Bellegarde v Singh

Supreme Court, Kings County

Decided on July 17, 2026

Index No. 506576/2020

Aaron D. Maslow, J.

Background

The underlying trial involved a motor vehicle accident, in which Defendant Mangal Singh ("Singh"), under the permission and consent of Defendant Premier Construction, Inc. ("Premier Construction"), operated a truck and came into contact with Plaintiff Vladimir Bellegarde's ("Bellegarde") Toyota Camry at Rogers Avenue near Sterling Place on October 18, 2019. As a result, Bellegarde allegedly sustained serious injuries as defined in Insurance Law § 5102 (d) and suffered economic loss greater than basic economic loss as defined in the aforementioned statute.

This decision is prompted by defense counsel's opening statement at trial on May 18, 2026, in which he informed the jury that his client, Singh, would not appear because he is no longer an employee of the defendant company. As reflected in the excerpt of the transcript, the following was stated:

MR. MORONEY: Now, myself as the defense attorney, you'll watch the video. I'm not getting up here and saying that my client is not at fault. I'm not doing that. It is the plaintiff who claims he has no fault.

The plaintiff, you heard Mr. Shectman. He says this will be the easiest decision you'll ever have to make. He said his client did nothing wrong.

So, it's the plaintiff who is making those claims, but you will watch the video and you will decide for yourself.

Now, the accident, as you know was in October of 2019. That's over six and a half years ago. And during that long time period from the accident until today, Mr. Singh no longer works for the company.

MR. SHECTMAN: Your Honor, I'm going to just object.

THE COURT: Sustained.

MR. SHECTMAN: If that could be stricken.

That's irrelevant.

THE COURT: We are going to strike that.

As I said anyway, what the lawyers tell you is argument. The evidence comes from people testifying on the witness stand, or in documents, exhibits, photos, or videos. Please remember that.

Discussion

CPLR 4016 (a) provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Before any evidence is offered, an attorney for each plaintiff having a separate right, and an attorney for each defendant having a separate right, may make an opening statement. At the close of all the evidence on the issues tried, an attorney for each such party may make a closing statement in inverse order to opening statements.

"CPLR 4016(a) does not define the permissible scope of opening statements, as that is more a matter of the attorney rules of professional conduct, the reasonableness of counsel, and the guardrails provided by the presiding judge. The scope of opening statements may be defined not so much by what is permitted, but by what is not permitted." (Mark C. Dillon, Prac Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, CPLR C4016:1.)

"It is customary and proper for counsel, in opening, to tell the jury what the issues are, as well as what they expect to prove (De Vito v Katsch, 157 AD2d 413, 415 [2d Dept 1990]). CPLR 4016 (a) does not address the permissible scope of opening statements. Instead, the permissible scope of opening statements may be better defined by what counsel is not allowed to do (Haig, Commercial Litigation in New York State Courts § 36:18, at 778). The case law reveals that, at a minimum, the substance of a party's opening statement is limited by the lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility or what is otherwise prohibited by the court as unfairly prejudicial to another party (id). In so doing, the parties should be allowed in the openings to define the issues in the case by reference to claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, and defenses (id. at 779). A party may reveal the substance of the pleadings in the openings, including any statements, admissions, and allegations because '[t]he pleadings are before the court, not as evidence, but to point out the object to which evidence is to be directed' (id)." (Carrasquillo v City of New York, 22 Misc 3d 171, 173-174 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2008]).

"It is fundamental that the jury must decide the issues on the evidence, and therefore fundamental that counsel, in summing up, must stay within 'the four corners of the evidence' (Williams, supra, at p 103) and avoid irrelevant comments which have no bearing on any legitimate issue in the case (People v Carborano, 301 NY 39, 42; People v Tassiello, 300 NY 425). Thus the District Attorney may not refer to matters not in evidence (People v Fielding, 158 NY 542, supra; People v Esposito, 224 NY 370; People v Dixon, 231 NY 111; People v Jackson,[*2]7 NY2d 142). . . ." (People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105, 109-110 [1976].) With regard to closing statements, the Court of Appeals affirmed "that the prosecutor 'may not refer to matters not in evidence or call upon the jury to draw conclusions which are not fairly inferable from the evidence' ([39 NY2d] at 109)" (People v Anderson, 29 NY3d 69, 72 [2017]). Principles involving closing statements likewise apply to opening statements in terms of counsel stating something as a definitive fact.

"The right to a fair trial requires a jury to consider only the facts in evidence and not any 'outside influence' (Parker v Gladden, 385 US 363, 364-365 [1966])" (People v Santana, 199 AD3d 491, 496 [1st Dept 2021]). If the jury may not consider anything beyond what is in the evidence, then counsel may not introduce a fact outside the record at any stage of trial, whether in an opening statement or in summation (see Beach v Touradji Capital Mgt., LP, 179 AD3d 474 [1st Dept 2020]; cf. Golimowski v Town of Cheektowaga, 184 AD3d 1195, 1197-1198 [4th Dept 2020]).

"The decision of the court was in error. In appearing as a lawyer before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not assert personal knowledge of the facts in issue, except when testifying as a witness, and shall not assert a personal opinion as to the credibility of a witness (Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-106 [c] [3], [4] [22 NYCRR 1200.37 (c) (3), (4)][^FN1]); see also People v Paperno, 54 NY2d 294, 300-301 [1981]; People v Blake, 139 AD2d 110, 114 [1988]. This conduct amounts to a subtle form of testimony, as to which the opposing party cannot cross-examine (id., citing Paperno at 301)." (Valenzuela v City of New York, 59 AD3d 40, 44 [1st Dept 2008]).

Here, defendants' counsel told the jury "[D]uring that long time period from the accident until today, Mr. Singh no longer works for the company." Counsel presented it as an established fact concerning Singh's employment status with Premier Construction. However, at that point, no witness testified regarding Mr. Singh's employment, and no evidence was ever offered to establish that fact. Counsel's statement strayed from established case law which holds that a party may reveal the substance of pleadings in the opening statement not as evidence but as indicators to evidence. It was unfairly prejudicial to plaintiff Bellegarde who did not have the opportunity to cross-examine a witness on the issue of Singh's unavailability, thus having the potential to sway the jury to draw conclusions not fairly inferable from the evidence. The relevance of this situation was that a missing witness charge could be given to the jury and counsel was attempting to explain why Singh was missing.^FN2 Accordingly, defendants' counsel's statement was improper and was stricken.

Conclusion

The Court concludes that it correctly sustained plaintiff Bellegarde's counsel's objection [*3]to defendants' counsel's statement regarding defendant Singh's no longer working for defendant Premier Construction.

Dated: July 17, 2026

Brooklyn, New York,

HON. AARON D. MASLOW

Justice of the Supreme Court of the

State of New York