further proceedings; (iv) dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or on the grounds of forum non conveniens; and (v) granting such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant filed divorce proceedings against him in Israel despite the pendency of these proceedings in a bad faith effort to trap him in Israel, knowing that he would be unable to leave until he offered a Get, something he was not prepared to do at the time. [*10]Defendant opposes the motion, pointing out that Plaintiff was ordered by a valid tribunal to provide the Get and that compliance with that order would have enabled him to be present for court proceedings, as well as comply with other court orders for evaluations and visits with the children. He chose not to follow an order which he claims prevented him from leaving Israel, but that this was utterly preventable. She claims that this is not a reasonable excuse for his failure to appear at the October 22, 2024 inquest. The Court also takes notice that Plaintiff managed to appear in-person before the Family Court in May 2025 and this Court in June 2025, both prior to his giving of a Get on September 18, 2025. Moreover, she correctly points out that Plaintiff's affirmation in support of his motion is devoid any claims or allegations relating to whether he could mount a meritorious claim or defense in connection with the ancillary issues of the divorce, such as custody and financial issues, as well as the family offense allegations. Plaintiff's counsel submitted a reply in which he avers that Plaintiff's submission do outline his claims relating to a meritorious claim/defense; however, the Court reviewed all submitted papers in connection with Motion #13 and the only claim relating to a meritorious defense made by Plaintiff was that there was a binding, fully-executed arbitration agreement in place prior to the entry of the default order. He does not offer anything else relating to custody, the family offense, or any of the financial issues.

All motions were deemed fully submitted as of January 16, 2026.

Legal Analysis

There are several complicated legal issues presented in this case. Many of the requests for relief set forth in Motion #9 are now moot, given that the marital home appears to have been sold by Plaintiff in June 2025. The only surviving claims from that motion are Defendant's application for an order of protection and application for contempt for Plaintiff's failure to pay basic child support.

In connection with the pending motions, this Court must determine: (1) whether Plaintiff in fact sold the marital residence in about June 2025 in violation of automatic restraining orders and if so, what remedy should be imposed upon him for this contempt and what should happen with the proceeds from that sale during the pendency of the litigation; (2) whether Plaintiff has willfully failed to pay basic child support to Defendant as required by the temporary order of support dated March 27, 2023, and if so, what remedy should be imposed upon him for this contempt; (3) whether the Arbitration Agreement alleged to have been signed by both parties on and dated June 22, 2024 is valid and binding; (4) whether the Stipulation of Discontinuance alleged to have been signed by both parties and on and dated July 3, 2024 is valid and binding; (5) whether the Court should set aside any orders that it issued in connection with decisions the prior Jurist made in Plaintiff's absence on October 22, 2024; (6) if there are remaining issues to be determined by this Court in connection with the divorce action; and (7) whether New York should continue to exercise jurisdiction over this case given allegations made by Plaintiff that both parties reside outside of the State of New York.

Contempt

Defendant has sought a finding of civil contempt against Plaintiff on two distinct bases. Firstly, she alleges he entered the marital home without her knowledge while she was in Israel and sold the property without her knowledge or consent. Secondly, she alleges that Plaintiff has never paid her any child support in connection with an order that was issued out of the Family Court in 2023. Plaintiff did not file any opposition papers to the allegations set forth in Motions #9 and #10.

With respect to the first claim that Plaintiff sold the marital residence during the pendency of the proceedings in violation of automatic orders, the Court finds that Plaintiff has in fact violated orders that required him to obtain the permission of Defendant or a court order before conveying the marital home to a third party. D.R.L. § 236 (B) (2) (b) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

The automatic orders shall remain in full force and effect during the pendency of the action, unless terminated, modified or amended by further order of the court . . . . The automatic orders are as follows:

(1) Neither party shall sell, transfer, encumber, conceal, assign, remove or in any way dispose of, without the consent of the other party in writing, or by order of the court, any property (including, but not limited to, real estate, . . . ) individually or jointly held by the parties, except in the usual course of business, for customary and usual household expenses or for reasonable attorney's fees in connection with this action.

(Ellipses added).

Moreover, 22 NYCRR 202.16-a similarly provides, in pertinent part:

(c) Automatic Orders. Upon service of the summons in every matrimonial action, it is hereby ordered that:

(1) Neither party shall sell, transfer, encumber, conceal, assign, remove or in any way dispose of, without the consent of the other party in writing, or by order of the court, any property (including, but not limited to, real estate, . . . ) individually or jointly held by the parties, except in the usual course of business, for customary and usual household expenses or for reasonable attorney's fees in connection with this action.

In Spencer v. Spencer, 159 AD3d 174, 177 (2d Dept. 2018), the Second Department concluded that these automatic orders are clear and unequivocal mandates, as a Summons for Divorce must include language relating to these automatic orders and caution the parties that failure to comply with these orders can result of in a finding of contempt by the Court. Given that no final judgment of divorce has yet been entered in this case, Defendant is permitted to seek a finding of civil contempt in connection with Plaintiff failure to adhere to automatic orders. Id.

The Second Department has held that the movant must establish by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) that a lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, was in effect, (2) that the party against whom contempt is sought disobeyed the order, (3) that the party who disobeyed the order had knowledge of its terms, and (4) that the movant was prejudiced by the offending conduct. Once such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the alleged contemnor to refute that showing or to offer evidence of a defense such as an inability to comply with the order.

Tankleff v. Tankleff, 239 AD3d 685, 686 (2d Dept. 2025). "A hearing is not mandated in every instance where a finding of contempt is sought. It need only be conducted if a factual dispute exists which cannot be resolved on the papers alone." Chichra v Chichra, 148 AD3d 883, 885 [*11](2d Dept. 2017).

Here, Defendant has met her burden by attaching exhibits to her contempt application demonstrating that on June 5, 2025, Plaintiff signed bargain and sale deed conveying the marital home to the "Triveni Estates Corp." in Delaware. NYSCEF Doc. 155. She also attaches a Real Property Transfer Report filed with the Rockland County Clerk's Office evidencing the sale and transfer of the property on June 6, 2025 with a full sales price of $999,000. NYSCEF Doc. 156. The Buyer is listed as "Noah Goldstein". Finally, she provides a printout of records from the Rockland County Clerk's Office relating to Plaintiff, evidencing the filing of a deed on June 12, 2025 relating to the marital home in the amount of $340,000. NYSCEF Doc. 157. Plaintiff offered nothing to refute these allegations. As such, without there being any factual dispute, the Court finds that Plaintiff is in contempt of automatic restraining orders. "Upon a determination that a party has committed civil contempt, the court may impose as a punishment a fine in an amount sufficient to indemnify the aggrieved party for an actual loss, including counsel fees." Tankleff, supra at 686-687.

Defendant requests Plaintiff be ordered to turn over the funds he received for the sale of the marital residence, as well as pay $7,500 in counsel fees as and for her having to bring an application before this Court as a remedy for contempt. While this would cure the inequity that Plaintiff created by his violation of court orders, the Court has tremendous concerns that given the history of this case, a mere direction by the Court that Plaintiff disclose the sums of monies received from the transfer and deposit those funds in an escrow account would be insufficient. In 2024, Plaintiff left the United States and went to Israel. He claims that the Defendant improperly brought duplicative divorce proceedings in Israel and that the courts there unlawfully restrained his movement. However, inexplicably, Plaintiff found himself back in the United States in May 2025, despite allegedly being under orders to remain in Israel. It was upon his clandestine return that he entered the marital home without Defendant's knowledge, and sold the residence without her consent or the court's approval. Plaintiff seemingly thumbs his nose at orders made by the Court, so what assurance does the Court have that he will comply with a direction to disclose and turn over to the equity funds from the sale of the marital home? Accordingly, Plaintiff is directed to produce proof of the funds received from the sale and closing on the marital residence and produce a bank check for those funds which will be deposited in an escrow account held by Defendant's counsel until further order of this Court. He is also directed to bring all passports issued in his name to Court so that the Clerk's Office can hold them until this action reaches its conclusion. He must bring those items with him to an in-person court appearance, with the date clearly stated at the conclusion of this Decision and Order. Plaintiff should be aware that the Court will not accept any excuse whatsoever for his non-appearance if he fails to appear in person on that date. If he fails to appear, a warrant for his arrest will be issued and he will be confined to the Rockland County Jail for a period of sixty (60) days, or until such a time that he purges this contempt. See Spencer, supra; El-Dehdan v. El-Dehdan, 26 NY3d 19 (2015). If he appears and does not bring with him the requisite documents and check, then Court will be poised to take swift and serious action that could include imprisonment until the contempt is purged.

With respect to the allegation that child support has not been paid since the temporary order of support was issued on March 27, 2023, once again, Plaintiff has not opposed that allegation. Accordingly, as stated earlier, no evidentiary hearing is required. Pursuant to Family Court Act ("FCA") § 454[3][a], "[f]ailure to pay support as ordered constitutes prima facie [*12]evidence of willful violation." Jaffe v. Jaffe, 248 AD3d 471, 472, 669 N.Y.S.2d 663 (2d Dept. 1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted)(brackets added). Such a failure shifts the burden to Plaintiff to offer competent, credible evidence of his inability to make support payments. Id. at 471; FCA § 454[3][a]. Without any defense being offered by Plaintiff, the Court finds him to be in willful violation of child support. Payment for basic child support were supposed to begin on April 1, 2023. As of the date of the filing of Motion #9, Defendant claims basic child support arrears due and owing of eleven thousand one hundred sixty dollars ($11,160)^FN18. The Court is empowered to not only set arrears but to impose a period of incarceration for up to six (6) months until such a time that the contempt can be purged with the full arrears being satisfied. F.C.A. § 454. At this juncture in the case, it remains to be seen whether Defendant will be able to recover the full amount of arrears owed from marital estate. Thus, the Court orders that Plaintiff be sentenced to six (6) months in the Rockland County Jail with such sentence being suspended upon presentation of a bond securing the arrears and counsel fees of twenty-one thousand one hundred sixty ($21,160) dollars and continuing until the conclusion of this case. If once the marital estate is equitably distributed and Plaintiff can satisfy arrears due and owing from its proceeds and/or posted bond, including counsel fees of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) on top of the arrears, then his contempt will be purged. If those funds are insufficient, however, the Court will impose sentence and the Plaintiff will need to satisfy the remaining arrears set forth in the Judgment of Divorce in order to purge his contempt and not serve the full six (6) months of his sentence of incarceration. Plaintiff is cautioned that any attempts by Plaintiff to abscond to Israel or anywhere else outside of the State of New York until such time this matter concludes and his contempt has either been purged or satisfied through serving the aforementioned periods of incarceration, will not be tolerated by this Court.

Validity of Purported Agreements

Plaintiff has proffered two documents, an Arbitration Agreement and a Stipulation of Discontinuance, that he claims were both voluntarily signed by him and Defendant in June and July of 2024. He contends that these documents effectively end the litigation of the divorce action in the secular courts and refer financial matters for arbitration and custody matters to mediation. Defendant maintains that these two documents are not enforceable; she avers that only she signed the arbitration agreement in June 2024 under extreme duress but that Plaintiff did not sign the agreement. In fact, she suspects that Plaintiff signed this agreement only recently in a ruse to try to remove this case from the Courts and to attempt nullifications of the default orders that were entered against him in October 2024. Defendant also contends that she never signed a stipulation to discontinue the action in favor of arbitration and mediation, and points out that when Plaintiff first submitted this document to the Court in July 2024, it was only signed by him and not Defendant.

With respect to the Plaintiff's claim that the stipulation of discontinuance purportedly signed by both parties on July 3, 2024 effectively ended this case and deprived the Court of jurisdiction to make any further orders, including those on October 22, 2024, the Court is governed by CPLR 3217. That rule states in pertinent part when parties may voluntarily discontinue an action after responsive pleadings have been served:

(a) Without an order. Any party asserting a claim may discontinue it without an order

2. by filing with the clerk of the court before the case has been submitted to the court or jury a stipulation in writing signed by the attorneys of record for all parties, provided that no party is an infant, incompetent person for whom a committee has been appointed or conservatee and no person not a party has an interest in the subject matter of the action.

(Emphasis added). Curiously, when the alleged stipulation of discontinuance was first presented to the Court on July 10, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc. 131), it was only signed by Plaintiff, who was pro se at that time. Neither Defendant's signature, nor the signature of her attorney-of-record at that time, Devorah Beck, Esq., were affixed to the document. When Plaintiff attempted to resubmit this document on September 12, 2025, a signature was now present on the Defendant's signature line, and it was supposedly notarized on July 3, 2024, the same day Plaintiff signed the document. It seems rather odd that if Defendant had actually signed the document on July 3, 2024 that the document submitted to the Court on July 10, 2024 was devoid of her signature. It also seems odd that the signature purported to be Defendant's signature looks nothing like the signature she has utilized on almost every other affirmation. Regardless, both documents are fatally flawed. Neither version has the signature of Ms. Beck on it, and being that Ms. Beck was Defendant's attorney-of-record on July 3, 2024, the document is insufficient to end the case as of that date without court order. Plaintiff never filed a motion to discontinue the action, nor has the Court ever ordered the matter discontinued. Accordingly, the stipulation to discontinue, which may very well be the product of a fraudulent signature, is invalid as it does not comport with the clear and express requirements of CPLR 3217.

Turning to the arbitration agreement, "[i]t is firmly established that the public policy of New York State favors and encourages arbitration and alternative dispute resolutions." Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. New York City Transit Auth., 82 NY2d 47, 53 (1975)(citations omitted)(brackets added). "Therefore, New York courts interfere as little as possible with the freedom of consenting parties' to submit disputes to arbitration." Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v. Sacharow, 91 NY2d 39, 49-50 (1997)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). An agreement to utilize the Bais Din to resolve issues in dispute has been held to be a form of an arbitration agreement. See Weisenberg v. Sass, 209 AD2d 424 (2d Dept. 1994).

CPLR § 7503(1) states in relevant part:

A party aggrieved by the failure of another to arbitrate may apply for an order compelling arbitration. Where there is no substantial question whether a valid agreement was made or complied with, and the claim sought to be arbitrated is not barred by limitation under subdivision (b) of section 7502, the court shall direct the parties to arbitrate. Where any such question is raised, it shall be tried forthwith in said court.

(Emphases added). Defendant maintains that the arbitration agreement is invalid for two reasons. Firstly, she maintains that Plaintiff did not sign the agreement himself until well after the date set forth in the agreement itself. Secondly, she argues that she was coerced into entering into the agreement, as she was told that she would never receive a Get unless she agreed to submit to arbitration of all remaining issues at the Bais Din selected by Plaintiff.

With respect to Defendant's contention that Plaintiff did not sign the arbitration agreement, this argument is unavailing. "Although CPLR 7501 states that an agreement to arbitrate must be in writing, there is no requirement that such a writing be signed by a party against whom arbitration is sought. Presumably, it is even clearer that it is unnecessary that it be [*13]signed by the party seeking enforcement." Rudolph & Beer, LLP v. Roberts, 260 AD2d 274, 275 (1st Dept. 1999)(internal quotation marks, citation and brackets omitted). However, whether the arbitration agreement was entered into voluntarily and freely does impact its validity. "[C]hallenges to the validity of arbitration agreements upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract can be divided into two types: (1) a challenge to the specific agreement to arbitrate and (2) a challenge to the contract as a whole." Cheng v. David Learner Assoc., Inc., 35 Misc 3d 1238(A), 1238A (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2012)(citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444, 126 S. Ct. 1204, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1038 (2006)(internal quotation marks omitted)(brackets added). "[A] party may resist enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate on any basis that could provide a defense to or grounds for the revocation of any contract, including fraud, unconscionability, duress, overreaching conduct, violation of public policy, or lack of contractual capacity." Iacob v. Iacob, 2003 NYLJ LEXIS 554 at 12 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2003)(citation omitted)(brackets added)(Supreme Court held that where the wife alleged that she was forced to enter into an arbitration agreement in exchange for receiving a Get, that the Court would need to convene a hearing to determine whether the agreement was valid). See also Golding v. Golding, 176 AD2d 20, 22-23 (1st Dept. 1992)(holding that "it is evident that plaintiff did not freely and voluntarily enter into the subject agreement but was compelled to do so by her husband's invocation of his power to refuse to give her a Jewish divorce"). Thus, an evidentiary hearing will be needed to determine the merits of these claims.

Accordingly, this Court must schedule and conduct a framed issue hearing to determine if the Arbitration Agreement valid and binding on the parties, or was it the product of coercion and duress, rendering it invalid and unenforceable. If following the hearing, the Court determines that the Arbitration Agreement is valid and enforceable, the Court will vacate any orders dated after the valid agreement nunc pro tunc, stay the proceedings and refer all financial issues in this case to the Bais Din.

Setting Aside the Default Order

Plaintiff claims that he was trapped in Israel for most of 2024 because the Rabbinical Court there, in an action instituted by Defendant, issued a travel ban when Plaintiff refused to sign the arbitration agreement (the one he now claims both he and Defendant signed on June 22, 2024). "In order to vacate a default in appearing, a party must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the failure to appear and a potentially meritorious defense to the relief sought in the petition [or pleading]." Goldstein v. Goldstein, 190 AD3d 971, 972 (2d Dept. 2021)(brackets added); see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]. Thus, Plaintiff bears the burden of providing a reasonable excuse for his failure to appear on October 22, 2024, when the prior Jurist granted substantive relief to Defendant in Plaintiff's absence, as well as a potentially meritorious defense to the relief sought in the family offense petitions, custody petitions, support petitions (all removed into the matrimonial case) and Defendant's counterclaims as set forth in her Verified Answer and Counterclaims.

Addressing Plaintiff's failure to appear in person in Court on October 22, 2024, the Court is not fully convinced that he was unable to appear. Plaintiff argues that he was trapped in Israel because he was refusing to give Defendant a Get, and goes on a long diatribe in his papers about Israel not having authority to compel him to engage in the religious act of providing the Get. The Court will not address any of those claims, as they are not relevant to the issues pending [*14]here. While the Court notes that the Israeli Courts had instituted a travel ban on June 23, 2024, the basis for the ban, according to the certified translation of the Order from the Israeli Court, was the Court's finding that Plaintiff had failed to sign the arbitration agreement that he now claims he signed the day before, June 22, 2024. Arguably, the act of signing the arbitration agreement would have been sufficient to lift the travel ban such that Plaintiff would be able to return to the United States and participate in proceedings before the designated Bais Din in Brooklyn. Clearly, Plaintiff signed the arbitration agreement at some point, as he has affirmatively provided the fully executed document to the Court, seeking its enforcement. Notable, however, is that there is only one notary signature present, and that notary signature was affixed to the document on the version that contains only Defendant's signature. Thus, it appears the Plaintiff (or someone posing as Plaintiff) signed the document outside the presence of a notary after June 23, 2024, the day the travel ban was imposed; however, there is no way to ascertain from the papers only when that signature was written on the document. For all the Court knows, it could have been signed on June 23, 2024 right after the Israeli Courts issued the travel ban, making it possible for Plaintiff to return to the United States right away. Clearly, Plaintiff must have signed it on or before May 2025, as he returned to the United States and appeared in person before a Rockland County Family Court Judge.^FN19

Plaintiff left for Israel in or about February 2024, a claim he does not refute in his papers. There were subsequent court conferences scheduled with this Court on March 12, 2024, April 18, 2024, a trial scheduled for May 3, 2024 that was adjourned to June 4, 2024 and adjourned again to July 15, 2024. The trial was not held on July 15, 2024, but a status conference held. Trial was scheduled for August 1, 2024, then adjourned to August 15, 2024 and finally October 22, 2024. Therefore, there were four court appearances before the arbitration agreement was signed by anyone that Plaintiff did not attend; he cannot reasonably contend that he was enjoined from appearing at those conferences as the travel ban did not get issued until June 23, 2024. It appears the Court held an in camera with the parties' children on March 12, 2024, and Plaintiff was not present, and by the next conference in April, Plaintiff's then-attorney, Tzvi Hagler, Esq., sought to be relieved.

As for whether Plaintiff could mount a meritorious defense to claims raised by Defendant in her pleadings and petition, Plaintiff failed to make any showing whatsoever in his papers. He does not address any claims about his alleged acts of domestic violence and violence aimed at the children, claims of mental health and substance use, or alleged defiance of multiple court orders for drug testing and mental health assessments. He says nothing about the parties' finances, their earnings, their assets and debts. Instead, Plaintiff's sole allegation with respect to whether he would be meritorious in defending Defendant's claims is his presentation of the arbitration agreement alleged to have been signed on June 22, 2024 that he claims is valid.

It is important to note that even if the Court were to hold that the arbitration agreement was valid, it only refers the financial issues for arbitration. The agreement specifically carves out custody, access and the family offense allegations, which cannot be subject to arbitration anyway. Instead, the parties allegedly agreed to mediation, even though there is a strong public policy disfavoring mediation when there are allegations of domestic violence. "Although this [*15]Court has adopted a liberal policy with respect to vacating defaults in custody proceedings, it remains incumbent upon a movant to make the requisite showing." Goldstein, supra at 942 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff has made no showing whatsoever. The record supports that Plaintiff absented himself after the Court had issued an order for hair follicle testing on February 7, 2024 for Plaintiff, as well as an order for forensic evaluation at the Derech Shalom Center on February 7, 2024 wherein Plaintiff was directed to submit to the evaluation and pay 100% of its cost. To date, Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence that he has complied with court orders relating to his mental health and substance use. Nor has he proffered any potentially meritorious defense as to the plethora of domestic abuse allegations that have been waged against him. Plaintiff has not seen his children in more than two (2) years at this point.^FN20

Generally, under such facts and circumstances, the Court would deny the application to set aside the default. However, this Court is well-aware of the Second Department's strong policy in favor of a full and complete evidentiary hearing on the merits when it comes to custody cases. See e.g. Paez v. Bambauer, 230 AD3d 586 (2d Dept. 2024)(reversing this Jurist's order of modification of custody on default, holding that "the law favors resolution on the merits in child custody proceedings. Thus, the general rule with respect to opening defaults in civil actions is not to be rigorously applied to cases involving child custody" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Meehan v. Kittle, 229 AD3d 553 (2d Dept. 2024)(reversing this Jurist's custody determination on default and stating that "the court's authority to proceed by default in no way diminishes the court's primary responsibility to ensure that an award of custody is predicated on the child's best interests, upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances, after a full and comprehensive hearing and a careful analysis of all relevant factors" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Riera v. Ayabaca, 235 AD3d 643 (2d Dept. 2025)(reversing the Family Court's custody determination made "without a hearing and without making any specific findings of fact regarding the best interests of the child. Under the circumstances, that branch of the father's motion which was to vacate the custody order should have been granted in the interest of justice").

Not only was the custody determination in this case made without the presence of Plaintiff, but the prior Jurist made not one single factual finding supporting her determination. She took no testimony, admitted no evidence, nothing. The prior Jurist granted a default decision on October 22, 2024 of sole legal and physical custody to the Defendant based on the application solely made by the Attorney for the Children, following an in camera proceeding she conducted with the children on March 12, 2024. Even putting aside Plaintiff's non-appearance, without a full inquest and proper findings of fact having been made to support her determination, this Court is constrained to vacate the order of sole custody to Defendant in the interests of justice.

The prior Jurist also granted Defendant a divorce, although it is unclear as to what the ground was as no testimony was taken.^FN21 She granted "all counterclaims" and neglected to [*16]address the family offense and violation of order of protection claims altogether. This proceeding, particularly when it came to the allegations of domestic violence and the financial issues, can hardly be called an inquest under these circumstances. No findings were made on the record and no testimony taken at all about any of those issues. Absent a clear record upon which proper findings can be made, this Court cannot in good conscience permit the decision issued on October 22, 2024 by the prior Jurist and so-ordered by this Court on July 7, 2025 to survive. Plaintiff's application to vacate the default judgment is granted, but Plaintiff is cautioned that if he wants to be heard on the merits of all claims, he must be present. Future failures on the part of Plaintiff to appear may indeed cause this Court to find him in default once again.

Thus, if following a framed issue hearing related to the Arbitration Agreement, that agreement is deemed invalid, the Court will have to conduct de novo proceedings and hearings on all ancillary issues relating to the parties' divorce.^FN22

Jurisdiction

Plaintiff avers that New York is no longer the proper jurisdiction for this divorce action, contending that he lives in New Jersey and Defendant lives in Florida. Even if that were true, the Court maintains both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over this case, as it was filed when the parties were both residing in New York and had resided here continuously prior to the case's inception. Even if the parties have both moved outside of New York State, which there is a factual dispute over that, this Court retains jurisdiction. "The general rule with respect to jurisdiction of the person or of the [marital] res is that jurisdiction acquired at the commencement of the action is not defeated by subsequent events occurring during the pendency of an action, even if they are of such character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance." Caivano v. Caivano, 188 Misc 2d 552, 555 (Sup. Ct. NY Co. 2001)(citations omitted)(brackets added).

Under CPLR 327(a), "[w]hen the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in another forum, the court, on the motion of any party, may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just." (Brackets added). "The doctrine of forum non conveniens is equitable in nature and, to a large degree, rests on considerations of public policy." Strand v. Strand, 57 AD2d 1033, 1034 (1st Dept. 1977). Public policy dictates that this case remain exactly where it is. It has been pending here for close to four years, Defendant would arguably suffer prejudice if forced to retry the case and all issues before a new tribunal, and this would ostensibly reward Plaintiff for his contemptuous behavior, as he would receive a blank slate before a new judge unfamiliar with the extensive history in this case. While Plaintiff argues that evidence relating to the children and relevant to custody is available either in Florida or Brooklyn, the two places that Plaintiff suggests Defendant is living, that one factor is insufficient for this Court to find that the case should begin de novo in front of an entirely different Court.

All remaining contentions contained within the moving papers are without merit.

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED that the application by Defendant to hold Plaintiff in civil contempt of [*17]automatic restraining orders (Motion #10) is GRANTED , and to purge his contempt, the parties and counsel are directed to appear for a conference before the Court on March 24, 2026 at 11:00 a.m. at the Integrated Domestic Violence Court at which time Plaintiff is directed to appear in person and must produce all passports issued in his name, which will be held by the Clerk's Office during the pendency of this case, proof of the funds received from the sale and closing on the marital residence, e.g. closing statement, and produce a bank check for those funds which will be deposited in an escrow account held by Defendant's counsel until further order of this Court, plus Defendant is awarded an additional seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500) as and for counsel fees relating to this motion; and is it further

ORDERED that failure of Plaintiff to appear live and in-person at that conference shall result in the immediate issuance of a Warrant for his Arrest and an Order of Commitment to the Rockland County Jail for sixty (60) day or until Plaintiff purges his contempt as set forth above; and it is further

ORDERED that the application by Defendant to hold Plaintiff in civil contempt for his failure to pay his court-ordered basic child support obligation (Motion #9) is GRANTED and the Court orders arrears in the sum of eleven thousand one hundred sixty dollars ($11,160) plus ten thousand dollars ($10,000) in counsel fees, for a total of twenty-one thousand one hundred sixty ($21,160) dollars, payable to Defendant; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff is sentenced to six (6) months incarceration in the Rockland County Jail in connection with the above contempt finding with such sentence being suspended until the conclusion of this case (i.e. the filing of a stipulation of settlement or this Court issuing a decision in connection with all ancillary issues of the divorce) or until the arrears of twenty-one thousand one hundred sixty dollars ($21,160) are fully satisfied, whichever comes first. Once the arrears are fully paid, the Plaintiff's contempt on this issue shall be deemed purged. Plaintiff shall post a bond to secure the entire amount owed by Plaintiff as set forth in this paragraph no later than March 24, 2026 and provide proof thereof to the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to set aside the October 22, 2024 default decision of the prior Jurist, the transcript of which was so-ordered by the undersigned Jurist on July 7, 2025 (Motion #13) is hereby GRANTED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's application to compel arbitration (Motion #12) is partially GRANTED to the limited extent that a framed issue hearing with respect to the validity of the Arbitration Agreement will be scheduled when the Court convenes its conference as set forth above; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's application to dismiss the action based upon lack of jurisdiction or New York being a forum non conveniens (Motion #13) is DENIED ; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's application to stay the action pending determination on the validity of the Arbitration Agreement (Motion #11) is DENIED .

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court on Motions # 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13.

Dated: March 2, 2026

New City, New York

HON. RACHEL E. TANGUAY

Justice of the Supreme Court