Bishop v State of New York
2026 NY Slip Op 51095(U)
July 10, 2026
Court of Claims
Linda K. Mejias-Glover, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.
Lance R. Bishop, Sr, Claimant,
v
State of New York, Defendant.
Court of Claims
Decided on July 10, 2026
Claim No. NONE
For Claimant:
LANCE R. BISHOP, SR, Pro Se
For Defendant:
HON. LETITIA JAMES, NYS ATTORNEY GENERAL
By: Noah T. Seabrook, Esq.
Linda K. Mejias-Glover, J.
[*1]Claimant moves by Notice of Motion, which is undated, and filed with the Clerk of the Court on July 25, 2025, seeking an order granting him permission to file a late claim.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
On April 21, 2025, Claimant filed a claim with the Clerk of the Court of Claims, which was assigned Claim No. 143599, as reflected in correspondence from the Clerk dated May 7, 2025. The Claim was served upon the Office of the Attorney General by certified mail and received on April 22, 2025. Defendant interposed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses on May 30, 2025. Thereafter, on July 25, 2025, Claimant filed the instant motion.
The Proposed claim, sounding in wrongful confinement, alleges that on July 21, 2024, Claimant was placed in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) following an alleged physical altercation with another, unnamed incarcerated individual (hereinafter "Proposed claim"). Claimant asserts that such confinement violated Title 7 NYCRR 301.1 on the ground that, due to his degenerative disc condition, he is classified as a "special population" and therefore should not have been housed in the SHU. According to the Proposed claim, Claimant pleaded guilty on July 25, 2024, to charges including violent conduct, creating a disturbance, fighting, possession of a weapon, and refusing a direct order. As a result, he received four days of pre-hearing confinement, 270 days in SHU, 90 days loss of packages, and 120 days loss of commissary. Claimant further alleges that the 270-day SHU sanction exceeded the authority of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), as it imposed a period of segregated confinement longer than that permissible under the HALT Act.
In support of his motion, Claimant asserts that his delay in filing is excusable because he is not a lawyer and lacked access to legal counsel and to the prison law library during the statutory filing period due to a statewide correction officers' strike. Claimant additionally contends that the State had notice of the essential facts through its review of the Misbehavior Report pursuant to Title 7 NYCRR 251-2.2 and had the opportunity to investigate his degenerative disc condition and his periodic reviews for SHU/RRU placement. Finally, Claimant asserts that he has "no other remedy for the State's negligence."
In opposition, the State argues that Claimant has failed to address the six statutory factors set forth in Court of Claims Act § 10 (6) and further contends that Claimant already has an active claim pending, rendering the Proposed claim moot and duplicative. Defendant asserts that the State did not have notice of the essential facts or an opportunity to investigate, and that any knowledge held by correction officers or other State agents is not imputed to the State. Defendant further maintains that the Proposed claim lacks merit because it is an improper attempt to cure jurisdictional defects in the original claim through a late-claim application, which would serve only to create a duplicative pleading where a claim has already been filed, properly served, and answered.
Defendant additionally argues that the Proposed claim fails to comply with the specificity requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b), as it does not include: (1) an adequate description of the location of the incident; (2) an adequate description of the condition alleged to have caused the incident; and (3) adequate particularization of the nature of the cause of action or the conduct attributed to Defendant.
In reply, Claimant reiterates the substance of his Proposed claim and his arguments regarding its merits. He acknowledges that he filed a claim on April 21, 2025, and states that he sent it by certified mail, return receipt requested, though he does not specify to whom it was sent, and the Court will not make that determination on his behalf. Claimant further acknowledges that Defendant answered the claim on May 30, 2025, asserting certain affirmative defenses. Claimant does not address the six statutory factors set forth in Court of Claims Act § 10 (6). He additionally concedes that the State did not have notice.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The State's Waiver of Immunity Under Section 8 of The Court of Claims Act
The State's waiver of immunity under Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act is conditioned upon a movant's compliance with specific conditions set forth in Article II, including the time limitations set forth in Section 10 (see Alston v State of New York, 97 NY2d 159, 163 [2001]). These requirements must be "strictly construed and a failure to comply therewith is a jurisdictional defect compelling the dismissal of the claim" (Hargrove v State of New York, 138 AD3d 777, 777-778 [2d Dept 2016], quoting Welch v State of New York, 286 AD2d 496, 497-498 [2d Dept 2001]; see Finnerty v New York State Thruway Auth., 75 NY2d 721, 722-723 [1989]).
The Sufficiency of the Proposed Claim Under Court of Claims Act § 11 (b)
Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) requires that a notice of intention or a claim "shall state the time when and place where such claim arose [and] the nature of same." Whether a claim is sufficient under Section 11 (b) is subject to strict scrutiny as Sections 10 and 11 of the Court of Claims Act are jurisdictional (see Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 NY3d 201, 207 [2003]; see also Dreger v New York State Thruway Auth., 81 NY2d 721, 724 [1992]) and not waivable.
It is well-established that the failure to satisfy the substantive pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) is a jurisdictional defect that requires dismissal of the claim (see Hargrove, 138 AD3d at 777; Kolnacki v State of New York, 8 NY3d 277, 280-281 [2007]; Lepkowski, 1 NY3d at 206-207; Czynski v State of New York, 53 AD3d 881, 882-883 [3d Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 715 [2009]).
The Court has reviewed the allegations contained within the four corners of the Proposed claim and finds that the allegations contained therein are insufficient to satisfy the requirements of specificity of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b). While the Proposed claim states that he pleaded guilty to certain charges, he does not provide the name of the correctional facility, the date that he entered the SHU nor the date that he was released. The documents attached to the Proposed claim cannot serve to cure this defect nor can such defect be cured by amendment (see Musumeci v State of New York, 220 AD3d 877, 879 [2d Dept 2023]). A claim must be complete within its four corners.
Upon this basis, Claimant's motion is denied, and the Court need not further address the merits of the motion for late claim relief.
DECISION AND ORDER
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Motion No. M-102525, seeking leave to file a late claim, is DENIED.
Dated: July 10, 2026
Hauppauge, New York
HON. LINDA K. MEJIAS-GLOVER,
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Read on this Motion:
1. Motion For Permission to File a Late Claim, Proposed Claim, Exhibits Annexed
2. Affirmation in Opposition, Exhibits Annexed
3. Affidavit in Support for Permission to File Late Claim, Memorandum of Law in Support of Permission to File a Motion for Late Claim, Exhibit Annexed