People v Martinez

County Court, Putnam County

Decided on May 15, 2026

Indictment No. 70009-25

Anthony R. Molé, J.

The following papers were read and considered on the combined "motion to reargue/renew," made pursuant to CPLR 2221 (d) and (e), by defendant MARCOS A. MARTINEZ (hereinafter defendant)^FN1:

Papers :

1. Defense Counsel's Affirmation in Support^FN2; Counsel's Memorandum of Law in Support

2. People's Affirmation in Response, Unmarked Exhibits

3. Defense Counsel's Reply Affirmation in Support

Upon review of the foregoing papers,^FN3 the Court finds, holds, and determines as follows:

The general facts of this case are more fully set forth in this Court's decision and order, dated October 31, 2025, on defendant's omnibus motion (People v Martinez, 87 Misc 3d 1231[A] [Co Ct, Putnam County 2025]) (hereinafter referred to as "the Omnibus Decision") — which is incorporated, in full, by reference herein.

From prior conferences, the undersigned anticipated that defendant would file a motion to reargue and/or renew certain branches of his omnibus motion. The Court, in this regard, established a briefing schedule for such a prospective motion at a court conference on January 28, 2026. Through counsel, defendant filed an "Affirmation in Support of Motion to Reargue/Renew" and a memorandum of law in support thereof on February 17, 2026. Defendant, however, neglected to file a notice of motion in connection with this application. On February 26, 2026, the People filed their opposition papers to defendant's combined motion to reargue/renew. Defendant, in turn, filed reply papers on March 12, 2026. The motion is deemed fully submitted. Before turning to the merits, the Court must first address some procedural issues that it has grappled with in entertaining and reviewing defendant's combined "motion to reargue/renew."

I. Timing of Defendant's Combined Motion to Reargue / Renew

Defendant presses that he timely filed his motion for leave to reargue since the People never served him with written notice of entry and thus the 30-day clock for a reargument motion made pursuant CPLR 2221 (d) never started to run (see CPLR 2221 [d] [3]). He also asserts that his motion for leave to renew has no statutory deadline and is based on discovery which was subsequently disclosed by the People after the Omnibus Decision and not available at the time when he filed his initial omnibus motion.

Under CPLR 2221 (d), a motion for leave to reargue "shall be identified specifically as such," must "be based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion, but shall not include any matters of fact not offered on the prior motion," and "shall be made within [30] days after service of a copy of the order determining the prior motion and written notice of its entry" (id. [1] — [3]). There is no dispute here that neither party filed a notice of entry relative to the Omnibus Decision rendered on October 31, 2025. Defendant filed and served his motion to reargue in February of 2026 — well beyond 30 days of after the Omnibus Decision was issued.

First, the Court finds without merit the People's arguments concerning defendant's substantial delay in filing this combined motion to reargue and renew, the lack of a notice of entry being filed in connection with the Omnibus Decision, and the 30-day time limitation under CPLR 2221 (d) (3) for filing a motion to reargue. Case law establishes that the timing deadline of a motion to reargue does not apply to criminal cases such as this one.

Mindful of certain exceptions that do not apply here, a decision or ruling rendered on a suppression motion is subsumed by the judgment of conviction by virtue of the pronouncement of a sentence immediately thereafter (see e.g. People v Elmer, 19 NY3d 501, 508 [2012]). For appellate courts, "an order denying a defendant's suppression motion is an unreviewable intermediate order" (People v Dearstyne, 183 AD3d 1123, 1124-1125 [3d Dept 2020]). "Ordinarily, in the course of a criminal proceeding, suppression hearings occur prior to a judgment of conviction and are reviewed incident to the direct appeal from that judgment" (id.; see CPL 450.10). In other words, intermediate orders, like rulings and orders on suppression motions, that are issued prior to sentencing are subsumed (merged) into the final judgment of conviction — meaning they must be challenged, via a direct appeal, from the final judgment of conviction within 30 days of sentencing (see id.). This is one reason why neither the State nor the defense typically file notices of entry in connection with a criminal court's orders on omnibus motions and any suppression rulings made therein or thereafter.^FN4 Hence, whether or not a notice of entry was filed as to the Omnibus Decision is irrelevant to the case at hand (see People v Elmer, 19 NY3d at 508; People v Dearstyne, 183 AD3d at 1124-1125).

Persuasive and binding authority exists for rejecting the People's argument about the timeliness of defendant's motion to reargue. A "[c]ourt has the discretion to entertain a motion to reargue or renew, so long as the criminal action remains pending before it" (People v Jones, 57 Misc 3d 590, 592 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2017]). "[T]he CPLR generally governs in civil matters, while the CPL applies to criminal actions. Whether the specific procedural requirements of CPLR 2221 should be applicable to motions to reargue or renew in a criminal case is not determinative of the motion. Irrespective of CPLR 2221, the criminal courts retain the inherent authority to consider motions to reargue and renew" (People v Jones, 57 Misc 3d at 592; see People v Rodriguez, 21 AD3d 834, 834 [1st Dept 2005] [finding that the trial court properly entertained a motion to reargue dismissal of a count of the indictment, although the motion was belatedly filed under the time requirement proscribed in CPLR 2221 (d)]; see also People v DeFreitas, 48 Misc 3d 569, 571 [Crim Ct, New York County 2015] [concluding that "a trial court in a criminal case has the inherent power to grant leave to reargue, but that power should be exercised sparingly"]).

All of this is to say that the People's argument regarding the timeliness of defendant's reargument motion has no teeth, inasmuch as the People incorrectly "assert[] that the [defendant] exceeded the 30-day time limit for reargument motions set forth in CPLR 2221 (d)" (People v Godbold, 117 AD3d 565, 566 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 27 NY3d 997 [2016]). For the stated reasons, that time limit is inapplicable to those branches of defendant's motion which are essentially for renewal rather than reargument; accordingly, this Court exercises its discretion to [*2]entertain defendant's motion since the People have not suffered prejudice, given that they had ample time to frame and submit their written response thereto (see id.; People v Jones, 57 Misc 3d at 592; People v Rodriguez, 21 AD3d at 834; People v DeFreitas, 48 Misc 3d at 571).

Putting aside defendant's unexplained and unnecessary delays in filing this motion after 3.5 months since the Omnibus Decision was rendered, the Court first starts with addressing the erroneous procedures that defendant used in filing this combined motion.

II. Defendant's Motion Procedure

To begin, the Court finds defendant's motion to be procedurally defective. Initially, he failed to file or include a notice of motion with his application as required by CPLR 2214. Such was error on his part. Indeed, "the CPLR may be applied in a criminal action where the CPL is silent on the issue at hand" (People v Leal, 50 Misc 3d 855, 860 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2015]).

CPLR 2214 (a) requires that "[a] notice of motion shall specify the time and place of the hearing on the motion, the supporting papers upon which the motion is based, the relief demanded and the grounds therefor." "Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded" (id.; see Uniform Civil Rules for the Supreme Court and the County Court [22 NYCRR] § 202.8 [entitled "motion procedure]"). In addition, barring exceptions that do not apply here, a motion for leave to reargue or renew a prior motion must "be made, on notice, to the judge who signed the prior order" (CPLR 2221 [a]; see Earley v City El. Inc., 41 Misc 3d 142[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 52025[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]; cf. Citimortgage, Inc. v Dedalto, 210 AD3d 628, 630 [2d Dept 2022]).

Here, defendant did not file and failed to include a notice of motion with respect to his combined motion to "reargue/renew" clearly stating "the relief demanded and the grounds therefor," as well as any alternate or different relief (CPLR 2214 [a]; see CPLR 2221 [a]). Defendant's filing is thus in derogation of CPLR 2214 (a), 2221, and Uniform Rule 22 NYCRR§ 202.8. But that is not the only quandary with defendant's filing.

The next infirmity with defendant's moving papers is that he erroneously combines and conflates the standards of reargument and renewal. In this regard, his consolidated motion is defective for failing to comply with CPLR 2221 (f). That rule states, in relevant part, that "[a] combined motion for leave to reargue and leave to renew shall identify separately and support separately each item of relief sought" (emphasis added). In other words, "[a] combined motion for leave to reargue and renew is permitted so long as each branch of the motion is separately identified and supported" (Pellerano v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 232 AD3d 552, 552-553 [1st Dept 2024]; see Fulcher v Empire State Grand Council Ancient & Accepted Scottish Rite Masons, Inc., 222 AD3d 721, 722-724 [2d Dept 2023]).

That was not done here by defendant because he clearly did not comply with the statutory requirement that a movant identify, as well as support, those branches of his motion as to which he seeks reargument and those for which he seeks renewal (see CPLR 2221 [f]). Defense counsel's affirmations in support of his consolidated "motion to reargue/renew" are "an assortment of jumbled arguments" which improperly combine both reargument and renewal [*3](LaFiosca v LaFiosca, 31 Misc 3d 973, 976 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2011]). This only complicates the inherent issues. His initial submission, as filed, bemuses the Court and muddles defendant's arguments. Consequently, his combined "motion to reargue/renew" is procedurally defective as filed (see id.; Matter of Shore, 19 Misc 3d 663, 667 [Sur Ct, New York County 2008]).

That said, defense counsel's memorandum of law sheds light on the crux of defendant's main arguments. The Court will, nevertheless, address what it has before it and in the manner it was filed. Faced with such a dilemma, the Court engages in some discourse before turning to the substantive merits of defendant's motion.

"In our adversarial system of adjudication, [courts] follow the principle of party presentation. The parties frame the issues for decision, while the court serves as neutral arbiter of matters the parties present" (Clark v Sweeney, 607 US 7, 9 [2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). This is to say that if a party fails to clearly articulate a cogent argument, with the requisite specificity when needed, a court does not assume the role of advocate. Instead, a court normally decides the issues that a party chose to present. Indeed, "[t]he Court of Appeals has cautioned the judiciary that 'we are not in the business of blindsiding litigants, who expect us to decide matters on rationales advanced by the parties, not arguments their adversaries never made'" (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v St. Louis, 229 AD3d 116, 122 [2d Dept 2024] [internal brackets omitted], quoting Misicki v Caradonna, 12 NY3d 511, 519 [2009]).

Defendant's defectively filed motion combines a mixture of cluttered arguments, while confusingly conflating the proper standards of review with that of a motion to reargue, in contrast to a motion to renew. Many of the contentions articulated in defendant's moving papers are not specifically identified, nor made with the requisite specificity as to various branches of his combined motion for leave to reargue and renew (see CPLR 2221 [f]). He also attempts to introduce facts that were not included as part of his original omnibus motion that he is now seeking to reargue, which is impermissible on a reargument motion (see id. [d]). Critically, defendant fails to state with specificity the legal basis for leave to reargue.

Notwithstanding, CPL 255.20 (3) specifically sets forth the circumstances under which motions may be renewed or filed notwithstanding provisions of time or inclusion in the initial omnibus motion. This Court has wide discretion to "entertain and dispose of the motion on the merits . . . in the interest of justice[] and for good cause" (CPL 255.20 [3]; see People v Hughes, 22 NY3d 44, 49 [2013]; People v Davydov, 144 AD3d 1170, 1172 [2d Dept 2016]; People v Huang, 248 AD2d 73, 76 [1st Dept 1998]). In the interests of justice and fairness here (see CPL 255.20 [3]), the Court excuses the defects and irregularities with defendant's underlying motion and elects to evaluate the substantive merits (see generally CPLR 2001). Doing so would be a better exercise of discretion and further develop the record.

Although his arguments predicated on his motion to renew are not specifically identified as separate from the arguments for leave to reargue (see id.), the Court will grant so much of defendant's motion for leave to renew with respect to renewing his application for a Franks/Alfinito hearing and his application to suppress the blood test results and his refusal only, [*4]and will decide the merits thereof (see People v Martinez, 87 Misc 3d 1231[A] at *15-17). Therefore, the Court only grants so much of defendant's motion for leave to renew that branch of his prior motion requesting a Franks/Alfinito hearing and the related application to suppress his blood test results and his refusal; and accordingly, decides so much of his renewal motion. In doing so, the undersigned will give defendant the benefit of the doubt to meaningfully review his arguments and contentions, as limitedly expressed herein, insomuch as he ascribes error on the part of this Court in connection with the blood seizure application and order.

III. Defendant's Motion to Reargue / Renew Dismissal of Certain Counts

A. Defendant's Motion to Reargue Dismissal of Three Counts Charged in the Indictment

Initially, the Court denies that branch of defendant's motion seeking leave for reargument to dismiss the indicted charges of aggravated vehicular homicide (count one), manslaughter in the second degree (count three), and reckless driving (count ten). The Court adheres to its original determinations rendered in the Omnibus decision (see People v Martinez, 87 Misc 3d 1231[A] at *4-7). His claims in this regard are, once again, predicated on virtually analogous arguments that the evidence before the grand jury was legally insufficient to sustain those counts. Defendant maintains that reckless driving requires more than one traffic infraction, that his act of falling asleep while operating the motor vehicle immediately before the crash with the victim's vehicle cannot sustain that charge, and without having committed reckless driving, he stresses that he could not have legally committed the crime of aggravated vehicular homicide.

Prior precedent establishes that a motion to reargue is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and is designed to afford a party an opportunity to establish that the court "overlooked or misapprehended the relevant facts, or misapplied any controlling principle of law" (Degraw Constr. Group, Inc. v McGowan Bldrs., Inc., 178 AD3d 772, 773 [2d Dept 2019], appeal dismissed 178 AD3d 770 [2019]; see CPLR 2221 [d] [2]; Robinson v Viani, 140 AD3d 845, 847-848 [2d Dept 2016]). A motion to reargue "is not designed to afford an unsuccessful party successive opportunities to reargue issues previously decided or to present arguments different from those originally asserted" (Matter of Mayer v National Arts Club, 192 AD2d 863, 865 [3d Dept 1993] [emphasis added]; see Gellert & Rodner v Gem Community Mgt., Inc., 20 AD3d 388, 388 [2d Dept 2005]). Stated differently, "[a] motion for reargument is not an appropriate vehicle for raising new questions" (Simpson v Loehmann, 21 NY2d 990, 990 [1968]; accord Foley v Roche, 68 AD2d 558, 568 [1st Dept 1979], lv denied 56 NY2d 507 [1982]).

Because defendant, again, raises nearly many of the same unsuccessful arguments that he already raised before, based on the same underlying facts and legal issues, which were previously addressed by the Court in the Omnibus Decision, defendant's corresponding motion to dismiss those three indicted counts cannot serve as another vehicle to reargue those issues that have been adversely decided against him (see Amato v Lord & Taylor, Inc., 10 AD3d at 375; Mazinov v Rella, 79 AD3d 979, 980 [2d Dept 2010]). The Court already rejected defendant's arguments predicated on dismissal of those counts for the reasons stated in its Omnibus Decision (People v Martinez, 87 Misc 3d 1231[A] at *4-7). Reargument in this respect is denied and the Court adheres to the original determinations set forth in the Omnibus decision.

In short and for purposes of brevity, the elements of aggravated vehicular homicide are statutorily defined as being comprised of two existing crimes, reckless driving (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212), and vehicular manslaughter in the second degree (see Penal Law § 125.12), as well as any one of seven exacerbating factors, which, as relevant here, include "commit[ing] such crimes while operating a motor vehicle while such person has .18 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in such person's blood" (Penal Law § 125.14 [1]). Defendant is precluded from asserting new or different arguments on his motion to reargue which he did not squarely raise or assert in his omnibus motion. Thus, that branch of defendant's motion to reargue dismissal of counts one, three, and ten of the indictment is denied and the Court adheres to its original determinations (see People v Martinez, 87 Misc 3d 1231[A] at *4-7; cf. People v Rodriguez, 21 AD3d at 834).

B. Defendant's Motion to Renew Dismissal of Three Counts Charged in the Indictment

To the extent defendant moves for leave to renew his motion seeking dismissal of those three counts delineated above, the Court exercises its discretion in denying such branch of his motion. CPLR 2221 provides, among other things, that a motion for leave to renew "shall be based on new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination" and "shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion" (CPLR 2221 [e] [2], [3]). "Although a court has discretion to entertain a motion to renew based on facts known to the movant at the time of the original motion, the movant must set forth a reasonable justification for failing to submit the information in the first instance" (Olden Group, LLC v 2890 Review Equity, LLC, 209 AD3d 755, 756 [2d Dept 2022]). "A motion to renew is not a second chance freely given to parties who have not exercised due diligence in making their first factual presentation" (id. at 756).

Applying those legal principles here, the Court holds defendant has not satisfied the requirements of CPLR 2221 (e) relative to that branch of his motion to renew his continued pursuit of dismissing those three counts charged in the indictment (see People v Martinez, 87 Misc 3d 1231[A] at *2-7; see also Heras v Winers Garage, 61 AD3d 637 [2d Dept 2009]). Most of the information contained in defendant's instant motion is not new and was available to him at the time when he filed his omnibus motion. The Court highlights that the new information he learned regarding the police officer's source of information about the odor of alcohol emanating from him on the night in question goes to the integrity and validity of the blood seizure application and order (see Discussion of motion to renew suppression of blood test results, supra at 8-17) — not to this branch of his motion to dismiss certain counts charged in the indictment. In any event, the information which defendant provides in his motion to renew dismissal of those three counts does not serve as a basis for this Court to grant him to leave to renew (see CPLR 2221 [e]; Jovanovic v Jovanovic, 96 AD3d 1019, 1020-1021 [2d Dept 2012]).

As said, "[t]o succeed on . . . a motion [to renew], the movant must supply new facts substantial enough to 'change the prior determination' and a justifiable excuse for not placing such facts before the court initially" (Matter of Cooke Ctr. for Learning and Dev. v Mills, 19 AD3d 834, 837 [3d Dept 2005], lv dismissed 5 NY3d 846 [2005], quoting CPLR 2221 [e] [2]). "If the allegedly new facts were available while the initial motion was pending but were not [*5]presented because of the movant's lack of diligence, renewal will not be granted" (Matter of Cooke Ctr. for Learning and Dev. v Mills, 19 AD3d at 837).

Application of the governing law leads the Court to conclude that defendant has not met the legal criteria with respect to so much of his motion seeking renewal to dismiss those charged counts. His arguments concerning renewal to dismiss each of those three counts are of "dubious validity with respect to [his] original motion to dismiss and of no validity with respect to [defendant's] . . . motion to renew" (Reese v McDaniel, 224 AD2d 329, 329 [1st Dept 1996]). Defendant's critique of the police officers' testimonies before the grand jury is not a valid basis for dismissing those counts since "[t]he Grand Jury proceeding is not intended to be adversarial in nature or a minitrial of the individual suspected of committing a crime" (People v Shahzad, 71 AD3d 704, 705-706 [2d Dept 2010] [internal quotations marks and citations omitted]; accord People v Martinez, 87 Misc 3d 1231[A] at *3). "The People have wide discretion in presenting evidence to establish their case and do not have the obligation to present to the Grand Jury every piece of evidence which they possess against a suspect, nor must every matter which may have a tendency to reflect upon the credibility of a witness be revealed" (People v Colucci, 32 AD3d 1044, 1045 [2d Dept 2006] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

Evidence concerning whether defendant fell asleep behind the wheel immediately before the fatal accident and whether he was aware of his level of drowsiness at the time are "collateral issue[s] more appropriately reserved for presentation to the petit jury than to the Grand Jury" (id. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). The same can be said of evidence bearing principally upon the credibility of the responding police officers who testified before the grand jury (see id.; People v Ramjit, 203 AD2d 488, 489 [2d Dept 1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 831 [1994]). Any "inconsistencies reflected in the instant case would not have had a material influence upon the Grand Jury, and as credibility factors, should more appropriately be reserved for presentation to the [trial] jury" (People v Suarez, 122 AD2d 861, 862 [2d Dept 1986], lv denied 68 NY2d 817 [1986]).

Moreover, the Court underscores that defendant failed to exercise his right to bring any exculpatory evidence to the attention of the Grand jury either "by [his] own testimony or that of others testifying on [his] behalf" (People v Mitchell, 82 NY2d 509, 515 [1993]; see CPL 190.50 [5], [6]; People v Ramjit, 203 AD2d at 489). Therefore, that branch of his motion to renew dismissal of counts one, three, and ten of the indictment is denied in its entirety.

IV. Defendant's Motions to Reargue and Renew Suppression of the Blood Test Results or a Court-Ordered Franks/Alfinito Hearing

Next, defendant contends that he should be granted leave to reargue and renew his prior motion to suppress the court-ordered blood test results as well as "proof of his refusal"; and upon granting reargument and renewal, the blood test results and his refusal be suppressed, or alternatively, this Court should conduct a Franks/Alfinito hearing that bear on issues related thereto (see Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154, 155-156 [1978]; People v Alfinito, 16 NY2d 181, 186 [1965]). In advancing his contentions in this regard, defendant claims that the judge who ordered his compulsory blood test on the night in question (Hon. Jessica Segal, J. [County Court, [*6]Dutchess County]) failed to comply with the statutory requirements of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 and that the police officer who applied for the blood seizure order — Investigator Kevin Radovich of the Putnam County Sheriff's Office — allegedly made false representations to Judge Segal in support of such application. The Court disagrees with defendant's view in all respects, rejects his assertions and claims in connection thereto, and denies all of the relief sought in this regard.

Beginning first with the reargument branch, the Court denies so much of his motion seeking leave to reargue his motion to suppress the court-ordered blood test results as well as "proof of his refusal," and, in denying reargument, the Court adheres to its original determination in the Omnibus Decision (see People v Martinez, 87 Misc 3d 1231[A] at *15-17; see generally People v Gantt, 575 NYS2d 782 [1st Dept 1991]).

As stated above (see Discussion of granting renewal in limited part, infra at 5), the Court, however, grants so much of defendant's motion seeking leave to renew his prior motions to suppress the court-ordered blood test results and his refusal, as well as requesting a combined Franks/Alfinito hearing (see CPLR 2221 [e]). In reaching this determination, the Court finds that defendant introduces new facts which were not offered in his omnibus motion that were not available to him at that time — specifically pointing to the prosecutor's letter correspondence, dated January 20, 2026, regarding the source of information about the odor of alcohol emanating from defendant on the night in question, wherein the People clarify that such reference in Radovich's blood seizure application is, in fact, attributable to Deputy Shawn Iarussi of the Putnam County Sheriff's Office and not attributable to Deputy Joseph Landow of the same office.

Defense counsel has therefore supplied new facts significant enough to potentially change the court's prior determination with respect to Judge Segal's blood seizure order and a justifiable excuse for not placing such facts before the court in his omnibus motion in light of the People's revelation concerning disclosure made earlier this year, but not known at the time that the omnibus motion was made and pending (see id.). Said differently, defendant could only raise this issue before this Court by way of a motion to renew based on facts unavailable to his defense attorney at the time he filed the omnibus motion on behalf of him.

The narrow issue distills to whether a police officer incorrectly referring to the name of another officer on the scene (rather than the police officer on the scene that he obtained the information from) constitutes an egregious defect in the blood seizure application that warrants nullifying the order, thereby requiring suppression of defendant's blood test results in view of the governing body of law. The Court holds that such a defect does not invalidate the blood seizure order at issue under the totality of the circumstances (see People v Dombrowski-Bove, 300 AD2d 1122, 1123 [4th Dept 2002]). The Court rejects defendant's claim that his motion to suppress the results of the blood test should have been granted (see CPL 710.20 [5]). The Court finds that Radovich properly secured a court order for a blood test which revealed defendant's blood alcohol content based on his persistent refusal and unwillingness to consent to the blood seizure.

Well-established decisional precedent holds that any noncompliance with the [*7]requirements of Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1194 (3) (d) (2) and (3) by the arresting officer and the judge issuing the blood seizure order are of no moment when there is "the requisite substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute" (People v Dombrowski-Bove, 300 AD2d at 1123; see People v Licausi, 122 AD3d 771, 772 [2d Dept 2014], lvs denied 25 NY3d 1166 [2015], 35 NY3d 994 [2020]; People v Rollins, 118 AD2d 949, 950 [3d Dept 1986]; see generally People v Crandall, 108 AD2d 413, 417-418 [3d Dept 1985], affd 69 NY2d 768 [1986], rearg denied 70 NY2d 748 [1987]; People v Stratis, 137 Misc 2d 661, 667-670 [Sup Ct, Kings County 1987], affd 148 AD2d 557 [2d Dept 1989], lv denied 74 NY2d 747 [1989]).

All that is required is that Radovich, as the police officer applying for the blood seizure order, had "reasonable cause to believe that defendant had violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192" (People v Hilker, 133 AD2d 986, 988 [3d Dept 1987], lv denied 70 NY2d 875 [1987]), since defendant refused to expressly consent to the drawing of his blood — which, in turn, prompted Radovich to apply for the blood seizure order in the first instance. "[T]he record demonstrates the requisite probable cause, the arrest was legal, as was the blood seizure order, since [police] properly concluded that defendant had refused to submit to a blood test" (id.). Thus, the blood test results were properly obtained by police, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (3), in attempting to prove that defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (cf. People v Hilker, 133 AD2d at 988).

If a driver of a motor vehicle who is required to submit to a chemical blood alcohol test actually refuses to provide his or her consent, then a court order is required to compel the test pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (3) (b), and the test shall not be given until a court order is obtained (see People v Centerbar, 80 AD3d 1008, 1009 [3d Dept 2011]; People v Morrisey, 21 AD3d 597, 598 [3d Dept 2005]).

The information provided by Investigator Raodvich to Judge Segal in support of the blood seizure order established that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, there was reasonable cause to believe that defendant was operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 1192 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and he refused to unambiguously consent to the blood test, despite several requests from police prior to Radovich applying to Judge Segal for the requisite order (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [3] [d] [2]; People v Alshoaibi, 273 AD2d 871, 872 [4th Dept 2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 960 [2000]). Having so determined, the Court, again, denies so much of defendant's motion to suppress the blood test results upon renewal for the same reasons outlined in its Omnibus Decision (see People v Martinez, 87 Misc 3d 1231[A] at *15-17).

Equally unavailing is defendant's further contention that the blood tests results be suppressed because there was no stenographic recording made of the application. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (3) (d) (3) states the following:

"Upon being advised that an oral application for a court order to compel a person to submit to a chemical test is being made, a judge or justice shall place under oath the applicant and any other person providing information in support of the application. Such oath or oaths and all of the remaining communication must be recorded, either by means [*8]of a voice recording device or verbatim stenographic or verbatim longhand notes. If a voice recording device is used or a stenographic record made, the judge must have the record transcribed, certify to the accuracy of the transcription and file the original record and transcription with the court within [72] hours of the issuance of the court order. If the longhand notes are taken, the judge shall subscribe a copy and file it with the court within [24] hours of the issuance of the order" (emphasis added).

"[T]he percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system" (Schmerber v California, 384 US 757, 770 [1966]). "The United States Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals have recognized the unique circumstances involved in testing a suspect's blood for alcohol given the fact that the evidence rapidly metabolizes with the passage of time" (People v Lerow, 70 AD3d 66, 74 [4th Dept 2009]; see Schmerber v California, 384 US at 770-771; see generally People v Kates, 53 NY2d 591, 594-595 [1981]).

As noted by the Second Department, "the evolution of the relevant body of law governing the obtaining of blood samples to be used in the prosecution of cases involving a motorist suspected or charged with driving while intoxicated or impaired evidences an intent to facilitate the State's ability to obtain this evidence" (People v Elysee, 49 AD3d 33, 42 [2d Dept 2007], affd 12 NY3d 100 [2009]). In Elyse, the Second Department reiterated that prior legal "'restrictions seriously impeded the utilization of blood tests where there was an accident involving death or serious injury'" (id., quoting People v Whelan, 165 AD2d 313, 318 [2d Dept 1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 927 [1991]) — and adding further that "due to the very nature of the test (i.e., to detect the presence of alcohol in the blood), the element of time was highly significant, for the longer it took to obtain the blood sample, the greater the likelihood that the percentage of alcohol in the blood would diminish'" (People v Elysee, 49 AD3d at 42, quoting People v Whelan, 165 AD2d at 318).

Such eventually paved the way for the State Legislature to enact Vehicle and Traffic Law former § 1194-a (L 1983, ch 481) — now codified in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (3) (entitled "Compulsory chemical tests") — which widely allows "an ex parte application for an order compelling the operator of a motor vehicle to submit to a chemical test of his or her blood under certain prescribed circumstances" (People v Elysee, 49 AD3d at 42; see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1194 [3] [b] [1]-[4]).

"Although an application for a court-ordered blood test may contain hearsay and double hearsay statements that satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the application must disclose that it is supported by hearsay and identify the source or sources of the hearsay" (People v Freeman, 46 AD3d 1375, 1377 [4th Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 840 [2008]; accord People v Earley, 121 AD3d 1192, 1192-1193 [3d Dept 2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 1200 [2015]). In other words, "an application under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (3) based on double hearsay [is] valid if each informant passes the Aguilar-Spinelli test" (People v Whelan, 165 AD2d at 321).

In this case, it is clear that Radovich's blood seizure application consisted mostly of hearsay and double hearsay, but this fact alone does not render the application defective (see id.). [*9]"Search warrants based on hearsay information have long been held to be valid where there is a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay statement" (id. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). "The procedure for evaluating the hearsay statements of informants involves the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test . . . which remains the controlling test to be applied in New York" (id. [internal citations omitted]). "[P]robable cause to arrest may be established by double hearsay as long as each informant in the chain of narration passes the Aguilar-Spinelli test. By parity of reasoning, an application under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (3) based on double hearsay would be valid if each informant passes the Aguilar-Spinelli test" (id. [internal citation omitted]). "The two-part Aguilar-Spinelli test requires a showing that the informant is reliable and has a basis of knowledge for the information imparted" (People v Sierra, 85 AD3d 1659, 1660-1661 [4th Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 905 [2011] [internal brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted]).

Here, page three of the blood seizure application contains a section entitled "Basis of Knowledge of the Facts." It states that "[t]he facts set forth herein are based upon direct knowledge and information and belief the sources of which are . . . [defendant] stated he was driving from Citi Field and has been drinking," that "[h]e stated he fell asleep at the wheel and crashed," that "[t]he other vehicle's driver was killed in the crash," and that "a 7-year old [the victim's son] is in critical condition at this time and was flown to Westchester." Relevant here, that section continues that "Deputy Landow could smell the order of an alcoholic beverage emanating from [defendant's] breath and watery[,] glassy eyes" (emphasis added). Radovich further notes that Landow conducted three different standardized field sobriety tests upon defendant to ascertain his level of sobriety, which "showed indication of [defendant's] impairment" by alcohol. Radovich notes that defendant "refused" a preliminary breath test that was offered by Landow. And critically, Radovich relayed to Judge Segal that defendant did not consent to his blood being taken by police, based on the statement in the application that refusal warnings were read to him four different times at 12:03 a.m., 12:18 a.m., 12:33 a.m., and 12:48 a.m. on the night in question; yet notwithstanding, defendant still "refused" and he did not expressly consent to the drawing of his blood.

Pursuant to CPL 710.60 (1), a motion for suppression of physical evidence must state the grounds of the motion and contain sworn allegations of fact. "Because hearings on suppression motions are not automatic or generally available for the asking by boilerplate allegations" (People v Burton, 6 NY3d 584, 587 [2006] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), a criminal court may summarily deny a suppression motion "if the [motion] papers do not allege a legal basis for suppression or . . . if the sworn factual allegations do not as a matter of law support the ground alleged" (People v Duval, 36 NY3d 384, 391 [2021] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

Here, despite defendant insisting in his prior omnibus motion, and now, that he did not refuse and did consent to the blood test, the record demonstrates otherwise. More tellingly, defendant did not adduce an affidavit (or affirmation) contradicting the blood seizure application relative to his claimed consent — merely relying on defense counsel to blanketly persist that he consented to giving his blood to police on the night in question. The Court remains unconvinced because defendant failed to adduce any sworn allegations of fact to expound and substantiate his [*10]factual assertion(s) (see People v Martinez, 87 Misc 3d 1231[A] at *15-17).

As to the subsequent revelation that Iarussi, not Landow, actually had relayed and imparted information to Radovich (the applicant) in that Iarussi smelled an alcoholic odor emanating from defendant's breath, the Court determines that this inaccuracy is not a seriously fatal flaw that ought to invalidate the blood seizure order and warrant suppression of the blood test results. The issuing judge was made aware by the applying police officer that some of the information provided to her was based upon hearsay, as required by the statute, and that the source of the hearsay information was a police officer present at the scene, albeit not the officer at the scene that actually provided that portion of the information relative to the alcoholic odor coming from defendant. This to say, in other words, that there was still substantial compliance with the governing statute, and no hearing is necessary on this narrowly discrete issue (see People v Licausi, 122 AD3d at 772).

Judge Segal's affidavit adduced by the People in their opposition papers to the omnibus motion states, in relevant part, that she was contacted by Investigator Radovich on the night in question "shortly before 1:33 [a.m.]" to entertain the police's application for the blood seizure order (Segal aff para 3). Judge Segal further states in her affidavit that in hearing the application telephonically, she was sent the 8-page typed document, that she placed Investigator Radovich under oath, "reviewed the [a]pplication . . . line by line by engaging in a question[-]and[-]answer format," and notated the date and time of the application on page two, as evidenced by her handwriting (id. at para 4-6). Judge Segal also confirms that she notated the time on page eight of the application and signed it on the bottom of that page in "grant[ing] the application . . . [a]fter ensuring that the typed answers conformed to [her] [telephone] conversation" with Radovich (id. at para 7). Moreover, Judge Segal represents in her affidavit she "filed the subscribed application, as my [verbatim] longhand notes, with the court pursuant to [Vehicle and Traffic Law] § 1194 (3) (d) (3)" (id. at para 8). Judge Segal concludes her affidavit by stating that "[t]o my knowledge, no recording was made of the telephone conversation between" her and Radovich (id. at para 9) — adding that the blood seizure "application itself constitutes the stenographic or verbatim longhand notes of the conversation" (id.).

Defendant's gripe that the blood seizure application and order were not filed with the court is unavailing and unsupported by any record evidence. The People represent that Judge Segal followed proper protocols regarding the filing of the blood seizure order. Other than his conclusory assertion, defendant presents no concrete evidence to support the fact that the blood seizure order was not filed.

In any event, the People's failure to scrupulously comply with the provisions of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (3) as to the filing of the application as Judge Segal's verbatim longhand notes would not warrant suppression of defendant's blood test results. A similar issue arose in Whelan, where the Second Department rejected a similar argument concerning the filing of a stenographic transcript of a voice recording (see People v Whelan, 165 AD2d at 322-323). In holding that suppression of the blood test results was not warranted, the appellate court reasoned that "substantial rather than literal compliance with the statutory standards herein is sufficient" (People v Whelan, 165 AD2d at 323). The Second Department rationed that "[i]t is obvious that [*11]the legislative intent . . . is twofold: (1) to ensure that the sworn testimony of the applicant and any supporting witnesses is recorded, thereby assuring the regularity of the application process, and (2) to preserve the application for appellate review" (id.). Because the application at issue here constitutes the verbatim longhand notes according to Judge Segal, there was no other recording for Judge Segal to file since the telephonic call was not recorded (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [3] [d] [3]).

Defendant's argument relative to the purported non-filing of the blood seizure order is misguided. Judge Segal stated in her affidavit that she filed the subscribed written application, which constituted her verbatim longhand notes of the telephone conversation between she and Radovich (see id.). Defendant does not squarely argue that any potential delay in Judge Segal filing the application and order prejudiced his defense (cf. People v Lisi, 59 AD3d 851, 852-853 [3d Dept 2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 836 [2009]).

The Court cites People v Sierra for the proposition that where the blood seizure application at issue is "written rather than oral" (People v Sierra, 85 AD3d at 1661), such constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (3) (d) (3) for purposes of filing. As found in Whelan, "the facts of the present case demonstrate overwhelmingly that the legislative goals of the recordation requirement have been met" (People v Whelan, 165 AD2d at 323). It is obvious that defense counsel had obtained a copy of the written blood seizure application well prior to July 31, 2025 (the date he filed his omnibus motion), since defendant raised various claims and issues about the propriety of Judge Segal's blood seizure order in his omnibus motion (see People v Martinez, 87 Misc 3d 1231[A], *15-17). Akin to the Whelan case, "[t]he defendant [here] was able to raise all of the issues relative to the application for the court order in a timely manner and suffered no prejudice or inconvenience by the failure to comply literally with the provisions of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (3) (d) (3)" (People v Whelan, 165 AD2d at 323).

Despite his claim to the contrary, defendant falls far short of making a substantial preliminary showing that Radovich's application in support of the blood seizure order contains "false statements made knowingly or intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth" (People v Tordella, 37 AD3d 500, 500 [2d Dept 2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 991 [2007]; see Franks v Delaware, 438 US at 155-156; People v Alfinito, 16 NY2d at 186; People v Nunziata, 10 AD3d 695, 695 [2d Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 759 [2004]). A defendant may fulfill this burden by submitting "a written sworn statement alleging falsehoods in the search warrant affidavit sufficient to raise any doubt as to the probable cause supporting the issuance of the warrant" (People v Woolnough, 180 AD2d 837, 839 [2d Dept 1992], lv denied 79 NY2d 1056 [1992]). A defendant must show that the affiant knew or should have known of the falsity (see id.).

The record reflects that Radovich, Iarussi, and Landow were all present at the scene of the fatal crash on the night in question and had different roles in responding to the scene of the accident, their joint investigation, and the process of placing defendant under arrest. Reviewing the blood seizure application at issue, the Court finds it hard pressed to conclude that Radovich deliberately made a false statement knowingly or intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, to Judge Segal that an alcoholic odor was emanating from his breath at the scene of the [*12]crash, especially given the various other statements defendant made to police that are being challenged and are the subject of the Huntley hearing. Again tellingly, defendant himself does not even dispute this fact or proffer any evidence which can negate or disprove it. Said simply, defendant does not even deny that an odor of alcohol was emanating from him on the night in question when he was questioned by police officers at the scene of the fatal accident.

The statements relayed by Radovich to Judge Segal in connection with the blood seizure application were made upon his own personal knowledge, and the statements that were made based upon hearsay were attributed to Deputy Landow (an officer at the scene of the fatal accident) — with the exception of the single statement regarding the odor of alcohol that was emanating from defendant's breath on the night in question which should have been attributed to Deputy Iarussi (who was also present and actively assisted and participated at the scene). Moreover, the only fact attributed to Iarussi in the blood seizure application pertains solely to the statement about the odor of alcohol emanating from defendant. Even if that statement was not accurately included in the application, the totality of the circumstances led to Judge Segal's decision to grant the blood seizure order at that critical time for the reasons explained above (see People v Elysee, 49 AD3d at 42; People v Whelan, 165 AD2d at 318). Ascribing that single statement to the wrong police officer or eliminating that specific statement entirely from the application should not result in blanketly invalidating the entire blood seizure order. In other words, this limited issue does not nullify the order in dispute.

Furthermore, defendant overlooks the fact that the accident resulted in the death of the driver of the other automobile and there were injuries sustained by the victim's son who was a passenger in the vehicle and had to be transported to a facility for urgent medical attention. There is no controversy that defendant was operating the motor vehicle on the night in question based on his "admission," which is summarily written on page four of the application. Indeed, pages four to five of the application reflect that Radovich stated to Judge Segal that the "driver of the other vehicle deceased in the vehicle" and the victim's "7[-]year[-]old [child] sustained [a] head injury and was flown to Westchester [M]edical [C]enter."

Because the application for the blood seizure order stated specific allegations of fact sufficient to demonstrate that, "based upon the totality of circumstances, there [was] reasonable cause to believe" that defendant was driving his automobile while impaired by alcohol (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [3] [d] [2]), the Court, again, denies so much of defendant's renewal motion to suppress his blood test results and his refusal (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [3] [c]; compare People v Isaac, 224 AD2d 993, 993 [4th Dept 1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 937 [1996]).

Based on the totality of circumstances that resulted in a fatal accident and injuries to the victim's son, it cannot be said that Radovich wholly failed to identify the sources of the hearsay statements, despite failing to mention the hearsay statement about the alcoholic order coming from defendant was relayed by Iarussi (not Landow). The Court concludes that such a failure should not render the entire blood seizure application defective (compare People v Isaac, 224 AD2d at 993-994; People v Whelan, 165 AD2d at 321-322; People v Walsh, 137 Misc 2d 1073, 1073-1075 [Co Ct, Monroe County, 1988]). All things considered, the application disclosed that it consisted of Radovich's direct/personal knowledge, coupled with hearsay, and stated the [*13]sources of the hearsay statements that came from Landow (with the exception of the hearsay statement from Iarussi about the alcoholic odor).

It seems that defendant is attempting to argue both sides of the coin as it concerns the blood seizure application and order. On one side, he maintains — strictly through counsel and without any sworn or affirmed statement(s) either in his initial omnibus motion or on this application to renew — that he did provide his consent to police. But because, as already concluded and held, that defendant did not unequivocally give his oral consent for his blood to be taken at the requested time(s), defendant then turns to assail the propriety of the blood seizure order. He does so by attacking the process of how Radovich made the application and obtained the blood seizure order via the written document and telephonic conversation between he and Judge Segal.

Defendant was given ample opportunity to have an Alfinito hearing, wherein he could have tested Radovich's veracity about the statement attributed to an odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from his breath. Importantly, however, defendant, as before, failed to submit a written sworn statement alleging specific falsehoods in Radovich's blood seizure application sufficient to cast doubt as to the probable cause supporting Judge Segal's issuance of the compel order. Radovich's incorrect statement about the alcoholic odor could have been a simple mistake or him misspeaking at that time — not, according to defendant, exaggerated as a "false statement[] made knowingly or intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth" (People v Tordella, 37 AD3d at 500).

Significantly, defendant — a retired police officer who may have knowledge about law enforcement protocols and procedures — failed to submit his own written sworn statement "contain[ing] sworn allegations of fact" that he unequivocally or expressly gave his oral/verbal consent to police to allow them to draw his blood (CPL 710.60 [1]; see id. [3] [b]). Other than repeatedly urging that he provided his claimed consent, defendant fails to provide the Court with any details amplifying such factual assertion in this respect. Consequently, the Court is not presented with a credibility issue sufficient to warrant a hearing.

The record and blood seizure application support the initial finding that police "reasonably believed that defendant was unwilling . . . to consent to . . . the . . . blood test" (People v Harris, 178 AD2d 919, 920 [4th Dept 1991], affd 81 NY2d 850 [1993]); and that he did not clearly and categorically provide his consent to submit to a blood test, despite being asked four different times every 15 minutes. Thus, based on the factual circumstances presented, the Court holds that Investigator Radovich "properly applied for a court-ordered blood test pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (3)" (id.).

To rehash, an application for a court-ordered blood test may contain hearsay and double hearsay statements that satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli test, and the application must disclose that it is supported by hearsay and identify the source or sources of the hearsay. Based on the record, the Court holds that the Aguilar-Spinelli requirements were satisfied here. Radovich's application in support of the blood seizure order reflected that it was based on his direct and personal knowledge and that some of its information was based upon statements conveyed to [*14]him by Landow. The application evinces that Radovich had reasonable cause to believe that the accident occurred while defendant was operating his vehicle based on his unrefuted admission. Hence, there is no merit to defendant's contention that his blood test results should be suppressed because Radovich initially misrepresented the statement about which police officer smelled the alcoholic odor emanating from defendant's person and then subsequently relayed such information to him as part of the underlying application. The record demonstrates that when the People later learned that such statement was relayed to Radovich by Iarussi and not Landow, the People immediately informed defense counsel of same as part of their discovery obligations to correct the record (cf. People v Harris, 178 AD2d at 920).

Even assuming, arguendo, that Judge Segal and Radovich failed to comply with the requirements of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (3) (d) (2) and (3), the Court concludes that any noncompliance is "of no moment because there was the requisite substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute" (People v Sierra, 85 AD3d at 1660; accord People v Dombrowski-Bove, 300 AD2d at 1123; see People v Rollins, 118 AD2d 949 at 950). Given the totality of the circumstances surrounding the need for a blood seizure order at that relevant time, the Court holds that the correct result is that defendant's request for a Franks/Alfinito hearing be denied since there are no genuine issues of material fact placed before the Court to warrant such an exploration (see People v Woolnough, 180 AD2d 837, 839 [2d Dept 1992], lv denied 79 NY2d 1056 [1992]).

Defendant fails to realize and accept that any minor irregularities and inaccuracies in the blood seizure application do not spell its doom by suppressing his blood test results and his claimed refusal. Substantial, not literal, compliance with the statute is the legal requirement. That dictate is settled law and remains unchanged given the abundant existing precedent that has been reaffirmed (see People v Licausi, 122 AD3d at 772; People v Sierra, 85 AD3d at 1660; People v Dombrowski-Bove, 300 AD2d at 1122; People v Whelan, 165 AD2d at 322-323; People v Rollins, 118 AD2d 949 at 950; see generally People v Crandall, 108 AD2d at 417-418).

The Court, therefore, rejects defendant's claim that the subject order permitting the chemical test of his blood was obtained in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (3). Again, there was reasonable cause to believe that defendant drove while intoxicated, thus justifying a chemical test of his blood pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (3) (d) (2) or (3) (see People v Dombrowski-Bove, 300 AD2d at 1123; People v Rollins, 118 AD2d 949 at 950).

Examining the scenario presented here, although the police may not have strictly complied with the procedures for obtaining a court order to compel the defendant to submit to a chemical blood test, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the governing statute (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [3]; People v Licausi, 122 AD3d at 771-772). The Court thus denies those branches of his renewal motion to suppress the results of his blood test, his claimed refusal, and for a Franks/Alfinito hearing in that regard (see id.).

V. Defendant's Improper Discovery Application

Lastly, that branch of defendant's motion to compel certain discovery from the People — namely, the drafts of the affidavits of Investigator Radovich and Judge Segal that the People submitted in their responsive papers to the omnibus motion and their phone records in connection with the blood seizure application conducted telephonically — is denied. Defendant's discovery motion is not properly before the Court since he did not specifically move for this relief by way of filing a written motion at any stage of this case (see generally CPLR 2214; 2221 [d], [e]).

What's more, defendant's strategical choice to suddenly inject a discovery application in this combined motion to reargue and renew is wholly improper. Even if his discovery application was properly before the Court, defendant's claim that the draft affidavits of Judge Segal and Investigator Radovich and their telephone records constitute potential impeachment material that is critical to his ability to defend is equally without merit. Those documents are not personnel records under CPL 245.20 (1) (k) (iv) and are not relevantly material. The right to full discovery, although broad, is not unlimited and absolute (see generally People v Contompasis, 236 AD3d 138, 149 n 12 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 43 NY3d 1007 [2025]; People v Baez, 232 AD3d 1044, 1049-1050 [3d Dept 2024]). Accordingly, it is hereby:

Ordered that the combined "motion to reargue/renew" by defendant MARCOS A. MARTINEZ, made pursuant to CPLR 2221 (d) and (e), is decided as specifically determined herein; and it is further

Ordered that so much of defendant's motion for leave to renew suppression of his blood test results, his claimed refusal, and to hold a Franks/Alfinito hearing is granted; and upon renewal, all such branches of his instant motion are denied; and it is further

Ordered that all other branches of defendant's combined "motion to reargue/renew" are denied in their entirety; and it is further

Ordered that this Court shall conduct consolidated pretrial hearings in this matter — specifically, a combined Mapp/Dunaway/Huntley hearing — prior to trial; and it is further

Ordered that the defendant and the attorneys are directed to personally appear on Wednesday, June 10, 2026, at 9:30 a.m., for commencement of the pretrial hearings that were originally ordered in the Omnibus Decision dated October 31, 2025.^FN5

The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of this Court.

Dated: May 15, 2026

Carmel, New York

E N T E R:

Hon. Anthony R. Molé

Judge of the County Court